Chosen-message pair Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks were proposed by Boer, Yen and Homma, and are attack methods based on searches for collisions of modular multiplication. However, searching for collisions is dif...Chosen-message pair Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks were proposed by Boer, Yen and Homma, and are attack methods based on searches for collisions of modular multiplication. However, searching for collisions is difficult in real environments. To circumvent this problem, we propose the Simple Power Clustering Attack (SPCA), which can automatically identify the modular multiplication collision. The insignificant effects of collision attacks were validated in an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) environment. After treatment with SPCA, the automatic secret key recognition rate increased to 99%.展开更多
In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introd...In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introduced via chosen-message pairs.This attack method is that the key parameters dp and dq are segmented by byte,and the modular multiplication collisions are identified by k-means clustering.The exponents dp and dq were recovered by 12 power traces of six groups of the specific message pairs,and the exponent d was obtained.We also propose a second order clustering collision power analysis attack against RSA implementation with CRT,which applies double blinding exponentiation.To reduce noise and artificial participation,we analyze the power points of interest by preprocessing and k-means clustering with horizontal correlation collisions.Thus,we recovered approximately 91%of the secret exponents manipulated with a single power curve on RSA-CRT with countermeasures of double blinding methods.展开更多
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60873216Scientific and Technological Research Priority Projects of Sichuan Province under Grant No. 2012GZ0017Basic Research of Application Fund Project of Sichuan Province under Grant No. 2011JY0100
文摘Chosen-message pair Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks were proposed by Boer, Yen and Homma, and are attack methods based on searches for collisions of modular multiplication. However, searching for collisions is difficult in real environments. To circumvent this problem, we propose the Simple Power Clustering Attack (SPCA), which can automatically identify the modular multiplication collision. The insignificant effects of collision attacks were validated in an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) environment. After treatment with SPCA, the automatic secret key recognition rate increased to 99%.
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China(No.2017YFB0802300)the Key Research and Development Project of Sichuan Province(No.2020YFG0307,No.2018TJPT0012)the Key Research and Development Project of Chengdu(No.2019-YF05-02028-GX).
文摘In this paper,we propose two new attack algorithms on RSA implementations with CRT(Chinese remainder theorem).To improve the attack efficiency considerably,a clustering collision power attack on RSA with CRT is introduced via chosen-message pairs.This attack method is that the key parameters dp and dq are segmented by byte,and the modular multiplication collisions are identified by k-means clustering.The exponents dp and dq were recovered by 12 power traces of six groups of the specific message pairs,and the exponent d was obtained.We also propose a second order clustering collision power analysis attack against RSA implementation with CRT,which applies double blinding exponentiation.To reduce noise and artificial participation,we analyze the power points of interest by preprocessing and k-means clustering with horizontal correlation collisions.Thus,we recovered approximately 91%of the secret exponents manipulated with a single power curve on RSA-CRT with countermeasures of double blinding methods.
