The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explai...The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explain how the Qing Court decentralized or centralized its power.These approaches fail to consider how local officials in fact reacted to central command.This research is an attempt to apply the social science method to a classical historical study.I firstly examine the various political decisions of governors when they were faced with a series of big events during the Boxer Uprising(1900–1901).After arranging them using strict criteria,I will conduct spatial and structural analysis on their diversity,and furthermore explore the internal and external influencing factors.Statistics indicate that governors of coastal provinces and of the provinces along the Yangtze River were more likely to express their opinions to the Qing court,while the North and Northeastern provinces tended to obey the central orders.Regional differences mainly have a positive correlation with provincial structural factors,such as revenue and relations with foreign powers.The correlations are also determined by personal political experience and resources of governors.展开更多
China's achievement of miraculous economic growth is a theoretical proposition that calls for an explanation.The key to understanding the logic of China’s economic reform is a rational explanation of the logical ...China's achievement of miraculous economic growth is a theoretical proposition that calls for an explanation.The key to understanding the logic of China’s economic reform is a rational explanation of the logical paradox between irregular local finance and the incentive compatibility of central and local governments.Based on the fact that autonomous local financial resources have long been dependent on irregular fiscal revenue,this paper constructs an inclusive public financial system analysis framework from the dual perspectives of the central and local government.This analytical framework offers an explanation of the long-standing implicit fiscal decentralization contract in which irregular fiscal revenue is the carrier in the reform process,together with a description of the central-local interaction process and institutional space underlying the behavioral motivations of central finance tolerance and local financial autonomy.It demonstrates the logical consistency of irregular fiscal revenue,central and local incentive compatibility,economic growth and market-oriented reform.The inclusive public finance system,which takes into account both local dynamism and central control,provides the important institutional logic that has enabled China to reach the dual goals of economic growth and market-oriented reform.展开更多
基金support of the China Scholarship Council and advises and helps from Professor James Tong in University of California,Los Angeles(Grant no.201406010081).
文摘The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explain how the Qing Court decentralized or centralized its power.These approaches fail to consider how local officials in fact reacted to central command.This research is an attempt to apply the social science method to a classical historical study.I firstly examine the various political decisions of governors when they were faced with a series of big events during the Boxer Uprising(1900–1901).After arranging them using strict criteria,I will conduct spatial and structural analysis on their diversity,and furthermore explore the internal and external influencing factors.Statistics indicate that governors of coastal provinces and of the provinces along the Yangtze River were more likely to express their opinions to the Qing court,while the North and Northeastern provinces tended to obey the central orders.Regional differences mainly have a positive correlation with provincial structural factors,such as revenue and relations with foreign powers.The correlations are also determined by personal political experience and resources of governors.
基金the key project of the National Natural Science Fund of China"Research on the Fiscal System of Supply of Public Services from the Perspective of National Governance"(71833002)“Regional Intergenerational Mobility Preferences in Migration Decisions:Empirical Measurement,Micro-Evidence and Impact Mechanisms”(71973020).
文摘China's achievement of miraculous economic growth is a theoretical proposition that calls for an explanation.The key to understanding the logic of China’s economic reform is a rational explanation of the logical paradox between irregular local finance and the incentive compatibility of central and local governments.Based on the fact that autonomous local financial resources have long been dependent on irregular fiscal revenue,this paper constructs an inclusive public financial system analysis framework from the dual perspectives of the central and local government.This analytical framework offers an explanation of the long-standing implicit fiscal decentralization contract in which irregular fiscal revenue is the carrier in the reform process,together with a description of the central-local interaction process and institutional space underlying the behavioral motivations of central finance tolerance and local financial autonomy.It demonstrates the logical consistency of irregular fiscal revenue,central and local incentive compatibility,economic growth and market-oriented reform.The inclusive public finance system,which takes into account both local dynamism and central control,provides the important institutional logic that has enabled China to reach the dual goals of economic growth and market-oriented reform.
