The Problems Being Faced for Establishing Index Futures Transaction and the Contract Design

The article deeply and systematically probed into a series of problems being faced for establishing index futures transaction in China. Drawing on the successful experiences of other relative countries and according to Chinese real conditions, the author chooses Shanghai composite index as subject-matter, and has designed an index futures contract that accord with the situation of China.

Cooperation and Contract Design in Project Management with Outsourcing

We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.

Strategic Contracting for Software Upgrade Outsourcing in Industry 4.0

The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.

MORAL HAZARD STRATEGY AND QUALITY CONTRACT DESIGN IN A TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected profits function model, in which the supplier makes production process investment-level decision and decides on the product quality prevention level, whereas the buyer makes quality evaluation decision and decides on the product quality inspection level. The supplier with a moral hazard of reducing investment level may lack investment in the production process; thus, the buyer will pay the information rent to incentivize the supplier to improve the investment level. The buyer creates the moral hazard of exaggerating the product quality defective rate, who may overinvest in the inspection process. We use the optimal condition to solve supplier＇s first-best investment level, product quality prevention level, and buyer＇s first-best quality inspection level, internal penalty, and apportionment ratio of external failure cost. We also conduct a simulation test that shows the following： When the supplier improves its investment level, its product quality prevention level will increase, and the buyer＇s quality inspection level will decrease. With the improvement in the buyer＇s product quality inspection level, its internal penalty will increase, and the supplier＇s external failure cost will also increase while its expected profits will decrease. Hence, the buyer will design an incentive contract, the expected profits of which will increase, and the whole supply chain＇s joint expected profits function may become an inverse U shape. Finally, we develop a simulation example and propose suggestions for quality control strategy and contract design in the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information.

The Supply Chain Contract Design under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism with Free Riding

This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mechanism. First, we discuss the situation where carbon emissions reduction investment affects the product price and income. It demonstrates that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturer increases with the degree of the free riding of the downstream manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer can improve their carbon reduction investment and the whole supply chain achieves Pareto improvement when the investment cost sharing contract is introduced. Nevertheless, under the cost-sharing contract the optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain is still lower than that of the centralized supply chain, and only in some particular cases can the two types of supply chain achieve equal total profits. Then, we preliminarily explore the situation where the product price and income is influenced by carbon emissions reduction investment. The consequences indicate that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturers in this situation is less than the former one's, and the transfer payment mechanism is able to improve the level of the supply chain overall carbon emissions-reduction. Moreover, compared to the former situation, the effects of free riding of the downstream manufacturer are even more serious. The conclusions can provide some intellectual support for manufacturing enterprises to make reasonable emissions reduction strategies and coordinate the supply chain existing in free riding.

基于发包人视角的政府投资项目工程总承包投资管控研究

政府投资项目作为我国推行工程总承包的主要项目类型,加强投资控制是规范合理使用财政资金的必然要求。根据标准合同条件,对设计施工总承包模式下政府投资项目的计量计价规则进行具体设定。在分析其投资运行及关键问题的基础上,采用合同状态分析方法,解析优化设计和设计优化两种典型情形下承包人的逐利行为,并提出制约承包人潜在违约机会主义行为,引导承包人由字面履约行为向尽善履约行为转变的对策建议。研究成果将为发包人进一步加强投资管控,引导承包人改善履约绩效,提供理论指导和策略靶向。

设计牵头的EPC工程总承包模式优化设计研究

EPC工程总承包是设计、采购与施工一体化模式,以设计牵头的EPC工程总承包项目越来越多,政府也不断推出相关总承包政策文件。介绍设计牵头的EPC管理模式优化设计的优势及策划要点,并结合项目实例总结优化设计经验和措施,为后续其他EPC项目优化设计提供借鉴。

MaaS旅游供应链收益共享契约设计与协调

针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。

设计牵头的EPC项目沟通协调机制研究

现阶段,我国EPC工程总承包在重大水利工程建设领域遇到了发展瓶颈。为促进其高质量发展,本文通过设计牵头视角,分析EPC工程总承包的内在优势和不足。针对现阶段沟通协调中暴露的问题,提出一种基于合作的柔性沟通协调机制,并阐述其基本原则、沟通技巧及实现步骤,试图为完善EPC工程总承包管理理论提供行业智慧。

基于医保政策目标的基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核理论框架构建

系统梳理国内政策文件资料,分析我国基本医保制度的发展历程和政策目标演变,并以此为基础确定基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核目标,构建以政策目标实现为导向的考核维度框架。研究从契约管理和绩效管理的视角出发,分析基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核系统的构成要素及要素之间的逻辑关系,构建基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核系统理论模型,为指导基本医保定点医疗机构履约考核研究的开展提供参考。

城市轨道交通工程设计数字化管理平台研究与实践

针对当前城市轨道交通工程二、三维并行设计环境,本文通过分析研究BIM技术应用管理现状及面临的问题,提出以建设方为主导、总体总包设计单位统一管理的方式,研发基于云端技术的数字化管理平台。实践证明,基于数字化管理平台能够较好地实现轨道交通工程二、三维一体化协同设计及管理,有助于推动二维设计向三维设计方式的转变,具有一定的推广价值。

建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的实践与思考

阐述建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的意义,以中航商发上海某产业园项目为例,对该项目中建筑师负责制与EPC工程总承包相结合的实践策略进行探究,主要从做好设计统筹与规划管理及完善过程设计与监造管理两方面进行具体分析。

EPC总承包项目设计、采购及施工融合管理的探讨

EPC总承包是按照所签订合同协议对工程项目的设计、采购、施工等全过程或若干阶段的总承包,因此能满足项目建设目标的各项要求。为做好总承包工程,避免设计、采购和施工的脱节,本文分析了当前EPC总承包管理的设计、采购与施工3个环节存在的主要问题,提出加强各环节相互融合管理的对策建议,以期实现设计、采购、施工各阶段工作高效运转,全面控制工程建设项目的成本、质量、进度,由此获得较好的经济效益。

基于EPC的BIM技术在设计-施工一体化中的综合应用

近年来,在建筑业高质量发展需求的驱动下,EPC工程总承包蓬勃发展。在EPC模式下,总承包单位需对建设项目的设计、采购、施工等全要素进行管控,与此同时,项目风险更多地从业主单位向总承包单位转移,这对总承包单位的综合管理能力提出了更为苛刻的要求。在设计阶段,提前考虑项目需求,采用多种BIM技术对关键问题开展研究,通过BIM技术间的融合与互补,有助于打破传统发包模式下设计与施工“各自为战”的窘境,进而实现“设计-施工一体化”。通过研究某EPC项目,介绍多种BIM技术在设计、商务、施工中的综合应用,针对关键问题利用BIM技术提出更合理的解决方案,加强设计与商务、施工的深度融合,体现EPC工程总承包“协同、高效、共赢”的价值属性。

工程总承包背景下BIM技术在装配式建筑工程中的应用

以工程总承包为背景,探讨建筑信息模型在装配式建筑工程中的应用。论文阐述工程总承包模式及装配式建筑工程的特点,对BIM技术的优点进行详细介绍,从全产业链高效整合、工程造价估算更精准、建筑施工专业性保障与信息化集成、保障控制施工前建筑材料质量5个方面探讨工程总承包背景下BIM技术应用在装配式建筑工程的作用。

设计-施工总承包模式下设计单位风险研究

文中在阐述设计-施工总承包基本概念的基础上,对设计-施工总承包模式下设计单位风险因素进行分析,以业主方、承包方、监理方以及环境风险四个风险要素构建风险评价体系,基于层次分析法-模糊综合评价法对设计单位进行风险评价,提出应对措施。

施工总承包模式下电梯工程的精益管理技术

施工总承包模式下的电梯工程作为专业性极强的分包工程,在项目管理过程中往往因为专业盲区、缺少直接管理经验,使得管理电梯工程的过程中存在知识壁垒,管理深度不够,导致电梯分包与其他分包工序穿插开展、精益建造等存在阻碍,甚至会造成返工。因此,探索施工总承包模式下的电梯工程在招采管理、深化设计、建造管理等方面的精细化管理,对丰富施工总承包管理以及项目创效等极具意义。

Design and Implementation of DBC Based on Dynamic AOP

Traditional approach of design by contract, due to mixing the contract code with application code, is difficult for the extensibility and reusability of software system. This paper presents a framework named JADBC for design by contract based on Aspect-Oriented Programming （AOP） to resolve these problems. By providing a new modularized element, aspect, the framework successfully separates the contracts in design by contract, from functional codes. The implementation of this framework is based on dynamic AOP which can have the contract changed at rtmtime, consequently, enhancing program flexibility. JADBC framework modularizes the contracts in a clear-cut fashion that is easier to design, implement, and maintain.

完全自主还是有限选择:中国家庭医生签约服务制度研究

为促进家庭医生签约服务全面有效开展,迫切需要对相关政策协同机制进行分析。从选择权视角出发,采用参与式实地调查法,选取河北省沧州市运河区河西北街社区卫生服务站为实地观察点,对当前家庭医生签约服务规范和制度设计进行详细分析。研究发现,当前我国家庭医生签约服务率较低,其根本原因是居民缺乏对基层医疗卫生机构的全面认识,服务制度存在不足,尤其是在制度设计上,过分强调居民享有自主选择权。因此,迫切需要将政府强制与居民自主选择权有机整合,实行居民有限选择权,在医疗保险、人才选聘和考核评估三方面进行统筹考量并做出相应制度安排,从而确保居民全面了解基层医疗卫生机构和真正享受到家庭医生签约服务。

FIDIC new conditions of contract and their applying prospects for the construction industry in China

In this paper, the author gives a brief introduction to the evolution of FIDIC conditions of contract, particularly the background of the 1999 new editions. A detailed discussion is made of the applying prospects referring to the new editions of FIDIC Conditions of Contract in China in 6 aspects: revisions of the existing model contract forms; finding solutions to the payment delay problem; advocating the Design/Build and EPC turnkey project delivery system; clarifying the roles of supervising engineers and opening up the new regions of their work. This paper also prepares a short form model contract for small projects in China, improving the settlement of construction disputes.