A class of closed-loop supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is designed, in which re-distribution, remanufacturing and reuse are considered synthetically. The manufacturer is in charge o...A class of closed-loop supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is designed, in which re-distribution, remanufacturing and reuse are considered synthetically. The manufacturer is in charge of recollecting and re-disposal the used products. Demands of ultimate products and collecting quantity of used products are described as the function of prices and reference prices. A non-linear dynamic pricing model for this closed-loop supply chain is established. A numerical example is designed, and the results of this example verified the model’s validity to price for the operation of closed-loop supply chain system.展开更多
This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting eff...This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.展开更多
在不确定市场需求和回收数量的背景下,将决策者风险规避行为纳入到闭环供应链中,研究决策者风险规避系数、消费者WTP(willing to pay)、不确定性水平对闭环供应链的定价影响。研究发现:决策者的风险规避系数会间接影响回收价格;消费者WT...在不确定市场需求和回收数量的背景下,将决策者风险规避行为纳入到闭环供应链中,研究决策者风险规避系数、消费者WTP(willing to pay)、不确定性水平对闭环供应链的定价影响。研究发现:决策者的风险规避系数会间接影响回收价格;消费者WTP对再制品销售价格总是有利的,但对新产品销售价格和回收价格的影响与决策者风向规避特性有关;不确定性水平对定价决策的影响与风险持有者有关。展开更多
Cause-related marketing(CRM),as an organic combination of marketing and corporate social responsibility(CSR),has been widely used in the supply chain.However,the existing literature rarely studies the CRM strategy the...Cause-related marketing(CRM),as an organic combination of marketing and corporate social responsibility(CSR),has been widely used in the supply chain.However,the existing literature rarely studies the CRM strategy the in the supply chain.This paper explores the pricing decisions and CRM strategy of supply chain members by examining a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,where the manufacturer produces two quality differentiated products.By developing a Stackelberg model for three scenarios,including the No CRM strategy,CRM strategy for the high-quality product,and CRM strategy for the low-quality product,this paper finds that the CRM strategy will result in higher wholesale and sales prices for the cause-related product.In addition,consumers’pro-sociality and the degree of product quality differentiation are critical to the manufacturer’s choice of CRM strategy.When the quality difference differs significantly,the manufacturer should implement CRM for the high-quality product in a market with low consumer pro-sociality and for the low-quality product in a market with high consumer pro-sociality;when the product quality difference is slight,the manufacturer should choose to implement CRM for the low-quality product regardless of consumer’s pro-sociality.Furthermore,the model is extended to that the retailer implements the CRM strategy and a retailer-led supply chain.The results indicate that CRM strategy in the supply chain is not influenced by the implementing entity or the supply chain leader.展开更多
文摘A class of closed-loop supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is designed, in which re-distribution, remanufacturing and reuse are considered synthetically. The manufacturer is in charge of recollecting and re-disposal the used products. Demands of ultimate products and collecting quantity of used products are described as the function of prices and reference prices. A non-linear dynamic pricing model for this closed-loop supply chain is established. A numerical example is designed, and the results of this example verified the model’s validity to price for the operation of closed-loop supply chain system.
基金supported by funding from National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72301087 and 71931009National Social Science Fund of China under Grant No.22CGL014+2 种基金Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.LQ23G010002Zhejiang Provincial Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project under Grant No.24NDQN007YBResearch Start-up fund of Hangzhou Normal University under Grant No.4135C50221204091.
文摘This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.
文摘在不确定市场需求和回收数量的背景下,将决策者风险规避行为纳入到闭环供应链中,研究决策者风险规避系数、消费者WTP(willing to pay)、不确定性水平对闭环供应链的定价影响。研究发现:决策者的风险规避系数会间接影响回收价格;消费者WTP对再制品销售价格总是有利的,但对新产品销售价格和回收价格的影响与决策者风向规避特性有关;不确定性水平对定价决策的影响与风险持有者有关。
基金This work has been supported in part by the Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications Research Fund project for Introducing Talents(high-level teachers)(No.NYY219002).
文摘Cause-related marketing(CRM),as an organic combination of marketing and corporate social responsibility(CSR),has been widely used in the supply chain.However,the existing literature rarely studies the CRM strategy the in the supply chain.This paper explores the pricing decisions and CRM strategy of supply chain members by examining a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,where the manufacturer produces two quality differentiated products.By developing a Stackelberg model for three scenarios,including the No CRM strategy,CRM strategy for the high-quality product,and CRM strategy for the low-quality product,this paper finds that the CRM strategy will result in higher wholesale and sales prices for the cause-related product.In addition,consumers’pro-sociality and the degree of product quality differentiation are critical to the manufacturer’s choice of CRM strategy.When the quality difference differs significantly,the manufacturer should implement CRM for the high-quality product in a market with low consumer pro-sociality and for the low-quality product in a market with high consumer pro-sociality;when the product quality difference is slight,the manufacturer should choose to implement CRM for the low-quality product regardless of consumer’s pro-sociality.Furthermore,the model is extended to that the retailer implements the CRM strategy and a retailer-led supply chain.The results indicate that CRM strategy in the supply chain is not influenced by the implementing entity or the supply chain leader.
