According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with ...According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.展开更多
In this paper, we consider the dual risk model in which periodic taxation are paid according to a loss-carry-forward system and dividends are paid under a threshold strategy. We give an analytical approach to derive t...In this paper, we consider the dual risk model in which periodic taxation are paid according to a loss-carry-forward system and dividends are paid under a threshold strategy. We give an analytical approach to derive the expression of gδ(u) (i.e. the Laplace transform of the first upper exit time). We discuss the expected discounted tax payments for this model and obtain its corresponding integro-differential equations. Finally, for Erlang (2) inter-innovation distribution, closedform expressions for the expected discounted tax payments are given.展开更多
基金funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71772029)LiaoNing Revitalization Talents Program(No.XLYC2007052)Tax Accounting Research Center of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
文摘According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.
文摘In this paper, we consider the dual risk model in which periodic taxation are paid according to a loss-carry-forward system and dividends are paid under a threshold strategy. We give an analytical approach to derive the expression of gδ(u) (i.e. the Laplace transform of the first upper exit time). We discuss the expected discounted tax payments for this model and obtain its corresponding integro-differential equations. Finally, for Erlang (2) inter-innovation distribution, closedform expressions for the expected discounted tax payments are given.
