A Pair of 3D Homochiral Coordination Polymers with Open Channels Constructed by Lactic Acid Derivative Ligands and In-situ Formed Anions

With the help of in-situ formed CH_3COO- anion, a pair of 3D homochiral coordination polymers with open channels were constructed by the assembly of lactic acid derivative ligands, 1.4-DIB ligands and Cd（II） ions, namely [Cd3（（R）-CIA）2（CH3CO2）_2（1.4-DIB）2（H2O）2]·x（Guest）（1-D） and [Cd3（（S）-CIA）2（CH3CO2）2（1.4-DIB）2（H2O）2]·x（Guest）（1-L）. They contain 1D interesting ladder-like Cd-（R）-CIA（3-） chains and exhibit SHG-active behavior and photoluminescent property.

A New Method for Image Tamper Detection Based on an Improved U-Net

With the improvement of image editing technology,the threshold of image tampering technology decreases,which leads to a decrease in the authenticity of image content.This has also driven research on image forgery detection techniques.In this paper,a U-Net with multiple sensory field feature extraction(MSCU-Net)for image forgery detection is proposed.The proposed MSCU-Net is an end-to-end image essential attribute segmentation network that can perform image forgery detection without any pre-processing or post-processing.MSCU-Net replaces the single-scale convolution module in the original network with an improved multiple perceptual field convolution module so that the decoder can synthesize the features of different perceptual fields use residual propagation and residual feedback to recall the input feature information and consolidate the input feature information to make the difference in image attributes between the untampered and tampered regions more obvious,and introduce the channel coordinate confusion attention mechanism(CCCA)in skip-connection to further improve the segmentation accuracy of the network.In this paper,extensive experiments are conducted on various mainstream datasets,and the results verify the effectiveness of the proposed method,which outperforms the state-of-the-art image forgery detection methods.

Supply Chain Coordination of Loss-Averse Newsvendor with Contract

This paper studies a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer who faces the newsvendor problem. The retailer is loss averse. The results show that the op- timal production quantity with decentralized decision making with a wholesale price contract is less than that with centralized decision making. The supply chain can achieve channel coordination with buy back and tar- get rebate contracts. With buy back contracts, the supply chain system profits can be allocated arbitrarily between the supplier and retailer. A new kind of contract, the incremental buy back contract, gives similar results as with the buy back contract. The advantages and drawbacks of these three types of contracts are analyzed with numerical examples.

A SURVEY OF STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODELS IN SUPPLY AND MARKETING CHANNELS

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure： a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and coordination issues. In supply chain management, Stackelberg differential games have been used to investigate inventory issues, wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and outsourcing in dynamic environments. The underlying demand typically has growth dynamics or seasonal variation. In marketing, Stackelberg differential games have been used to model cooperative advertising programs, store brand and national brand advertising strategies, shelf space allocation, and pricing and advertising decisions. The demand dynamics are usually extensions of the classical advertising capital models or sales-advertising response models. We begin by explaining the Stackelberg differential game solution methodology and then provide a description of the models and results reported in the literature.

Price squeeze under fairness: the road to supply chain coordination with a powerful retailer

This research investigates the impacts of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the supply chain performance when the power retailer implements a price squeeze and market service investment together.Through game-theoretic modeling,we find that 1)in the absence of fairness,although the manufacturer may be worse off due to possessing imperfect information on the price squeeze rate,the channel may be coordinated through an ex-ante negotiation between the two parties.2)When the manufacturer has fairness concerns for price squeeze,both channel performance and brand goodwill are made worse by disadvantageous inequality and improved by advantageous inequality versus the case of no fairness concerns.Furthermore,channel members’ex-ante negotiations regarding a profit reallocation scheme under certain conditions may achieve the following three objectives:generating a channel profit of the coordination level,promoting brand goodwill to the level of the integrated channel,and creating an equitable channel relationship.