The border gateway protocol (BGP) is the default inter domain routing protocol used on the internet for exchanging information between autonomous systems. Available literature suggests that BGP is vulnerable to sessio...The border gateway protocol (BGP) is the default inter domain routing protocol used on the internet for exchanging information between autonomous systems. Available literature suggests that BGP is vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. There are a number of proposals aimed at improving BGP security which have not been fully implemented. This paper examines a number of approaches for securing BGP through a comparative study and identifies the reasons why these proposals have not been implemented commercially. This paper analyses the architecture of internet routing and the design of BGP while focusing on the problem of BGP session hijacking attacks. Using Graphical Network Simulator 3 (GNS-3), a session hijack is demonstrated and a solution which involves the implementation of route filtering, policy-maps and route-maps on CISCO routers representing ASes is carried out. In the end, a workable industry standard framework for securing and protecting BGP sessions and border routers from exploitation with little or no modification to the existing routing infrastructure is demonstrated.展开更多
Traffic hijacking is a common attack perpetrated on networked systems, where attackers eavesdrop on user transactions, manipulate packet data, and divert traffic to illegitimate locations. Similar attacks can also be ...Traffic hijacking is a common attack perpetrated on networked systems, where attackers eavesdrop on user transactions, manipulate packet data, and divert traffic to illegitimate locations. Similar attacks can also be unleashed in a NoC (Network on Chip) based system where the NoC comes from a third-party vendor and can be engrafted with hardware Trojans. Unlike the attackers on a traditional network, those Trojans are usually small and have limited capacity. This paper targets such a hardware Trojan;Specifically, the Trojan aims to divert traffic packets to unauthorized locations on the NoC. To detect this kind of traffic hijacking, we propose an authentication scheme in which the source and destination addresses are tagged. We develop a custom design for the packet tagging and authentication such that the implementation costs can be greatly reduced. Our experiments on a set of applications show that on average the detection circuitry incurs about 3.37% overhead in area, 2.61% in power, and 0.097% in performance when compared to the baseline design.展开更多
Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits s...Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits security design defects,such as an unconditional trust mechanism and the default acceptance of BGP route announcements from peers by BGP neighboring nodes,easily triggering prefix hijacking,path forgery,route leakage,and other BGP security threats.Meanwhile,the traditional BGP security mechanism,relying on a public key infrastructure,faces issues like a single point of failure and a single point of trust.The decentralization,anti-tampering,and traceability advantages of blockchain offer new solution ideas for constructing secure and trusted inter-domain routing mechanisms.In this paper,we summarize the characteristics of BGP protocol in detail,sort out the BGP security threats and their causes.Additionally,we analyze the shortcomings of the traditional BGP security mechanism and comprehensively evaluate existing blockchain-based solutions to address the above problems and validate the reliability and effectiveness of blockchain-based BGP security methods in mitigating BGP security threats.Finally,we discuss the challenges posed by BGP security problems and outline prospects for future research.展开更多
中间人攻击是网络攻击的一种常用手段,其中超文本传输安全(Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure,HTTPS)协议的中间人攻击危害较大,已有检测方法主要面向单客户端,以证书匹配验证为主要手段,部署成本和性能开销较高。通过分析SSL(Secure ...中间人攻击是网络攻击的一种常用手段,其中超文本传输安全(Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure,HTTPS)协议的中间人攻击危害较大,已有检测方法主要面向单客户端,以证书匹配验证为主要手段,部署成本和性能开销较高。通过分析SSL(Secure Sockets Layer)握手阶段的密钥协商、证书验证等关键报文,提出基于时间特征的HTTPS中间人攻击检测方法,从流量角度提供了一种检测思路,具有更广泛的适用场景。实验结果表明,该方法在互联网环境测试数据集下具有较高的准确率。展开更多
Activity hijacking is one of the most powerful attacks in Android. Though promising, all the prior activity hijacking attacks suffer from some limitations and have limited attack capabilities. They no longer pose secu...Activity hijacking is one of the most powerful attacks in Android. Though promising, all the prior activity hijacking attacks suffer from some limitations and have limited attack capabilities. They no longer pose security threats in recent Android due to the presence of effective defense mechanisms. In this work, we propose the first automated and adaptive activity hijacking attack, named VenomAttack, enabling a spectrum of customized attacks (e.g., phishing, spoofing, and DoS) on a large scale in recent Android, even the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms are deployed. Specifically, we propose to use hotpatch techniques to identify vulnerable devices and update attack payload without re-installation and re-distribution, hence bypassing offline detection. We present a newly-discovered flaw in Android and a bug in derivatives of Android, each of which allows us to check if a target app is running in the background or not, by which we can determine the right attack timing via a designed transparent activity. We also propose an automated fake activity generation approach, allowing large-scale attacks. Requiring only the common permission INTERNET, we can hijack activities at the right timing without destroying the GUI integrity of the foreground app. We conduct proof-of-concept attacks, showing that VenomAttack poses severe security risks on recent Android versions. The user study demonstrates the effectiveness of VenomAttack in real-world scenarios, achieving a high success rate (95%) without users’ awareness. That would call more attention to the stakeholders like Google.展开更多
文摘The border gateway protocol (BGP) is the default inter domain routing protocol used on the internet for exchanging information between autonomous systems. Available literature suggests that BGP is vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. There are a number of proposals aimed at improving BGP security which have not been fully implemented. This paper examines a number of approaches for securing BGP through a comparative study and identifies the reasons why these proposals have not been implemented commercially. This paper analyses the architecture of internet routing and the design of BGP while focusing on the problem of BGP session hijacking attacks. Using Graphical Network Simulator 3 (GNS-3), a session hijack is demonstrated and a solution which involves the implementation of route filtering, policy-maps and route-maps on CISCO routers representing ASes is carried out. In the end, a workable industry standard framework for securing and protecting BGP sessions and border routers from exploitation with little or no modification to the existing routing infrastructure is demonstrated.
文摘Traffic hijacking is a common attack perpetrated on networked systems, where attackers eavesdrop on user transactions, manipulate packet data, and divert traffic to illegitimate locations. Similar attacks can also be unleashed in a NoC (Network on Chip) based system where the NoC comes from a third-party vendor and can be engrafted with hardware Trojans. Unlike the attackers on a traditional network, those Trojans are usually small and have limited capacity. This paper targets such a hardware Trojan;Specifically, the Trojan aims to divert traffic packets to unauthorized locations on the NoC. To detect this kind of traffic hijacking, we propose an authentication scheme in which the source and destination addresses are tagged. We develop a custom design for the packet tagging and authentication such that the implementation costs can be greatly reduced. Our experiments on a set of applications show that on average the detection circuitry incurs about 3.37% overhead in area, 2.61% in power, and 0.097% in performance when compared to the baseline design.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China,GrantNumbers(62272007,62001007)the Natural Science Foundation of Beijing,GrantNumbers(4234083,4212018)The authors also acknowledge the support from King Khalid University for funding this research through the Large Group Project under Grant Number RGP.2/373/45.
文摘Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits security design defects,such as an unconditional trust mechanism and the default acceptance of BGP route announcements from peers by BGP neighboring nodes,easily triggering prefix hijacking,path forgery,route leakage,and other BGP security threats.Meanwhile,the traditional BGP security mechanism,relying on a public key infrastructure,faces issues like a single point of failure and a single point of trust.The decentralization,anti-tampering,and traceability advantages of blockchain offer new solution ideas for constructing secure and trusted inter-domain routing mechanisms.In this paper,we summarize the characteristics of BGP protocol in detail,sort out the BGP security threats and their causes.Additionally,we analyze the shortcomings of the traditional BGP security mechanism and comprehensively evaluate existing blockchain-based solutions to address the above problems and validate the reliability and effectiveness of blockchain-based BGP security methods in mitigating BGP security threats.Finally,we discuss the challenges posed by BGP security problems and outline prospects for future research.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 62072309 and 6171101225).
文摘Activity hijacking is one of the most powerful attacks in Android. Though promising, all the prior activity hijacking attacks suffer from some limitations and have limited attack capabilities. They no longer pose security threats in recent Android due to the presence of effective defense mechanisms. In this work, we propose the first automated and adaptive activity hijacking attack, named VenomAttack, enabling a spectrum of customized attacks (e.g., phishing, spoofing, and DoS) on a large scale in recent Android, even the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms are deployed. Specifically, we propose to use hotpatch techniques to identify vulnerable devices and update attack payload without re-installation and re-distribution, hence bypassing offline detection. We present a newly-discovered flaw in Android and a bug in derivatives of Android, each of which allows us to check if a target app is running in the background or not, by which we can determine the right attack timing via a designed transparent activity. We also propose an automated fake activity generation approach, allowing large-scale attacks. Requiring only the common permission INTERNET, we can hijack activities at the right timing without destroying the GUI integrity of the foreground app. We conduct proof-of-concept attacks, showing that VenomAttack poses severe security risks on recent Android versions. The user study demonstrates the effectiveness of VenomAttack in real-world scenarios, achieving a high success rate (95%) without users’ awareness. That would call more attention to the stakeholders like Google.
