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Prevention of the Member's Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Alliance 被引量:1
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作者 Chenglin Liao Kaiqian Wu Xianmu Qiao 《Chinese Business Review》 2003年第5期50-53,共4页
Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. T... Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. Then, by introducing a third-party system into dynamic alliance, a model of incomplete information dynamic game theory is formulated in the principal-agent framework. The model shows the dynamic consistency between a member's income and the dynamic alliance's profit, and that moral hazard can be prevented by an allocation policy With both characteristics of incentive measures and supervision, which is designed by a third-party system. Finally, the composition of the third-party system is discussed. 展开更多
关键词 dynamic alliance moral hazard Principal-agent Third-party system
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