The Effect of Spillovers on R&D Level

This paper emphasizes the effect of spillovers on R&D (Research and Development) level. When competing firms have spillovers to each other in R&D, cooperation will always increase firms' profits. Only if the positive spillover is large enough, the cooperative R&D level will be larger than the non\|cooperative R&D level. The cooperative level will be smaller than the non\|cooperative level if the positive spillover is small enough. However, the cooperative level is always smaller than the non\|cooperative level while there're negative spillovers to each other. R&D levels are the function of the spillover and will change with the spillover. The changing regularity is related to the sign of spillover and to whether they're cooperative or not. Spillovers made by the competing firms are usually different. When spillovers are small enough, the larger the spillover obtained from the other, the smaller the firm will invest in R&D; inversely, when the spillover is large enough, the larger spillovers obtains from the other, the larger the firm will invest in R&D.

NEW PROSPEROUS FIELD FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONS——R&D TECHNOLOGIES OF AUTO PRODUCTS

With the rapid development of China auto industry, the Chinese Government and the auto industry itself have given more and more attention to the upgrading self-R&D capacity of auto products. Ten years later, it is predicted that the national economy and living standard will be improved greatly, and there will be a peak of the procurement

Influence Factors and Development Model of Regional Ecotourism Cooperation in China

Regional ecotourism cooperation provides an institutional guarantee that brings together ecological resources development, protection of natural ecologies and regional economic growth, and also is one of the keys to improve the level of China＇s ecotourism development. China＇s administrative regions are divided by large areas of natural geography, such as vast tracts of land, mountainous areas and bodies of water. Given the structure of China＇s administrative system, administrative areas make independent and uncoordinated decisions concerning the use of ecological resources, resulting in low-level ecotourism products and redundant construction projects undertaken by local governments, limiting the further improvement of China＇s ecotourism level. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a spatial system and a model of regional ecotourism cooperation in line with China＇s national conditions. This paper adopts an inductive deductive method analyze systematically the connotations and obstacles of China＇s regional ecotourism cooperation, and proposes space development and cooperative model. Research shows that the inescapable choice is cross-regional ecotourism cooperation based on natural zonality, cultural similarity, coordinated regional economic development and policy integration. The key existing obstacles include administrative barriers, lack of motivation to cooperate and loose cooperation patterns. Future regional ecotourism cooperation should define the thematic function area, cooperation zones, scenic roads and ecotourist routes, to establish the cross-regional integration development system and realize systematic optimization. This study is of theoretical value for the development of regional ecotourism cooperation and the construction of spatial systems in China.

A Bounded Commitment in Vertical Collaborations of New Product Development

Uncertainty is a main source of opportunistic behaviors in research and development cooperations,which challenges strategic decisions ranging from investments to operations.To avoid opportunism arising in cooperations,commitments(either formal contracts or informal communications)are generally made in advance by members of an alliance.However,how does a commitment encourage R&D investments and ultimately enhance the total performance,without loss of flexibility in ex post operations?This study attempts to answer this by investigating a bounded commitment in the context of vertical collaborations in a supply chain.In this exploratory study,a 3-stage game model is used(by backward induction)to examine a two-echelon supply chain under a bounded commitment in NPD.Our analysis shows that upstream R&D investment is stimulated more and that both members are better off under the bounded commitment.At the same time,when the relative bargaining power between the supplier and the manufacturer falls into an appropriate area,it is possible to reach a bounded commitment,and the manufacturer is more sensitive to this relationship.Finally,the bounded commitment restrains opportunistic behaviors,but there is no strong sign that an increase in the ratio of the order outside the chain to the inside one can make firms better.