According to the consensus view, central banks reached a high level of independence by the end of last century. This paper argues that as a result short-term political considerations applied during the appointment pro...According to the consensus view, central banks reached a high level of independence by the end of last century. This paper argues that as a result short-term political considerations applied during the appointment process of central bank decision-makers, their actual independence was at a lower level already that time. The global f＇mancial crisis created new tasks for central banks and forced a review of the meaning of independence. The paper argues that central banks should be responsible for safeguarding fmancial stability and their macro-prudential activity can only be executed in cooperation with governments. However, interest rate policy decisions must remain free of political influence. The novelty of this paper lies in showing the conflictual relationship of the various roles of central banks. The paper concludes that the duality of independence and cooperation represents a major uncertainty in the operation of central banks. As a result of the greater degree of politicisation of the activities of central banks, their de facto independence in interest rate policy making may further shrink in the future. The paper also shows that India represents a unique case of central bank independence. In most countries, de jure independence is higher than de facto. India is one of the very rare countries where the reverse is the case.展开更多
The disparity in credit access between large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises contributes to the prevalence of shadow banking activities,where large,nonfinancial firms with high credit ratings have become ...The disparity in credit access between large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises contributes to the prevalence of shadow banking activities,where large,nonfinancial firms with high credit ratings have become new financial intermediaries.These activities vary geographically and are afected significantly by collateral monetary policy.This paper examines the effect of collateral monetary policy,its reform,and regional financial development characteristics on large firms'shadow banking activities,with a focus on the medium-term lending facility(MLF),the primary collateral monetary policy instrument in China.The results indicate that the MLF encouraged large firms'shadow banking activity.However,the MLF reform in 2018 mitigated this effect by broadening the range of acceptable collateral.Regional financial development,such as a higher number of bank branches around firms,facilitated large firms'shadow banking activities and amplified the MLF's stimulating effect.In contrast,regional advancements in digital finance and market development limited both shadow banking activities and MLF's impact.展开更多
The enduring impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the financial sector is undeniable,persisting far beyond the eventual waning of the pandemic.This research examines central bank interventions during the pandemic,using a ...The enduring impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the financial sector is undeniable,persisting far beyond the eventual waning of the pandemic.This research examines central bank interventions during the pandemic,using a quantitative event study approach over a five-day window to analyse the impact of 188 monetary policy announcements on banking stocks in China,the U.S.,and Europe.Our results demonstrate how monetary policy announcements targeting different economic mechanisms have produced a diverse market reaction throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.Namely,cuts in interest rates and the maintenance of a low interest rate environment by the Federal Reserve resulted in negative abnormal returns in the U.S.A.,while short-term announcements surrounding intra-day credit and liquidity provisions boosted banking sector stock prices.In Europe,a muted reaction by the banking sector was observed,with negative abnormal returns observed in response to the ECB’s 2% inflation objectives.Finally,banking stocks in China responded strongly and positively to foreign currency and exchange-related announcements by the People’s Bank of China.The results and insights from this analysis can thus inform preparations made by policymakers,governments,and financial market stakeholders in the event of future waves of COVID-19,or further extreme societal disruptions.展开更多
In present days,our instable financial markets,characterized by heavier growing monetary responsibilities,are delivering and enlarging ever growing central banks’functions.The financial stability applied standards ha...In present days,our instable financial markets,characterized by heavier growing monetary responsibilities,are delivering and enlarging ever growing central banks’functions.The financial stability applied standards have been creating contradictory results in the recent Great Recessions since the year 1987 up to the central banks model,after the 2008 last financial crisis,with major central banks as the FED and the CEB(Diamond,2007,pp.189-200)conflicting main operative areas,monetary and financial goals with unexpected results.We have been living a very difficult and dramatic period,which suggests a lot of reconsiderations about what the monetary policy means and may pursue and in which area,with respect to the financial system restrictions,in particular,during the post-second World War,based initially on the pseudo gold dollar parity,things were relatively stable and major financial crises were happening in emerging peripheral markets only.Financial stability was ever relevant,but it was not something to which governments devoted institutional attention.Based on what happened during the recent crisis,it is now of capital responsibility connecting monetary and economic financial stability jointly.Central banks,on the contrary,seem not able to pursue both functions relying on classical market tools.Up to now,the only obligation,imposed to a central bank as a private agent,has been taking care of monetary stability,to contain inflation rates over upper limits,assumed in entering definitely in the legal tender monetary,regime almost everywhere over the planet.Originally,for specific monetary policy purposes alone,between central banks and possible financial entities,there were no guidelines or structural determined controls,only institutional and statutory single bank’s operational clauses.There were no legal constraints such as formal loan to-value,or loan to cash-flows,or formal capital level limits,based on actual constraints.Free repurchase agreements and sales or purchases of securities(the most relevant tools of monetary policy guidelines),generally based on private financial covenants,were the sole most recurrent tactical interferences in adjusting the economic free activity.The assuming statutory thresholds were casual in the incorporating state,central banks used to monitor the activities of agents through economic incentives,rather than mandating and monitoring specific legal prescriptions.The evolving inconsistency of both activities has become even more manifest;two conditions should be fulfilled simultaneously:To avoid dilemmas in which a central bank might be called to make the autonomous independent management choice between monetary price stability,pursuing at same time,generally incompatible,financial stability,two different policies should be rarely jointly assigned to same bodies,especially central banks.As regards the first issue,the IMF nevertheless,with Brunnermeier and Sannikov(Brunnermeier&Sannikov,2012),has argued that price stability and financial stability are interlinked Short-term debt financing played an important role in the run-up to the financial crisis,as increases in leverage helped boost growth but also made the economy more susceptible to a downturn.Since the recession,private agents have reduced their debt level while many governments have increased borrowing.This deleveraging process appears to be holding back the recovery,and the Japanese experience suggests that such deleveraging can continue over an extended period”,unless in the long run we are all broken at state level,as history seems now to prove.It is true indeed,as reminded by Lamfalussy(Lamfalussy et al.,2010,pp.7-9),and now widely proved by facts,that prices and the growth-employment objectives,run into each other because it is seldom the case that the pursuit of one is consistent with the pursuit of the second in global economies.展开更多
The main aim of this paper is to compare the stability, in terms of systemic risk, of conventional and Islamic banking systems. To this aim, we propose correlation network models for stock market returns based on grap...The main aim of this paper is to compare the stability, in terms of systemic risk, of conventional and Islamic banking systems. To this aim, we propose correlation network models for stock market returns based on graphical Gaussian distributions, which allows us to capture the contagion effects that move along countries. We also consider Bayesian graphical models, to account for model uncertainty in the measurement of financial systems interconnectedness. Our proposed model is applied to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region banking sector, characterized by the presence of both conventional and Islamic banks, for the period from 2007 to the beginning of 2014. Our empirical findings show that there are differences in the systemic risk and stability of the two banking systems during crisis times. In addition, the differences are subject to country specific effects that are amplified during crisis period.展开更多
法定数字货币(Central Bank Digital Currency,CBDC)是既有数量又有方向区分的智能“异质矢量”货币,有助于实现货币政策的定向精准调控。基于CBDC的流向主体条件触发机制,构建了货币效用生产(Money in Utility&Production,MIUP)模...法定数字货币(Central Bank Digital Currency,CBDC)是既有数量又有方向区分的智能“异质矢量”货币,有助于实现货币政策的定向精准调控。基于CBDC的流向主体条件触发机制,构建了货币效用生产(Money in Utility&Production,MIUP)模型,并分别模拟了面向家庭或厂商的定向数量型货币政策调控效果。研究发现:传统数量型货币政策,同时影响经济总需求和总供给,但以需求侧效应为主;针对家庭的定向数量型货币政策,仅影响经济总需求,可兼顾“稳增长”与“稳通缩”,能有效缓解需求侧冲击;针对厂商的定向数量型货币政策,仅影响经济总供给,能同时“稳增长”与“稳通胀”,可有效缓解供给侧冲击。在CBDC时代,货币政策具有“定量+定向”双重属性,将促进货币政策从“大水漫灌”模式进入“精准滴灌”模式。因此,在CBDC功能创新方面,应同时关注交易支付功能和政策实施功能,做到多能并举和智能集成;货币政策创新要为宏观调控立良策谋善治,既要跟上货币形态和功能的演进,又要适应数字经济的发展要求。展开更多
文摘According to the consensus view, central banks reached a high level of independence by the end of last century. This paper argues that as a result short-term political considerations applied during the appointment process of central bank decision-makers, their actual independence was at a lower level already that time. The global f＇mancial crisis created new tasks for central banks and forced a review of the meaning of independence. The paper argues that central banks should be responsible for safeguarding fmancial stability and their macro-prudential activity can only be executed in cooperation with governments. However, interest rate policy decisions must remain free of political influence. The novelty of this paper lies in showing the conflictual relationship of the various roles of central banks. The paper concludes that the duality of independence and cooperation represents a major uncertainty in the operation of central banks. As a result of the greater degree of politicisation of the activities of central banks, their de facto independence in interest rate policy making may further shrink in the future. The paper also shows that India represents a unique case of central bank independence. In most countries, de jure independence is higher than de facto. India is one of the very rare countries where the reverse is the case.
基金support from the National Social Science Fund of China(No.23AZD024)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71973053).
文摘The disparity in credit access between large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises contributes to the prevalence of shadow banking activities,where large,nonfinancial firms with high credit ratings have become new financial intermediaries.These activities vary geographically and are afected significantly by collateral monetary policy.This paper examines the effect of collateral monetary policy,its reform,and regional financial development characteristics on large firms'shadow banking activities,with a focus on the medium-term lending facility(MLF),the primary collateral monetary policy instrument in China.The results indicate that the MLF encouraged large firms'shadow banking activity.However,the MLF reform in 2018 mitigated this effect by broadening the range of acceptable collateral.Regional financial development,such as a higher number of bank branches around firms,facilitated large firms'shadow banking activities and amplified the MLF's stimulating effect.In contrast,regional advancements in digital finance and market development limited both shadow banking activities and MLF's impact.
文摘The enduring impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the financial sector is undeniable,persisting far beyond the eventual waning of the pandemic.This research examines central bank interventions during the pandemic,using a quantitative event study approach over a five-day window to analyse the impact of 188 monetary policy announcements on banking stocks in China,the U.S.,and Europe.Our results demonstrate how monetary policy announcements targeting different economic mechanisms have produced a diverse market reaction throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.Namely,cuts in interest rates and the maintenance of a low interest rate environment by the Federal Reserve resulted in negative abnormal returns in the U.S.A.,while short-term announcements surrounding intra-day credit and liquidity provisions boosted banking sector stock prices.In Europe,a muted reaction by the banking sector was observed,with negative abnormal returns observed in response to the ECB’s 2% inflation objectives.Finally,banking stocks in China responded strongly and positively to foreign currency and exchange-related announcements by the People’s Bank of China.The results and insights from this analysis can thus inform preparations made by policymakers,governments,and financial market stakeholders in the event of future waves of COVID-19,or further extreme societal disruptions.
文摘In present days,our instable financial markets,characterized by heavier growing monetary responsibilities,are delivering and enlarging ever growing central banks’functions.The financial stability applied standards have been creating contradictory results in the recent Great Recessions since the year 1987 up to the central banks model,after the 2008 last financial crisis,with major central banks as the FED and the CEB(Diamond,2007,pp.189-200)conflicting main operative areas,monetary and financial goals with unexpected results.We have been living a very difficult and dramatic period,which suggests a lot of reconsiderations about what the monetary policy means and may pursue and in which area,with respect to the financial system restrictions,in particular,during the post-second World War,based initially on the pseudo gold dollar parity,things were relatively stable and major financial crises were happening in emerging peripheral markets only.Financial stability was ever relevant,but it was not something to which governments devoted institutional attention.Based on what happened during the recent crisis,it is now of capital responsibility connecting monetary and economic financial stability jointly.Central banks,on the contrary,seem not able to pursue both functions relying on classical market tools.Up to now,the only obligation,imposed to a central bank as a private agent,has been taking care of monetary stability,to contain inflation rates over upper limits,assumed in entering definitely in the legal tender monetary,regime almost everywhere over the planet.Originally,for specific monetary policy purposes alone,between central banks and possible financial entities,there were no guidelines or structural determined controls,only institutional and statutory single bank’s operational clauses.There were no legal constraints such as formal loan to-value,or loan to cash-flows,or formal capital level limits,based on actual constraints.Free repurchase agreements and sales or purchases of securities(the most relevant tools of monetary policy guidelines),generally based on private financial covenants,were the sole most recurrent tactical interferences in adjusting the economic free activity.The assuming statutory thresholds were casual in the incorporating state,central banks used to monitor the activities of agents through economic incentives,rather than mandating and monitoring specific legal prescriptions.The evolving inconsistency of both activities has become even more manifest;two conditions should be fulfilled simultaneously:To avoid dilemmas in which a central bank might be called to make the autonomous independent management choice between monetary price stability,pursuing at same time,generally incompatible,financial stability,two different policies should be rarely jointly assigned to same bodies,especially central banks.As regards the first issue,the IMF nevertheless,with Brunnermeier and Sannikov(Brunnermeier&Sannikov,2012),has argued that price stability and financial stability are interlinked Short-term debt financing played an important role in the run-up to the financial crisis,as increases in leverage helped boost growth but also made the economy more susceptible to a downturn.Since the recession,private agents have reduced their debt level while many governments have increased borrowing.This deleveraging process appears to be holding back the recovery,and the Japanese experience suggests that such deleveraging can continue over an extended period”,unless in the long run we are all broken at state level,as history seems now to prove.It is true indeed,as reminded by Lamfalussy(Lamfalussy et al.,2010,pp.7-9),and now widely proved by facts,that prices and the growth-employment objectives,run into each other because it is seldom the case that the pursuit of one is consistent with the pursuit of the second in global economies.
文摘The main aim of this paper is to compare the stability, in terms of systemic risk, of conventional and Islamic banking systems. To this aim, we propose correlation network models for stock market returns based on graphical Gaussian distributions, which allows us to capture the contagion effects that move along countries. We also consider Bayesian graphical models, to account for model uncertainty in the measurement of financial systems interconnectedness. Our proposed model is applied to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region banking sector, characterized by the presence of both conventional and Islamic banks, for the period from 2007 to the beginning of 2014. Our empirical findings show that there are differences in the systemic risk and stability of the two banking systems during crisis times. In addition, the differences are subject to country specific effects that are amplified during crisis period.
文摘法定数字货币(Central Bank Digital Currency,CBDC)是既有数量又有方向区分的智能“异质矢量”货币,有助于实现货币政策的定向精准调控。基于CBDC的流向主体条件触发机制,构建了货币效用生产(Money in Utility&Production,MIUP)模型,并分别模拟了面向家庭或厂商的定向数量型货币政策调控效果。研究发现:传统数量型货币政策,同时影响经济总需求和总供给,但以需求侧效应为主;针对家庭的定向数量型货币政策,仅影响经济总需求,可兼顾“稳增长”与“稳通缩”,能有效缓解需求侧冲击;针对厂商的定向数量型货币政策,仅影响经济总供给,能同时“稳增长”与“稳通胀”,可有效缓解供给侧冲击。在CBDC时代,货币政策具有“定量+定向”双重属性,将促进货币政策从“大水漫灌”模式进入“精准滴灌”模式。因此,在CBDC功能创新方面,应同时关注交易支付功能和政策实施功能,做到多能并举和智能集成;货币政策创新要为宏观调控立良策谋善治,既要跟上货币形态和功能的演进,又要适应数字经济的发展要求。
