Innovation Incentive of Downstream Firms in Stackelberg Duopoly Model

The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.

Dynamics of a Bertrand Duopoly Game of the Greek Oil Market and Application of the d-Backtest Method

This work presents the complexity that emerges in a Bertrand duopoly between two companies in the Greek oil market, one of which is semi-public and the other is private. The game uses linear demand functions for differentiated products from the existing literature and asymmetric cost functions that arose after approaches using the published financial reports of the two oil companies (Hellenic Petroleum and Motor Oil). The game is based on the assumption of homogeneous players who are characterized by bounded rationality and follow an adjustment mechanism. The players’ decisions for each time period are expressed by two difference equations. A dynamical analysis of the game’s discrete dynamical system is made by finding the equilibrium positions and studying their stability. Numerical simulations include bifurcation diagrams and strange attractors. Lyapunov numbers’ graphs and sensitivity analysis in initial conditions prove the algebraic results and reveal the complexity and chaotic behavior of the system focusing on the two parameters k1 and k2 (speed of adjustment for each player). The d-Backtest method is applied through which an attempt is made to control the chaos that appears outside the stability space in order to return to the locally asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium for the system.

Static Aspect of Heterogeneous Competition in Duopoly

The study gives a comparison between price policy and quantity policy in duopoly producing differentiated goods with different production costs and indicates which is more beneficial. Further, it is investigated that in a non-linear duopoly with differentiated goods and two different policies, firms may earn more profit if they choose a quantity policy in a stable economy when the marginal production cost of both the firms is the same. If the production cost of both firms is different, then the price policy is better only when the firm is efficient.

Duopoly Competition Between Chauffeured Car and Taxi:An Analysis of Pricing and Market Segmentation

Chauffeured car service(CCS) has developed rapidly in recent years. Although CCS brings convenience and effectiveness, it also triggers some new problems like vicious competition. This work studies the duopoly competition between CCS company and taxi company, in terms of different average cost and number of vehicles of two companies. To find the solutions like the pricing scheme to ease the vicious competition, Hotelling model is introduced. The Hotelling-type model is used to present passengers’ preferences to the companies. Besides, failing situation is taken into account in the Hotelling model to describe the situation where passenger’s demand is not satisfied in reality. This work theoretically analyzes the price scheme and equilibrium market segmentation based on the average cost and number of vehicles of each company. Furthermore, companies’ profits, passengers’ utility and social welfare in equilibrium are revealed based on the game theory. The study shows that both of companies can get optimal profits by setting effective price scheme. The company which has higher price, definitely gets less market share. In addition, moderate competition can lead to positive influence on social welfare.

Bifurcations and Chaos in a Nonlinear Discrete Time Cournot Duopoly Game

A nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game is investigated in this paper. The conditions of existence for saddle-node bifurcation, transcritical bifurcation and flip bifurcation are derived using the center manifold theorem and the bifurcation theory. We prove that there exists chaotic behavior in the sense of Marotto＇s definition of chaos. The numerical simulations not only show the consistence with our theoretical analysis, but also exhibit the complex but interesting dynamical behaviors of the model. The computation of maximum Lyapunov exponents confirms the theoretical analysis of the dynamical behaviors of the system.

Optimization of cloud load balancing using fitness function and duopoly theory

Purpose-Current industrial scenario is largely dependent on cloud computing paradigms.On-demand services provided by cloud data centre are paid as per use.Hence,it is very important to make use of the allocated resources to the maximum.The resource utilization is highly dependent on the allocation of resources to the incoming request.The allocation of requests is done with respect to the physical machines present in the datacenter.While allocating the tasks to these physical machines,it needs to be allocated in such a way that no physical machine is underutilized or over loaded.To make sure of this,optimal load balancing is very important.Design/methodology/approach-The paper proposes an algorithm which makes use of the fitness functions and duopoly game theory to allocate the tasks to the physical machines which can handle the resource requirement of the incoming tasks.The major focus of the proposed work is to optimize the load balancing in a datacenter.When optimization happens,none of the physical machine is neither overloaded nor under-utilized,hence resulting in efficient utilization of the resources.Findings-The performance of the proposed algorithm is compared with different existing load balancing algorithms such as round-robin load(RR)ant colony optimization(ACO),artificial bee colony(ABC)with respect to the selected parameters response time,virtual machine migrations,host shut down and energy consumption.All the four parameters gave a positive result when the algorithm is simulated.Originality/value-The contribution of this paper is towards the domain of cloud load balancing.The paper is proposing a novel approach to optimize the cloud load balancing process.The results obtained show that response time,virtual machine migrations,host shut down and energy consumption are reduced in comparison to few of the existing algorithms selected for the study.The proposed algorithm based on the duopoly function and fitness function brings in an optimized performance compared to the four algorithms analysed.

Optimal Two-Part Tariff Licensing in a Differentiated Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.

The Effect of Green Technology Adoption Strategy on Duopoly Competition

Given consumers’trade-offs between conventional economic and environmental attributes of products,we provide a game-theoretic model to explore the role of GTA strategy in duopoly competition by incorporating two salient features:Two product types—The green product produced by a firm with GTA strategy and the ordinary product produced by a firm without GTA strategy,and two consumer segments,i.e.,the green consumers who are willing to pay for green products and the ordinary consumers who are willing to pay for ordinary products.Our analysis shows that GTA strategy may either increase or decrease the green firm’s quality provision.The subtle relationship between the green firm’s quality strategy and GTA strategy not only affects its own equilibrium performances but its rival’s.We also find that two consumer segments may be better off in the presence of a lower GTA intensity.Additionally,although the GTA strategy benefits the environment,the GTA investment is not the more the better.Finally,we find that GTA strategy would lead to higher social welfare only when the GTA efficiency is high enough.Our work not only provides an alternative economic explanation why some firms choose to implement GTA strategy and some do not in reality,but gives managerial insights for firms with different GTA strategies as well as policy insights for the social planner.

基于Cournot Model与Bertrand Model寡头竞争模型的药品最优定价策略

本文将竞争博弈模型引用到药品定价策略中,分别从制造商利润最大化,销售商利润最大化以及总体药品市场价值最大化的角度,研究了在Cournot Model下,制造商应该对销售商采取如何定价策略,而销售商应该如何应对才能达到总体利润最大化;在Bertrand Model下,论证多个药品制造商应该采取一体化的价格管理体系,并在文章最后给出Cournot Model以及Bertrand Model的寡头竞争模型在药品流通渠道管理中的应用。

Econophysical Applications for Economic Progress:Monopoly and Competition Cases

This study attempts to investigate the relationship between monopoly and competition and the philosophy of progress,using the methods,models,and terms from physics.The term“progress”is a newly adopted term and is defined as the value of an increase in the production rate per unit of time.It is shown that to achieve progress,it is necessary to increase the production on a non-linear basis over time.Therefore,it is enough to have many firms that interact with each other under the influence of“market forces”.It is important to have a high level of university education,a legal environment for competition and indestructible antitrust laws.Even without strong science,you can make progress by acquiring technology and creating conditions for competition in the market.A factor that strongly influences progress,of course,is technology.For the development of technology,there is a great need for science.Science is a very powerful factor that affects the non-linear change in the economic development.It is shown that during the transition period from an absolute monopoly to an imperfect monopoly the system becomes more complex,and its output characteristics become non-linear as a function of time.It was found that the relationship between monopoly and competition is very simple,and there is no contradiction between them.Initially,the market is born as a monopoly,and then with the creation of similar firms,competition,as the natural market process,begins between them.

Study on the share ratio between a service provider and two carriers

Based on the premise of obtaining optimal revenue, a mathematical model about operation strategies of service provider （SP） in duopoly telecom market was established in this article. In consideration of complexities, the model was transformed from a tri-game to two-party game model under four hypotheses. Nash equilibrium solution between SP and two carriers was proposed with detailed analyses. The value ranges under different cases provided a reference for carriers and SP while deciding share ratios.

Optimal technology licensing contract with quality improvement innovation under Cournot competition

This paper analyzes the optimal licensing contract for the patentor with a quality improvement innovation in a Cournot duopoly market.We examine and compare three licensing contracts(fixed-fee licensing,royalty licensing,and two-part ad valorem licensing)in terms of the patent-holding firm’s profit,consumer surplus,and social welfare.We also study the impact of quality differences on the choice of licensing contract.One might expect that consumer surplus and social welfare are greater under fixed-fee licensing.However,we show that this conclusion seems to be untrue under quality improvement technology licensing.Moreover,we find that(1)there exists a threshold for the degree of quality difference above which fixed-fee licensing will be listed for the consideration of the patent-holding firm and below which it will be abandoned;(2)royalty licensing and two-part ad valorem licensing are always profitable for the patentholding firm and two-part ad valorem licensing brings the patentee the most profit.