The allocation mechanism for carbon emissions permit(CEP)is an institutional guarantee for advancing the development of China’s unified carbon trading market.The initial allocation of carbon quotas fails to solve new...The allocation mechanism for carbon emissions permit(CEP)is an institutional guarantee for advancing the development of China’s unified carbon trading market.The initial allocation of carbon quotas fails to solve new inequalities stemming from subsidizing cleaner production.This paper constructs a theoretical framework that describes China’s progressive decline in carbon intensity,calculates the equilibrium solution on the neoclassical saddle point path using the shooting method,and studies the income distribution imbalance caused by cleaner production subsidies and the reallocation mechanism of carbon emissions permit The main conclusion is that the incremental cleaner production subsidy policy meets the goal of maximizing welfare on the saddle point path,but it may lead to over-investment in the clean sector,thus causing the income distribution imbalance among entities.Further research suggests that the amount of carbon emissions permit acquired by the clean sector should be higher than the actual emissions in the trading market and that,as the cleaner support increases,the share of carbon emissions permit acquired by the sector should be constantly increased through reallocation mechanism.This helps achieve the Pareto improvement in all parties’economic benefi ts.展开更多
基金The authors express their gratitude to the Youth Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China(71904131)the 2019 Youth Talent Program for Publicity,Thought and Culture by the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee,and the basic research expenses of Beijing municipal universities for the Capital University of Economics and Business for their funds。
文摘The allocation mechanism for carbon emissions permit(CEP)is an institutional guarantee for advancing the development of China’s unified carbon trading market.The initial allocation of carbon quotas fails to solve new inequalities stemming from subsidizing cleaner production.This paper constructs a theoretical framework that describes China’s progressive decline in carbon intensity,calculates the equilibrium solution on the neoclassical saddle point path using the shooting method,and studies the income distribution imbalance caused by cleaner production subsidies and the reallocation mechanism of carbon emissions permit The main conclusion is that the incremental cleaner production subsidy policy meets the goal of maximizing welfare on the saddle point path,but it may lead to over-investment in the clean sector,thus causing the income distribution imbalance among entities.Further research suggests that the amount of carbon emissions permit acquired by the clean sector should be higher than the actual emissions in the trading market and that,as the cleaner support increases,the share of carbon emissions permit acquired by the sector should be constantly increased through reallocation mechanism.This helps achieve the Pareto improvement in all parties’economic benefi ts.
