This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting...This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting on debt contracts,while also exploring the influence of corporate governance on fair value accounting.The study emphasizes the importance of considering the interests and legal status of creditors in the context of debt contracts.The findings indicate that strong corporate governance can reduce the likelihood of debt default and that the company’s restructuring costs in the event of a default determine whether improved corporate governance will increase or decrease debt costs.Additionally,the study reveals that the strength of corporate governance affects the value relevance of fair value accounting.However,the impact of fair value accounting on debt contracts is not inherently positive or negative;for instance,companies may use fair value adjustments with manipulative intent to enhance performance.Ultimately,the research highlights that discussions about corporate governance should not prioritize shareholder interests exclusively but also consider the legitimate position of creditors.展开更多
This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between accounting information and reputation, an informal ins...This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between accounting information and reputation, an informal institution. Empirical results using a sample of family firms listed in the Chinese A-share stock market from 2004 to 2007 show that in China, where the legal environment is far from perfect, the complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information is more pronounced than is the substitutional relationship. Thus, the aggregate effect is that a better reputation improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts. Besides the aggregate effect, this paper also provides evidence of the substitutional and complementary relationships between reputation and accounting separately.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting on debt contracts,while also exploring the influence of corporate governance on fair value accounting.The study emphasizes the importance of considering the interests and legal status of creditors in the context of debt contracts.The findings indicate that strong corporate governance can reduce the likelihood of debt default and that the company’s restructuring costs in the event of a default determine whether improved corporate governance will increase or decrease debt costs.Additionally,the study reveals that the strength of corporate governance affects the value relevance of fair value accounting.However,the impact of fair value accounting on debt contracts is not inherently positive or negative;for instance,companies may use fair value adjustments with manipulative intent to enhance performance.Ultimately,the research highlights that discussions about corporate governance should not prioritize shareholder interests exclusively but also consider the legitimate position of creditors.
文摘This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between accounting information and reputation, an informal institution. Empirical results using a sample of family firms listed in the Chinese A-share stock market from 2004 to 2007 show that in China, where the legal environment is far from perfect, the complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information is more pronounced than is the substitutional relationship. Thus, the aggregate effect is that a better reputation improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts. Besides the aggregate effect, this paper also provides evidence of the substitutional and complementary relationships between reputation and accounting separately.