The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tenderi...The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tendering, and the functions of the estimate of reasonable low price in the bidding were revealed. On this basis, a new bidding mode of the project with bill of quantities was pro- posed. The application of the new mode will be advantageous to the promotion of the bill of quantities in China.展开更多
Bargaining between the host country and oil companies is very common to international oil and gas development projects.The existence of information asymmetry gives the host country an endogenous bargaining advantage.F...Bargaining between the host country and oil companies is very common to international oil and gas development projects.The existence of information asymmetry gives the host country an endogenous bargaining advantage.Foreign oil companies might change their unfavorable negotiating position by changing the order of bidding and adjusting bidding strategies.This paper introduces both factors into a bilateral bargaining model to study the impact of information asymmetry and bidding order on the strategy and equilibrium returns of oil companies.According to the ownership of the right to bid first,two scenarios are designed for the model to compare the equilibrium returns of the host country and oil companies.The results show that:1)There is a first-mover advantage in the process of bilateral bidding,so oil companies better bid first;2)The information asymmetry will lead to a higher nominal income ratio of oil companies and a lower nominal income ratio of the host country,but it doesn’t affect the total income ratio at all.展开更多
文摘The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tendering, and the functions of the estimate of reasonable low price in the bidding were revealed. On this basis, a new bidding mode of the project with bill of quantities was pro- posed. The application of the new mode will be advantageous to the promotion of the bill of quantities in China.
基金the financial support provided by the Humanities and Social Sciences Program of Chinese Ministry of Education(Grant Nos.19YJCZH106 and 20YJCZH201)National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71904111 and 71774105)Program for the Philosophy and Social Sciences Research of Higher Learning Institutions of Shanxi(Grant No.201803079,2nd[2018]of Jin Education)。
文摘Bargaining between the host country and oil companies is very common to international oil and gas development projects.The existence of information asymmetry gives the host country an endogenous bargaining advantage.Foreign oil companies might change their unfavorable negotiating position by changing the order of bidding and adjusting bidding strategies.This paper introduces both factors into a bilateral bargaining model to study the impact of information asymmetry and bidding order on the strategy and equilibrium returns of oil companies.According to the ownership of the right to bid first,two scenarios are designed for the model to compare the equilibrium returns of the host country and oil companies.The results show that:1)There is a first-mover advantage in the process of bilateral bidding,so oil companies better bid first;2)The information asymmetry will lead to a higher nominal income ratio of oil companies and a lower nominal income ratio of the host country,but it doesn’t affect the total income ratio at all.
