One of the aims of the Universal Declaration on B ioethics and Human Rights （UNESCO） is to ＂promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights＂,l Here are two overarching principles at work, ensuring that ...One of the aims of the Universal Declaration on B ioethics and Human Rights （UNESCO） is to ＂promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights＂,l Here are two overarching principles at work, ensuring that the biomedical sciences fulfill their task within an ethical framework. The principle of respect for human dignity is a universal moral concept, meant to be applied in human encounters. Protecting human rights underscores the legal principle of not only affirming the fundamental equality of all human beings, but equally safeguarding it. These two principles are universally defined, but are ordinarily specified by the particular value system of individual cultures in which they are employed. It is within such particular cultural application that their relevance stands out. The thrust of this paper is that, since principles are general action guides, they actually constitute a universal language for the analysis and evaluation of all human conduct. However, there is also recognition of the fact that moral contexts vary from culture to culture, and that while the scope of the two principles above is not restricted by any particular culture, it is indeed those cultural specifics of each moral context that constitute the framework within which the principles become operational. As general action guides, I will argue that these principles lack moral relevance outside of those particular cultural settings wherein they are contextualized. Without such relevance, these principles become meaningless mantras. I will further show that such principles do not merely uphold values informed by particular cultures, but they are an embodiment of values inherent to human nature in general. Consequently, these principles do not just serve as instruments for addressing issues peculiar to ＂Western bioethics＂ or any other particular cultural setting in an exclusive sense, but are also used for moderating bioethics discourse that transcend particular cultural boundaries. I will further explain that such universal discourse is potentially instructive with regards to how cultural universals are viewed in relation to the cultural particulars, and that this discourse essentially becomes a lingua franca for cross-cultural dialogue in bioethics.展开更多
As the title of this paper suggests, I intend to draw attention to what, in my opinion, lies at the core of the shared notion in both Kant and Habermas. This will be the concern of the first part of my paper. My focus...As the title of this paper suggests, I intend to draw attention to what, in my opinion, lies at the core of the shared notion in both Kant and Habermas. This will be the concern of the first part of my paper. My focus will then shift, in the second part, to Habermas＇s views on freedom. In due time, however, as the provocative question mark in the title suggests, the notion of freedom becomes questionable. I will conclude by examining Frankfurt＇s notion of coercion in order to show that Habermas＇s notion of freedom is not only questionable but can, at times, be coercive. Throughout this paper, the reader shall be encouraged to see and possibly appreciate that there is a degree of similarity between the two thinkers. Shall the reader be hard put to gauge this similarity or shall the reader promptly appreciate it and take it into consideration？ I will argue--and demonstrate--that a certain amount of similarity can readily be drawn between the two. I will leave it up to the reader to decide whether this similarity is a forced similarity or whether this is a similarity that one perceives at a first glance and thus ought to consider. This paper could better be appreciated if the reader has reasonable knowledge of the Hegelian critique of Kant＇s Categorical Imperative.展开更多
文摘One of the aims of the Universal Declaration on B ioethics and Human Rights （UNESCO） is to ＂promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights＂,l Here are two overarching principles at work, ensuring that the biomedical sciences fulfill their task within an ethical framework. The principle of respect for human dignity is a universal moral concept, meant to be applied in human encounters. Protecting human rights underscores the legal principle of not only affirming the fundamental equality of all human beings, but equally safeguarding it. These two principles are universally defined, but are ordinarily specified by the particular value system of individual cultures in which they are employed. It is within such particular cultural application that their relevance stands out. The thrust of this paper is that, since principles are general action guides, they actually constitute a universal language for the analysis and evaluation of all human conduct. However, there is also recognition of the fact that moral contexts vary from culture to culture, and that while the scope of the two principles above is not restricted by any particular culture, it is indeed those cultural specifics of each moral context that constitute the framework within which the principles become operational. As general action guides, I will argue that these principles lack moral relevance outside of those particular cultural settings wherein they are contextualized. Without such relevance, these principles become meaningless mantras. I will further show that such principles do not merely uphold values informed by particular cultures, but they are an embodiment of values inherent to human nature in general. Consequently, these principles do not just serve as instruments for addressing issues peculiar to ＂Western bioethics＂ or any other particular cultural setting in an exclusive sense, but are also used for moderating bioethics discourse that transcend particular cultural boundaries. I will further explain that such universal discourse is potentially instructive with regards to how cultural universals are viewed in relation to the cultural particulars, and that this discourse essentially becomes a lingua franca for cross-cultural dialogue in bioethics.
文摘As the title of this paper suggests, I intend to draw attention to what, in my opinion, lies at the core of the shared notion in both Kant and Habermas. This will be the concern of the first part of my paper. My focus will then shift, in the second part, to Habermas＇s views on freedom. In due time, however, as the provocative question mark in the title suggests, the notion of freedom becomes questionable. I will conclude by examining Frankfurt＇s notion of coercion in order to show that Habermas＇s notion of freedom is not only questionable but can, at times, be coercive. Throughout this paper, the reader shall be encouraged to see and possibly appreciate that there is a degree of similarity between the two thinkers. Shall the reader be hard put to gauge this similarity or shall the reader promptly appreciate it and take it into consideration？ I will argue--and demonstrate--that a certain amount of similarity can readily be drawn between the two. I will leave it up to the reader to decide whether this similarity is a forced similarity or whether this is a similarity that one perceives at a first glance and thus ought to consider. This paper could better be appreciated if the reader has reasonable knowledge of the Hegelian critique of Kant＇s Categorical Imperative.
