A wireless sensor network （WSN） commonly whilst a body sensor network （BSN） must be secured with requires lower level security for public information gathering, strong authenticity to protect personal health infor...A wireless sensor network （WSN） commonly whilst a body sensor network （BSN） must be secured with requires lower level security for public information gathering, strong authenticity to protect personal health information. In this paper, some practical problems with the message authentication codes （MACs）, which were proposed in the popular security architectures for WSNs, are reconsidered. The analysis shows that the recommended MACs for WSNs, e.g., CBC- MAC （TinySec）, OCB-MAC （MiniSec）, and XCBC-MAC （SenSee）, might not be exactly suitable for BSNs. Particularly an existential forgery attack is elaborated on XCBC-MAC. Considering the hardware limitations of BSNs, we propose a new family of tunable lightweight MAC based on the PRESENT block cipher. The first scheme, which is named TukP, is a new lightweight MAC with 64-bit output range. The second scheme, which is named TuLP-128, is a 128-bit variant which provides a higher resistance against internal collisions. Compared with the existing schemes, our lightweight MACs are both time and resource efficient on hardware-constrained devices.展开更多
基金supported by the National Foundation of Netherlands with SenterNovem for the ALwEN project under Grant No.PNE07007the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61100201,U1135004,and 61170080+3 种基金the Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme of Guangdong Province of China(2011)the High-Level Talents Project of Guangdong Institutions of Higher Education of China(2012)the Project on the Integration of Industry,Education and Research of Guangdong Province of China under Grant No.2012B091000035the Project of Science and Technology New Star of Guangzhou Pearl River of China(2014)
文摘A wireless sensor network （WSN） commonly whilst a body sensor network （BSN） must be secured with requires lower level security for public information gathering, strong authenticity to protect personal health information. In this paper, some practical problems with the message authentication codes （MACs）, which were proposed in the popular security architectures for WSNs, are reconsidered. The analysis shows that the recommended MACs for WSNs, e.g., CBC- MAC （TinySec）, OCB-MAC （MiniSec）, and XCBC-MAC （SenSee）, might not be exactly suitable for BSNs. Particularly an existential forgery attack is elaborated on XCBC-MAC. Considering the hardware limitations of BSNs, we propose a new family of tunable lightweight MAC based on the PRESENT block cipher. The first scheme, which is named TukP, is a new lightweight MAC with 64-bit output range. The second scheme, which is named TuLP-128, is a 128-bit variant which provides a higher resistance against internal collisions. Compared with the existing schemes, our lightweight MACs are both time and resource efficient on hardware-constrained devices.
