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Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution
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作者 Yang Zhang 《Chinese Business Review》 2006年第4期20-25,共6页
This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization,... This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs. 展开更多
关键词 principal and agent disclosure of information game strategy auditing institution
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