The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection ...The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.展开更多
Fighting corruption has been a signature theme in the governance of China since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CCCPC)in 2012.Among the extensive attention ...Fighting corruption has been a signature theme in the governance of China since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CCCPC)in 2012.Among the extensive attention from academic and policy discourse to this unprecedented anti-corruption elfort in CPC's history,there are studies that take the one-sided view that the effort under way is not anti-corruption in its strict sense as it relies on the Party mechanism rather than the legal system,scripted,and calculated for the narrow self-interest of factional power enhancement.Reviewing contemporary fundamental anti-corruption discourses,anchored in critical discourse analysis,and assisted by 134 circulars of intra-Party disciplinary punishments of corrupt high-ranking officials(“tigers”,dalaohu),this interdisciplinary study reveals that,by contrast,China adopts an integrated approach to corruption,which incorporates republican and liberal-rationalist beliefs and values.Specifically,it is characterized by CCCPC as leadership,the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as political agency,both following a mentality of the rule of law,and by the coordination between intra-Party disciplinary rules and state laws.This approach is appropriate because it conceptualizes corruption by targeting the main feature of the corruption-related problem.This study contributes from a discoursal perspective to the understanding of China's anti-corruption in the Xi Jinping Era.展开更多
The article discusses the increasing levels of public sector corruption despite the NRM government’s pursuing of accountability reforms and anti-corruption policy strategies.It asserts that having an impressive legal...The article discusses the increasing levels of public sector corruption despite the NRM government’s pursuing of accountability reforms and anti-corruption policy strategies.It asserts that having an impressive legal and institutional framework in place to enhance accountability and control corrupt tendencies may not be enough if political factors are ignored.In the absence of exemplary political leadership and support to institutions that enforce compliance,fighting corruption will remain a far cry.The article further argues that in circumstances where the political terrain ascribes to patron-client and neo-patrimonial instruments to consolidate and retain power,curbing public sector corruption will be elusive.The article insists that fighting public sector corruption largely depends on political commitment and less on the semblance of laws,institutions and technocrats.展开更多
In 2001,Ethiopia established a centralised anti-corruption agency(ACA),the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission(FEACC),purportedly to be used for curbing the rampant corruption.By the government’s repeated a...In 2001,Ethiopia established a centralised anti-corruption agency(ACA),the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission(FEACC),purportedly to be used for curbing the rampant corruption.By the government’s repeated admissions,corruption continues to engulf the country,indicating the failure of the FEACC to curb corruption.Various researchers attribute the FEACC’s failures to curb corruption to a host of reasons.This article follows a different route to show why the FEACC was doomed to fail from the outset.We show that the war against corruption in Ethiopia collapsed mainly because of mischaracterisation of the nature of corruption in the country and how the FEACC was established–a conventional anti-corruption agency for a nonconventional problem of corruption.We deploy some testable hypotheses to explore the scenarios under which an anticorruption agency would be effective.Drawing from the corruption literature of post-communist countries,the article shows that corrupt Ethiopian practices can easily be subsumed under an extreme version of the highest form of corruption known as state capture.The article then moves onto unpacking the systemic and predatory nature of the Ethiopian corruption conundrum and how the FEACC approached in tackling it.Doing so allows us to illustrate the endogenous nature of the country’s corruption patterns and why a traditional ACA is incapable of tackling a state-driven patronage.It also lays out the flawed structures and practices of the FEACC showing why,under a state-crafted corruption conundrum,the FEACC was doomed to fail from the start.The article concludes by illustrating the detrimental effects of using the agency as a political weapon to neutralise the ruling party’s political opponents as well as the failure of the war against corruption.It calls for a different approach in combating the Ethiopian systemic corruption,a governance regime change being one of them.展开更多
A well-developed set of international anti-corruption tools now exists. These range from broad conventions to focused initiatives in specific policy areas. This article argues that international agreements work best w...A well-developed set of international anti-corruption tools now exists. These range from broad conventions to focused initiatives in specific policy areas. This article argues that international agreements work best when they are focused and they speak to the common interests of the parties involved. Solutions need to be creative, they need to bring in a broad coalition of stakeholders and they need to be focused on specific problems. International agreements need to help states with good quality institutions of governance focus on developing transparency initiatives, accountability drives and nuanced efforts to tackle particular national variants of "legal corruption." In countries with patchy institutions of governance the scope for international influence is broader, while in states with serious governance challenges the best international anti-corruption efforts will often have surprisingly little to do with corruption at all. In a state where the rule of law is patchy or non-existent then anti-corruption laws (or indeed laws more generally) mean very little. The challenge here is to improve the basic tools of governance in the knowledge that only then can the issue of corruption be brought on to the agenda.展开更多
The issue of corruption has attracted increasing attention in the study and practice of international investment law during recent years.After taking prudent consideration of the corruption defense invoked by the host...The issue of corruption has attracted increasing attention in the study and practice of international investment law during recent years.After taking prudent consideration of the corruption defense invoked by the host states in some international investment arbitration cases involved with corruption,International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID)tribunals accordingly determined the final awards.However,some parts of the arbitral jurisprudence aroused strong criticism,especially with regard to the ICSID tribunals’reasoning that arbitrators have no jurisdiction over corruption-tainted international investments.The ICSID tribunals are legitimately supposed to exercise their jurisdiction and are lawfully obliged to probe into the nature of corrupt activities.The tribunals are strongly expected to adopt a balanced approach in deciding the merits and fairly weighing the obligations,rights,and interests of both disputing parties.It is preferable to strengthen the collaborative interaction between ICSID proceedings and domestic anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms when it comes to combating corrupt international investment activities.Existing international treaties(or specific treaty provisions)on combating corruption in international business transactions and calling for international cooperation,alongside domestic anti-corruption enforcement legislation,have actually laid solid legal foundations for the establishment of such an anti-corruption coordinative mechanism between ICSID and domestic corruption regulatory authorities on the global level.展开更多
文摘The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.
文摘Fighting corruption has been a signature theme in the governance of China since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CCCPC)in 2012.Among the extensive attention from academic and policy discourse to this unprecedented anti-corruption elfort in CPC's history,there are studies that take the one-sided view that the effort under way is not anti-corruption in its strict sense as it relies on the Party mechanism rather than the legal system,scripted,and calculated for the narrow self-interest of factional power enhancement.Reviewing contemporary fundamental anti-corruption discourses,anchored in critical discourse analysis,and assisted by 134 circulars of intra-Party disciplinary punishments of corrupt high-ranking officials(“tigers”,dalaohu),this interdisciplinary study reveals that,by contrast,China adopts an integrated approach to corruption,which incorporates republican and liberal-rationalist beliefs and values.Specifically,it is characterized by CCCPC as leadership,the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as political agency,both following a mentality of the rule of law,and by the coordination between intra-Party disciplinary rules and state laws.This approach is appropriate because it conceptualizes corruption by targeting the main feature of the corruption-related problem.This study contributes from a discoursal perspective to the understanding of China's anti-corruption in the Xi Jinping Era.
基金The author acknowledges with gratitude the supportive role played by Saulo Nsubuga Zirimenya in the collection of the first set of data and appreciates the funding for the said exercise in 2009 by NORAD and Makerere University。
文摘The article discusses the increasing levels of public sector corruption despite the NRM government’s pursuing of accountability reforms and anti-corruption policy strategies.It asserts that having an impressive legal and institutional framework in place to enhance accountability and control corrupt tendencies may not be enough if political factors are ignored.In the absence of exemplary political leadership and support to institutions that enforce compliance,fighting corruption will remain a far cry.The article further argues that in circumstances where the political terrain ascribes to patron-client and neo-patrimonial instruments to consolidate and retain power,curbing public sector corruption will be elusive.The article insists that fighting public sector corruption largely depends on political commitment and less on the semblance of laws,institutions and technocrats.
文摘In 2001,Ethiopia established a centralised anti-corruption agency(ACA),the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission(FEACC),purportedly to be used for curbing the rampant corruption.By the government’s repeated admissions,corruption continues to engulf the country,indicating the failure of the FEACC to curb corruption.Various researchers attribute the FEACC’s failures to curb corruption to a host of reasons.This article follows a different route to show why the FEACC was doomed to fail from the outset.We show that the war against corruption in Ethiopia collapsed mainly because of mischaracterisation of the nature of corruption in the country and how the FEACC was established–a conventional anti-corruption agency for a nonconventional problem of corruption.We deploy some testable hypotheses to explore the scenarios under which an anticorruption agency would be effective.Drawing from the corruption literature of post-communist countries,the article shows that corrupt Ethiopian practices can easily be subsumed under an extreme version of the highest form of corruption known as state capture.The article then moves onto unpacking the systemic and predatory nature of the Ethiopian corruption conundrum and how the FEACC approached in tackling it.Doing so allows us to illustrate the endogenous nature of the country’s corruption patterns and why a traditional ACA is incapable of tackling a state-driven patronage.It also lays out the flawed structures and practices of the FEACC showing why,under a state-crafted corruption conundrum,the FEACC was doomed to fail from the start.The article concludes by illustrating the detrimental effects of using the agency as a political weapon to neutralise the ruling party’s political opponents as well as the failure of the war against corruption.It calls for a different approach in combating the Ethiopian systemic corruption,a governance regime change being one of them.
文摘A well-developed set of international anti-corruption tools now exists. These range from broad conventions to focused initiatives in specific policy areas. This article argues that international agreements work best when they are focused and they speak to the common interests of the parties involved. Solutions need to be creative, they need to bring in a broad coalition of stakeholders and they need to be focused on specific problems. International agreements need to help states with good quality institutions of governance focus on developing transparency initiatives, accountability drives and nuanced efforts to tackle particular national variants of "legal corruption." In countries with patchy institutions of governance the scope for international influence is broader, while in states with serious governance challenges the best international anti-corruption efforts will often have surprisingly little to do with corruption at all. In a state where the rule of law is patchy or non-existent then anti-corruption laws (or indeed laws more generally) mean very little. The challenge here is to improve the basic tools of governance in the knowledge that only then can the issue of corruption be brought on to the agenda.
基金funded by the 2018 Hunan Provincial Innovative and Open Project“‘Abuse of Process'in International Investment Arbitration and Regulation”(18K022)2019 Hunan Provincial Social Science Union Project“Innovation of the BITs between China and African Countries under the BRJ”(XSP19YBZ178).
文摘The issue of corruption has attracted increasing attention in the study and practice of international investment law during recent years.After taking prudent consideration of the corruption defense invoked by the host states in some international investment arbitration cases involved with corruption,International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID)tribunals accordingly determined the final awards.However,some parts of the arbitral jurisprudence aroused strong criticism,especially with regard to the ICSID tribunals’reasoning that arbitrators have no jurisdiction over corruption-tainted international investments.The ICSID tribunals are legitimately supposed to exercise their jurisdiction and are lawfully obliged to probe into the nature of corrupt activities.The tribunals are strongly expected to adopt a balanced approach in deciding the merits and fairly weighing the obligations,rights,and interests of both disputing parties.It is preferable to strengthen the collaborative interaction between ICSID proceedings and domestic anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms when it comes to combating corrupt international investment activities.Existing international treaties(or specific treaty provisions)on combating corruption in international business transactions and calling for international cooperation,alongside domestic anti-corruption enforcement legislation,have actually laid solid legal foundations for the establishment of such an anti-corruption coordinative mechanism between ICSID and domestic corruption regulatory authorities on the global level.