Listening and the Well-tempered Controversy（With Reference to Intercultural Exchange）

The issue of this study continues the analysis of persuasive truth （the ＂truth＂ of beliefs）, a problem debated by us inseveral articles already published, especially in two of them： Doxastic Dialectics （1999） and The Probable and theProblem （2010）. In this new ＂chapter,＂ our intention is to develop more details from the perspective of subjectivity,which has a grounding role in doxastic dialectics. Doxa＇s axiomatic mechanism tries to temper the subjectivedimension of persuasive truth, by submitting the doxastic proofs to the control of the oppositional principle（=antithetic ＂reasoning＂）. Doxastic thinking discovers dialectically its own ratio （=measure）, progressivelyincreasing the relevance of the listening capacity. In the text that follows, the concept of listening is used in a largerthan sensitive sense, being equivalent to condition of receptivity.

所予的新神话?——与唐热风商榷

麦克道尔为经验论提出了一个著名的解决方案,即概念论。这个方案可以让我们避开所予的神话而不陷入融贯论。唐热风认为,概念论存在两个鸿沟,即经验与信念之间、经验与世界之间的鸿沟。这两个鸿沟使得经验成为信念与世界之间的中介物,从而导致了所予的新神话。我将表明,唐热风的指责并不成立。她所说的第一个鸿沟是基于信念原则之上。然而,无论是从正面论证,还是间接辩护的角度看,信念原则都是站不住脚的。第二个鸿沟则是忽视了析取论而导致的。没有了两个鸿沟,经验无论在何种意义上都不是所予。最后,我将指出,概念论的问题并不在于它太弱了,而是太强了。

信念辩护与信念论

走克道尔的概念论试图避开所予的神话而保留经验对信念的辩护作用,从而结束在所予论和融贯论之间的无尽摆荡。但由于概念论否认经验包含断定态度,因而造成经验不足以辩护信念。对概念论的辩护观念的批评提示了一种信念论的理论取向,即认为经验是一种信念。信念论对于经验与信念之间的关系问题,在走克道尔概念论和戴维森融贯论之外找到了一条出路。