In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different...In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.展开更多
After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic...After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.展开更多
基金Project supported by the Doctoral Foundation Project of Guizhou University(Grant No.(2019)49)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71961003)the Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province(Grant No.7223)。
文摘In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.However,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player’s learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player’s strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner’s dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In contrast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.
基金the Natural Science Research Fund of Hubei Province(No.2014BDH121)
文摘After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.
