The Problems Being Faced for Establishing Index Futures Transaction and the Contract Design

The article deeply and systematically probed into a series of problems being faced for establishing index futures transaction in China. Drawing on the successful experiences of other relative countries and according to Chinese real conditions, the author chooses Shanghai composite index as subject-matter, and has designed an index futures contract that accord with the situation of China.

Cooperation and Contract Design in Project Management with Outsourcing

We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.

Strategic Contracting for Software Upgrade Outsourcing in Industry 4.0

The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.

MORAL HAZARD STRATEGY AND QUALITY CONTRACT DESIGN IN A TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected profits function model, in which the supplier makes production process investment-level decision and decides on the product quality prevention level, whereas the buyer makes quality evaluation decision and decides on the product quality inspection level. The supplier with a moral hazard of reducing investment level may lack investment in the production process; thus, the buyer will pay the information rent to incentivize the supplier to improve the investment level. The buyer creates the moral hazard of exaggerating the product quality defective rate, who may overinvest in the inspection process. We use the optimal condition to solve supplier＇s first-best investment level, product quality prevention level, and buyer＇s first-best quality inspection level, internal penalty, and apportionment ratio of external failure cost. We also conduct a simulation test that shows the following： When the supplier improves its investment level, its product quality prevention level will increase, and the buyer＇s quality inspection level will decrease. With the improvement in the buyer＇s product quality inspection level, its internal penalty will increase, and the supplier＇s external failure cost will also increase while its expected profits will decrease. Hence, the buyer will design an incentive contract, the expected profits of which will increase, and the whole supply chain＇s joint expected profits function may become an inverse U shape. Finally, we develop a simulation example and propose suggestions for quality control strategy and contract design in the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information.

The Supply Chain Contract Design under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism with Free Riding

This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mechanism. First, we discuss the situation where carbon emissions reduction investment affects the product price and income. It demonstrates that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturer increases with the degree of the free riding of the downstream manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer can improve their carbon reduction investment and the whole supply chain achieves Pareto improvement when the investment cost sharing contract is introduced. Nevertheless, under the cost-sharing contract the optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain is still lower than that of the centralized supply chain, and only in some particular cases can the two types of supply chain achieve equal total profits. Then, we preliminarily explore the situation where the product price and income is influenced by carbon emissions reduction investment. The consequences indicate that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturers in this situation is less than the former one's, and the transfer payment mechanism is able to improve the level of the supply chain overall carbon emissions-reduction. Moreover, compared to the former situation, the effects of free riding of the downstream manufacturer are even more serious. The conclusions can provide some intellectual support for manufacturing enterprises to make reasonable emissions reduction strategies and coordinate the supply chain existing in free riding.

基于发包人视角的政府投资项目工程总承包投资管控研究

政府投资项目作为我国推行工程总承包的主要项目类型,加强投资控制是规范合理使用财政资金的必然要求。根据标准合同条件,对设计施工总承包模式下政府投资项目的计量计价规则进行具体设定。在分析其投资运行及关键问题的基础上,采用合同状态分析方法,解析优化设计和设计优化两种典型情形下承包人的逐利行为,并提出制约承包人潜在违约机会主义行为,引导承包人由字面履约行为向尽善履约行为转变的对策建议。研究成果将为发包人进一步加强投资管控,引导承包人改善履约绩效,提供理论指导和策略靶向。

设计牵头的EPC工程总承包模式优化设计研究

EPC工程总承包是设计、采购与施工一体化模式,以设计牵头的EPC工程总承包项目越来越多,政府也不断推出相关总承包政策文件。介绍设计牵头的EPC管理模式优化设计的优势及策划要点,并结合项目实例总结优化设计经验和措施,为后续其他EPC项目优化设计提供借鉴。

MaaS旅游供应链收益共享契约设计与协调

针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。

基于以太坊的服装设计版权方案

现有的中心化服装设计版权体系中,低质量抄袭作品层出不穷,而作品的审核周期长且完成度不是非常高的阶段性成果又无法得到认可,使得创作者维权时往往缺乏这一时间段的时间证明。此外,作品的版权确权并不简洁,不利于版权的使用,数据本身也有遭受攻击的风险。为解决上述问题,提出了一个基于区块链、零水印和星际文件系统(IPFS)的服装设计版权方案。区块链的不可篡改特性保证了数据安全,使得其与传统版权保护流程能够有效结合。同时将区块链取代以往零水印中的可信知识产权保护(IPR)中央权威机构,消除了第三方带来的隐患。智能合约结合时间戳功能可以准确提供各步骤的线上记录,让创作者能更好提供作品从草稿到成品的时间线证明,以便在版权纠纷中维护自身权益。而感知哈希也能剔除掉抄袭作品,从抄袭作品的登记源头来控制低级抄袭作品的出现,保证创作者的著作权。实验表明,整体功能完善、安全性高,其中零水印方案具备可行性和有效性,作品登记和查询消耗的以太坊资源Gas成本低。

考虑零售商资金约束和损失厌恶的延迟支付契约设计

本文研究当零售商存在自有资金约束且损失厌恶时,供应商应如何设计延迟支付契约,以及契约设计对零售商决策的影响。首先,构建博弈模型,并给出了转移价格-延迟支付契约和收益共享-延迟支付契约;其次,构建求解模型,给出供应商的最优契约决策、零售商的订购决策;接着,进一步分析了零售商损失厌恶程度和自有资金水平对供应商最优契约设计的影响。研究表明:当零售商的损失厌恶程度和自有资金水平低于某个临界值时,供应商偏好提供收益共享契约,零售商订购集中决策时的订购量;当零售商的损失厌恶程度和自有资金水平高于某个临界值时,供应商偏好提供转移价格契约,零售商的订购量少于集中决策时的订购量。最后,本文通过数值算例验证了上述结论。本文在一定程度上丰富了现有供应链延迟支付契约理论的研究,为供应链节点企业的相关决策提供了依据和参考。

考虑成本信息不对称的信息安全外包契约设计

本文考虑客户企业和管理安全服务提供商(MSSP)合作保护客户企业信息安全的问题。双方的安全努力不可验证性会导致努力程度低下,MSSP成本信息不对称会导致服务低效性。首先,以社会福利最优作为基准,本文分析了努力不可验证对双边退款契约设计的影响。然后,本文分析了MSSP私有成本信息导致服务低效的问题,提出了甄别MSSP私有成本信息的契约,最后通过算例分析验证了本文的重要结论。研究表明:信息安全合作外包中的双边退款契约会因安全服务的特性产生双重道德风险问题。客户企业采取措施来验证MSSP的努力水平以缓解双重道德风险问题有成本上界。当MSSP拥有私有成本信息时,甄别契约具有“高端不扭曲”和“低端向下扭曲”的特点。在私有成本信息下,无论MSSP是高成本类型还是低成本类型,由于信息缺乏,客户企业都会遭受损失。MSSP成本的市场分布相近或者服务合作重要程度越高,客户企业越需要采取措施来甄别MSSP的成本。本研究对信息安全管理领域客户企业外包的决策具有重要的参考意义。

城市轨道交通工程设计数字化管理平台研究与实践

针对当前城市轨道交通工程二、三维并行设计环境,本文通过分析研究BIM技术应用管理现状及面临的问题,提出以建设方为主导、总体总包设计单位统一管理的方式,研发基于云端技术的数字化管理平台。实践证明,基于数字化管理平台能够较好地实现轨道交通工程二、三维一体化协同设计及管理,有助于推动二维设计向三维设计方式的转变,具有一定的推广价值。

基于付费阅读的网络文学平台与作家之间的契约设计

针对网络作家收入分配不合理的问题,本文从网络文学平台运营商的视角,考虑作家的创作损耗度和创作努力程度,以委托代理模型为基础,建立了基于读者付费阅读数据的可变比例收入分配的最优契约模型。根据作家的创作损耗度和作品付费人数的变异系数,将作家分为投机型、困难型、损耗型和稳定型四种类型。通过分析模型参数对平台和网络作家的影响发现,对于变异系数较大的投机型和困难型作家,平台应设置小于0.5的分成比例和高于外部保留效用水平的基础工资;对于变异系数较小的稳定型和损耗型作家,平台应设置大于0.5的分成比例和低于外部保留效用水平甚至为零的基础工资。研究结果为平台运营商设计不同类型作家的契约提供依据。

设计牵头的EPC项目沟通协调机制研究

现阶段,我国EPC工程总承包在重大水利工程建设领域遇到了发展瓶颈。为促进其高质量发展,本文通过设计牵头视角,分析EPC工程总承包的内在优势和不足。针对现阶段沟通协调中暴露的问题,提出一种基于合作的柔性沟通协调机制,并阐述其基本原则、沟通技巧及实现步骤,试图为完善EPC工程总承包管理理论提供行业智慧。

基于EPC的BIM技术在设计-施工一体化中的综合应用

近年来,在建筑业高质量发展需求的驱动下,EPC工程总承包蓬勃发展。在EPC模式下,总承包单位需对建设项目的设计、采购、施工等全要素进行管控,与此同时,项目风险更多地从业主单位向总承包单位转移,这对总承包单位的综合管理能力提出了更为苛刻的要求。在设计阶段,提前考虑项目需求,采用多种BIM技术对关键问题开展研究,通过BIM技术间的融合与互补,有助于打破传统发包模式下设计与施工“各自为战”的窘境,进而实现“设计-施工一体化”。通过研究某EPC项目,介绍多种BIM技术在设计、商务、施工中的综合应用,针对关键问题利用BIM技术提出更合理的解决方案,加强设计与商务、施工的深度融合,体现EPC工程总承包“协同、高效、共赢”的价值属性。

基于医保政策目标的基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核理论框架构建

系统梳理国内政策文件资料,分析我国基本医保制度的发展历程和政策目标演变,并以此为基础确定基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核目标,构建以政策目标实现为导向的考核维度框架。研究从契约管理和绩效管理的视角出发,分析基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核系统的构成要素及要素之间的逻辑关系,构建基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核系统理论模型,为指导基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核研究的开展提供参考。

双边市场中的销售人员激励合同设计

与传统企业类似,平台企业需要雇佣销售人员开展促销活动,但与传统企业不同,平台企业两边的用户存在交叉网络效应。构建平台企业雇佣销售人员进行促销的委托代理模型,研究交叉网络效应对于销售激励合同设计和平台利润的影响。研究发现,如果代理人的工资与直接销售挂钩,即平台仅对销售人员直接施加努力的一边进行补偿,则交叉网络效应的增强不见得总是有利于平台利润的提高。但是,如果将平台另一边的销售量也纳入激励合同,则代理人需要在平台两边都分担风险,这将促使代理人提高努力水平,也有利于增加平台利润。研究揭示了,双边市场中的激励合同设计不但需要考虑平台两边用户由于交叉网络效应导致的溢出效应和风险传导,还需要考虑平台的费用设定。

抽水蓄能项目EPC总承包设计管理要点分析

近年来,随着我国“双碳”目标的提出,抽水蓄能电站项目作为区域电网调峰、填谷、储能的重要工程,已经成为目前新能源项目发展的“天然充电宝”。在此背景下,以设计为龙头的抽水蓄能项目EPC总承包模式营运而生,本文主要探讨抽水蓄能EPC总承包项目,如何发挥设计优势,通过设计为纽带,串联业主、设计、施工等参建方的工作,从而在工程管理、成本控制等方面发挥优势,推动抽蓄项目建设模式的发展。

以设计方牵头的工程总承包联合体模式运营管理研究

随着国内法律法规、标准文本及管理规范的逐步完善,工程总承包(EPC)模式在越来越多的行业被采用,尤其是新能源行业。阐述了以设计方作为牵头方的联合体总承包模式的运营管理,从招投标、设计、建设、结算4个阶段论述运营管理策略。运用联合体利益共享、限额设计、制度考核、三级管理模式、连带责任且有限责任、现场设计服务、工程总承包管理思想等策略,实施相对应的管理方式、管理思想、管理策略,使得联合体总承包模式下各成员各司其职,共同推进项目建设,实现多方共赢。

建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的实践与思考

阐述建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的意义,以中航商发上海某产业园项目为例,对该项目中建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的实践策略进行探究,主要从做好设计统筹与规划管理及完善过程设计与监造管理两方面进行具体分析。