Research on telecommunication resale service supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contract

The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract is an effective way to coordinate the supply chain. This paper analyzes the revenue-sharing contract between telecom operators and resale operators. The study shows that by setting up a rational revenue-sharing ratio and wholesale price, a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate this supply chain, and telecom operators and resale operators can achieve a 'win-win' solution.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions

A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.

Supply chain coordination with participators' risk bias under buy-back contract

Considering participators' risk bias,which is measured by the method of value at risk,the risk constraints in a two-echelon supply chain coordination under buy-back contract is equal to giving the order of an upper bound.With a risk-averse dominant enterprise(M)and a risk-neutral non-dominant one(R),the coordination which optimizes the supply chain under the risk constraints is achieved by a penalty mechanism L to reduce R's order.With risk-neutral M and risk-averse R,M can motivate R to increase his order by providing a risk subsidy K,and two cases are discussed.If the risk constraints of R cannot satisfy M's participation constraint to offer K,M will prefer to accept R's order to obtain a sub-optimization solution of the supply chain.Or else,with M's K,R's optimal order just coordinates the supply chain,which is equal to the case without risk bias,and in this situation R's risk bias only affects the profit distribution between the participators.

DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT FOR SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH EXPONENTIAL DEMAND FUNCTION

The coordination problem of a supply chain comprising one supplier and one retailer under market demand disruption is studied in this article. A novel exponential demand function is adopted, and the penalty cost is introduced explicitly to capture the deviation production cost caused by the market demand disruption. The optimal strategies are obtained for different disruption scale under the centralized mode. For the decentralized mode, it is proved that the supply chain can be fully coordinated by adjusting the price discount policy appropriately when disruption occurs. Furthermore, the authors point out that similar results can be established for more general demand functions that represent different market circumstances if certain assumptions are satisfied.

Coordination of Multi-leaders and Multi-followers in Supply Chain of Value-Added Telecom Services

In order to study supply chain of the telecom value-added service,a multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game model with multiple telecom operators and multiple service providers whose income is composed of information fee division and advertisement was constructed.Then a demonstration was simulated,and the results were compared with the situation of service providers' income only from information fee division.The simulated and compared results indicate that,the enterprises in the supply chain have the nature of pursuing the maximum profits in capital markets;meanwhile,first-mover advantages and some enterprise can get more profits with the information asymmetry.

Collaborative supply chain planning under dynamic lot sizing costs with capacity decision

Studies show that supply chain cooperation improves supply chain performance. However, it remains a challenge to develop and implement the realistic supply chain cooperation scheme. We investigate a two-echelon supply chain planning problem with capacity acquisition decision under asymmetric cost and demand information. A simple negotiation-based coordination mechanism is developed to synchronize production/order strategies of a supplier and a buyer. The coordination scheme shows how the supplier and the buyer modify their production and order policy in order to find a joint economic lot sizing plan, which saves the overall supply chain cost. The allocation of the cooperation benefit is determined by negotiation. Due to the complexity of the multiple periods, multiple level supply chain lot sizing with capacity decision, a heuristic algorithm is developed to find coordination solutions. Finally, the results of the numerical study indicate the performance of supply chain coordination scheme.

Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions,but manufacturers’insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies.To alleviate capital constraints,manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments.This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts.Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode,we come to the following conclusions:(1)Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain,manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas.(2)When financing independently,a decentralized decision-making mode(MD)is the best choice for manufacturers.(3)In cooperative financing,when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode(SD)in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit,the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved.(4)When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model(SC)in cooperative financing,they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction.If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range,the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement,indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.

A joint inventory–finance model for coordinating a capital‑constrained supply chain with financing limitations

Faced with economic recession,firms struggle to find ways to stay competitive and maintain market share.Effective coordination of the supply chain can solve this problem,but this may fail if existing capital constraints and financial flows are ignored.This study addresses the challenge by exploiting coordination through joint decision-making on the physical and financial flows of a capital-constrained supply chain.We also consider the capital-constrained member’s financing limitations that lead to lost sales.Two scenarios based on non-coordinated and coordinated structures are modeled in the form of bi-objective optimization problems that simultaneously optimize system costs and service levels.The models are solved using the -constraint method.The results indicate that the non-coordinated model cannot satisfy more than about 50%of the demand due to capital shortage and financing limitations,while the coordinated model can satisfy all of the demand via internal financing.Furthermore,the proposed coordination scheme leads to cost reduction for the members and the total system.To motivate all members to accept the proposed coordination scheme,a cost-sharing mechanism is applied to the coordination procedure.Finally,a sensitivity analysis concerning financial parameters is provided for validating the coordination model.

Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges:a multi‑leader–follower game approach

This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.

Supply chain coordination with CCPP for a short-life-cycle product

Supply chain coordination for short-life-cycle products with price-dependent demand is a focus in present operation management and management science fields. This paper considers the supply chain coordination problem for a single-cycle and two-selling-stage short-life-cycle product. Firstly, the inventory model of whole system is depicted with a stochastic dynamics programming. Then, a new combined contract CCPP （combined contract with pending prices） is developed to coordinate the decentralized system, and its validity for channel coordination is proved. Finally, the analysis on system performances is simulated with some examples.

An Improved Inventory Coordination Model in a Multi-stage Multi-customer Supply Chain

To solve the inventory coordination model in a multi-stage, multi-customer supply chain, this paper first analyzes the third model （integer powers of two multipliers at each firm） studied by Moutaz Khouja （2003）, and the authors take a numerical example to prove that the third model is irrational to miss feasible solution. Then this paper puts up a new improved model （integer multiplier at each firm）, and takes the example to prove it gives better results than the integer powers of two multipliers at each firm.

Supply chain coordination with inventory risk allocation

Unlike the traditional decentralized channel,the drop-shipping channel entails a retailer relaying consumers’orders to the manufacturer,which proceeds to stock the orders and directly ship them to the consumers.This study explores supply chain coordination and product quality in drop-shipping and traditional channels.Specifically,we analyze the performance of both channels under wholesale price and revenue-sharing contracts.Our study yields several key findings.First,the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate both traditional and drop-shipping channels,effectively increasing supply chain performance.Second,given the channel structure,the retailer prefers the wholesale price contract,whereas the manufacturer prefers the revenue-sharing contract.Third,product quality is higher in the drop-shipping channel when demand uncertainty is high.Finally,the implementation of the revenue-sharing contract increases product quality in the traditional channel,whereas it keeps product quality unchanged in the drop-shipping channel.

Pareto Optimal Solution for Supply Contracts with Multiple Suppliers

This paper analyzes an electronic procurement （e-procurement） process between a manufacturer and N-supplier in the e-market. We proof that using the general contract based on auction theory, i. e. the wholesale price contract, would not achieve the coordination of channel composed of the manufacturer and the winning supplier. The paper designs a contract mechanism, i.e. the side payment price-restricted contract based on auction theory, which not only ensures Pareto optimal solutions for both, but also coordinates the supply chain. A numerical experiment is provided to compare the performance of different auction mechanisms and to reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.

SIMULATING THE SUPPLY DISRUPTION FOR THE COORDINATED SUPPLY CHAIN

There are many disruptive accidents in the supply chain operations system and achieving the coordination of supply chain is main objective for supply chain research. While disruptive accidents have increasingly influenced the coordinated operation of the supply chain, existing research literature on the supply chain coordination is setting in a stationary environment. The answer for how the disruptive accidents affect the coordinated supply chain is given in this paper. Based on the benchmark supply chain which is coordinated by the negative incentive mechanism, we study the impacts of supply disruption on the supply chain system by using simulation approach in which two different distribution function of random variable are used to express the supply disruption. Comparison between these two simulation results and possible coordination mechanism under the supply disruption are proposed. From the perspective of supply chain risk management, we provide the inspiration for the manager.

Evolutionary approaches for supply chain optimisation.Part II:multi-silo supply chains

Purpose–The purpose of this paper and its companion(Part I:single and two-component supply chains)is to investigate methods to tackle complexities,constraints(including time-varying constraints)and other challenges.In this part,attention is devoted to multi-silo supply chain and the relationships between the components.The first part of the paper aims to consider two types of experimental supply chains:with one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.The second half of the paper aims to present two approaches on optimising the material flow in the real-world supply chain network.Design/methodology/approach–Cooperative coevolutionary and classical sequential approaches are taken to address the experimental multi-silo supply chains.Due to the nature and the complexity of the supply chain presented in the second half of the paper,evolutionary algorithm was not sufficient to tackle the problem.A fuzzy-evolutionary algorithm is proposed to address the problem.Findings–The proposed systems produce solutions better than solutions proposed by human experts and in much shorter time.Originality/value–The paper discusses various algorithms to provide the decision support for the real-world problems.The system proposed for the real-world supply chain is in the process of integration to the production environment.

Evolutionary approaches for supply chain optimisation Part I:single and two-component supply chains

Purpose–The purpose of this paper and its companion(Part II:multi-silo supply chains)is to investigate methods to tackle complexities,constraints(including time-varying constraints)and other challenges.In tis part,the paper aims to devote attention to single silo and two-silo supply chains.It also aims to discuss three models.The first model is based on the winebottling real-world system and exposes complexities of a single operational component of the supply chain.The second model extends it to two components:production and distribution.The last system is a real-world implementation of the two-component supply chain.Design/methodology/approach–Evolutionary approach is proposed for a single component problem.The two-component experimental supply chain is addressed by the algorithm based on cooperative coevolution.The final problem of steel sheet production is tackled with the evolutionary algorithm.Findings–The proposed systems produce solutions better than solutions proposed by human experts and in a much shorter time.Originality/value–The paper discusses various algorithms to provide the decision support for the real-world problems.The proposed systems are in the production use.

COMPARISONS OF LOW CARBON POLICIES IN SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

This paper investigates the influence of low-carbon policies on channel coordination for a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. Four different models are considered： the basic model, the carbon emission model, the carbon emission trading model and the carbon tax model. We find that the government policy on all carbon emission models is not universal among the firms as well as the customers. The carbon emission trading policy is always better than the carbon emission policy and the carbon tax policy when the allocated carbon emission quotas are greater than the carbon emissions. The carbon emission trading policy is proved to be an effective mechanism which can motivate the supply chain to reduce carbon emissions. Under certain conditions, the supply chain prefers the carbon emission trading policy with higher carbon price to other policies. In the framework of Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader, for each carbon policy, the paper presents coordination mechanism with the all-unit wholesale quantity discount contract （AWQD）. We analyze and compare the influence of low-carbon policies on channel coordination for the foul＂ low-carbon policies. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine our findings.

Coordination by Option Contracts in a Retailer-Led Supply Chain with Demand Update

This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one retailer in which the retailer designs contracts to coordinate the supplier＇s production in a two-mode production environment. This focuses on an option contract that consists of two option prices and one exercise price. By theoretical analysis and numerical example, we find that such a contract can coordinate the supplier and retailer to act in the best interest of the channel. The optimal pricing conditions are given as follows： First, option prices should be negatively correlated to the exercise price and should be in a relevant range. Second, the first-period option price should be no greater than the second-period price and should be linearly correlated to the second-period option price when the latter is beyond some threshold. The results show that such option contracts can arbitrarily allocate the extra system profit between the two parties so that each party is in a win-win situation.

Supply Chain Coordination with Sales Effort Effects and Impact of Loss Aversion on Effort Decision

A new supply contract based on sharing the sales profits as well as the cost of effort was devel- oped to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort effects. The contract coordinates the supplier’s actions with voluntary compliance; the contract is symmetric in the sense that both the supplier’s and retailer’s prof- its are linearly correlated and is more easily implemented in some situations. The impact of the retailer’s loss aversion on his effort is investigated based on the contract. After characterizing the retailer’s optimal solutions, this paper demonstrates that contrary to intuition, loss aversion weakens incentives for retailer’s sales effort and the retailer’s optimal effort decreases as the loss aversion increases.

Food safety management and regulation:International experiences and lessons for China

China is experiencing rapid urbanization, changes in diets, and modernization of food retailing and production. In this context, food safety can become a greater concern for a variety of reasons. The purpose of this article is to review the international experiences and lessons regarding food safety management, regulation, and consumer behavior, with the goal of identifying how to improve food safety in middle income countries such as China. International experience in addressing food safety provides two general kinds of lessons. First, a middle-income country such as China needs to develop the capacity to carry out risk analysis in order to better focus public resources on the most important risks. Second, it will be important to leverage market incentives so as to make the best use of limited public capacity to enforce standards. Inter- national experiences show that food safety management is feasible where market incentives exist, and that public-private partnerships can support the process of improving food safety management. Market incentives require effective consumer or buyer demand, mechanisms to identify and reward quality, and supply chain coordination. Public efforts can be targeted to supporting these market developments for the risks that are the greatest burden to public health.