The effect of specific human capital on governance was analyzed,and a governance frame was proposed based on specific human capital for high-tech enterprises.The frame takes residual rights of claimant and residual ri...The effect of specific human capital on governance was analyzed,and a governance frame was proposed based on specific human capital for high-tech enterprises.The frame takes residual rights of claimant and residual rights of control as core,including the factors of institutional environment and bargaining power.One of the important contexts of Chinese enterprises governance is ownership structure,which means that local government plays an important role in the governance.Meanwhile,the level of market development in China is low,which has an effect on corporate governance.The model of capital gains and status of human capital is explored,and it shows that all of the residual claims belonging to shareholder is only an exceptional case,and the internal factors influencing the residual claim allocation proportion of stakeholders are the scarcity in the capital market and risks born by them.Furthermore,two cases are discussed in detail to study the governance in Chinese high-tech enterprises.展开更多
This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini （2005）-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilib- rium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition ho...This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini （2005）-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilib- rium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition holds no matter whether learning is about finn-specific human capital or about general human capital. However, the stationary equilibrium can never be efficient if externalities exist from unemployment. In contrast, even with externalities, the stationary equilibrium can be efficient under some modified Hosios condition if there is no uncertainty （standard Mortensen and Pissarides （1994）-type equilibrium search environment）. The key intuition is that the equilibrium can only be efficient if firm-worker matching is formed and terminated efficiently.展开更多
基金Project of Humanities and Social Sciences Study of Ministry of Education of China(No.11YJC630222)Promotive Research Fund for Young and Middle-Aged Scientists of Shandong Province,China(No.BS2010SF007)Foundation of Ludong University,China(No.LY20085902)
文摘The effect of specific human capital on governance was analyzed,and a governance frame was proposed based on specific human capital for high-tech enterprises.The frame takes residual rights of claimant and residual rights of control as core,including the factors of institutional environment and bargaining power.One of the important contexts of Chinese enterprises governance is ownership structure,which means that local government plays an important role in the governance.Meanwhile,the level of market development in China is low,which has an effect on corporate governance.The model of capital gains and status of human capital is explored,and it shows that all of the residual claims belonging to shareholder is only an exceptional case,and the internal factors influencing the residual claim allocation proportion of stakeholders are the scarcity in the capital market and risks born by them.Furthermore,two cases are discussed in detail to study the governance in Chinese high-tech enterprises.
文摘This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini （2005）-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilib- rium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition holds no matter whether learning is about finn-specific human capital or about general human capital. However, the stationary equilibrium can never be efficient if externalities exist from unemployment. In contrast, even with externalities, the stationary equilibrium can be efficient under some modified Hosios condition if there is no uncertainty （standard Mortensen and Pissarides （1994）-type equilibrium search environment）. The key intuition is that the equilibrium can only be efficient if firm-worker matching is formed and terminated efficiently.
