Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about a...Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.展开更多
The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind ...The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind of bond, related to the fact of being part of a community, and therefore has a very strong relationship, although the two do not coincide with that kind of friendship which Aristotle calls politike philia （civic friendship）. My thesis, then, is that there is a strong relationship, among Aristotelian ethical works, between philia/amiability, like-mindedness （homonoia）, and politike philia. The key to discovering this link is the Aristotelian account of social relations： in Aristotle＇s opinion, the polls is not a commercial alliance, as if it were a public limited company, in which the common good depends on the fact that everyone has a strong economic interest in the company, but is a common life in which citizens are concerned about each other＇s moral goodness. The link between them is therefore a kind of friendship, which is of course civic and therefore does not presuppose love. In the political context, the knowledge of the nature of the constitution, in fact, is a sufficient condition for there being benevolence towards other citizens. Since philia/amiability shows deep analogies with homonoia as well, for both represent, in different ways, peculiar features of the citizenship, the thesis I want to support is not that philia/amiability, homonoia, and politike philia coincide, but that philia/amiability and homonoia are two different expressions of the same disposition, namely politike philia： according to my view, the former is the expression ofpolitike philia on a relational and moral side, while the latter represents the attitude of the citizens towards each other when implicated in political decisions.展开更多
文摘Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.
文摘The purpose of my paper is to show that the virtue which Aristotle calls philia, not in the strong sense of friendship, but in the weaker one of amiability （cf. NE 1126b 10-1 i 27a 12）, represents a particular kind of bond, related to the fact of being part of a community, and therefore has a very strong relationship, although the two do not coincide with that kind of friendship which Aristotle calls politike philia （civic friendship）. My thesis, then, is that there is a strong relationship, among Aristotelian ethical works, between philia/amiability, like-mindedness （homonoia）, and politike philia. The key to discovering this link is the Aristotelian account of social relations： in Aristotle＇s opinion, the polls is not a commercial alliance, as if it were a public limited company, in which the common good depends on the fact that everyone has a strong economic interest in the company, but is a common life in which citizens are concerned about each other＇s moral goodness. The link between them is therefore a kind of friendship, which is of course civic and therefore does not presuppose love. In the political context, the knowledge of the nature of the constitution, in fact, is a sufficient condition for there being benevolence towards other citizens. Since philia/amiability shows deep analogies with homonoia as well, for both represent, in different ways, peculiar features of the citizenship, the thesis I want to support is not that philia/amiability, homonoia, and politike philia coincide, but that philia/amiability and homonoia are two different expressions of the same disposition, namely politike philia： according to my view, the former is the expression ofpolitike philia on a relational and moral side, while the latter represents the attitude of the citizens towards each other when implicated in political decisions.
