Alternative Tradable Credit Scheme on General Transportation Network

This paper designs and analyzes an alternative tradable travel credit scheme on general transportation network for managing travelers’route choice behaviors.The scheme is a kind of charging and rewarding mechanism,which provides an attempt to urge travelers to plan their travel routes reasonably so that excessive traffic congestion can be mitigated.Mobility credits are imposed on those travelers who use high congested routes,while rewarded credits are given to those travelers who switch to the low congested routes.A free tradable market is created such that the travelers paying credits can purchase them from those earning them from the rewarding travel route choices.When the total amount of credits earned is equal to the amount of credits consumed,transfer of wealth can only take place among the travelers and hence overcome the inequity problem of congestion pricing.On the general transportation network,the type of tradable credit schemes can be formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraint（MPEC）model.Based on the model,a credit charging mechanism is obtained under the system optimum and Pareto-improving system optimum conditions.

Optimal strategies of automakers with demand and credit price disruptions under the dual-credit policy

In this paper,a production and pricing decision model for automakers under the dual-credit policy is formulated.Then,with consideration of demand and credit price disruptions,a nonlinear programming model that maximizes automakers’profit and constrains the production of fuel vehicles(FVs)and new energy vehicles(NEVs)is investigated.Furthermore,four strategies that involve adjusting the production or price of FVs and NEVs are proposed,and four optimal solutions for each strategy are obtained.Finally,16 scenarios are comprehensively analyzed,and a case study involving demand and credit price disruptions is conducted.The results show that the dual-credit policy has a positive impact on the development of NEVs,especially in early stages of NEV development.The FV credit coefficient has a significantly positive impact on the probability of automakers adopting adjustment strategies,while the NEV credit coefficient has almost no such impact.Moreover,automakers are inclined to adjust the prices of NEVs or the production of FVs to cope with demand and credit price disruptions.