Calculation of Ecological Compensation Standards for the Kuancheng Traditional Chestnut Cultivation System

Kuancheng Traditional Chestnut Cultivation System is located in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Water Containment Function Area.The Traditional Chestnut Cultivation System is characterized by agroforestry compound,and some studies have shown that the compound planting of chestnut has better ecological benefits than the single chestnut planting mode.However,most of the local farmers in Kuancheng are mainly engaged in single chestnut cultivation.Through ecological compensation,farmers are being encouraged to change their chestnut planting mode,which can achieve the purpose of inheriting China’s important agricultural heritage and improving the ecological benefits.This paper introduces preference coefficients to correct for opportunity costs,and through interviews and questionnaires,we obtained the input and output of the single chestnut cultivation,chestnut-maitake,chestnut-millet,and chestnut-chicken and the income of laborers working outside the home in the Kuancheng area.Through analysis and calculation,we obtained the following results:(1)Although the net income of the three chestnut composite modes is higher,their economic input is higher than that of a single chestnut planting mode,and the return on unit investment is lower.(2)The average income of young and middle-aged workers who work outside is higher than that of the local farming industry,so the local chestnut agroforestry plantation has a higher opportunity cost.(3)The final calculation shows that the chestnut-chicken agroforestry operation mode needs no compensation,the chestnut-maitake plantation mode is compensated at least 1608.5 USD ha^(-1) yr^(-1),and the minimum compensation for the chestnut-millet plantation mode is 198.3 USD ha^(-1) yr^(-1),which can guarantee that farmers receive the full value of their creations.Ultimately,farmers are incentivized to revive the traditional agroforestry production mode to achieve both economic and ecological benefits while inheriting agricultural heritage.

Study on Consistent Agricultural Compensation Standards for Ecosystem and Ecological Value

Chinese and international studies on agricultural ecological compensation standards fall into two categories:While some focus on the cost of ecological protection,others proceed from the value of ecological services.Cost and value are two aspects of an integrated input-output system,but most existing studies on both types of compensation standards are independent of each other.Drawing upon the reasonable elements from both types of studies to overcome each other’s one-sidedness,this paper has created a“model of consistent compensation standards for the ecosystem and ecological value,”integrating the research approaches for both types of compensation standards under the same analytical framework.Through the application and analysis of this model,this paper has verified the model’s theoretical and practical significance in correcting the one-sidedness of each type of research.The principles and methodologies for creating the model may be further extended to research on agricultural ecological compensation standards under different conditions.In some circumstances,the ability of relatively redundant resources to create ecological value is overlooked.To address this problem,this paper employs a linear programming(LP)sensitivity analysis instrument to correct the model’s initial optimal solutions and arrive at consistent compensation standards that satisfy the consistency between ecosystem and ecological value,thus perfecting the theoretical and methodological system created by this paper for research on agricultural ecological compensation standards.

Research on the ecological compensation standard of the basin pollution control project based on evolutionary game theory and by taking Xiangjiang River as a case

Ecological compensation is a new resource and environment management model.As one of the main areas for implementing ecological compensation policies,basin ecological compensation has become an important measure for encouraging basin pollution control projects and improving the quality of regional economic development.By applying the basic game analysis of evolutionary game theory and building an evolutionary game model with a“reward-punishment”mechanism,this paper compares the interest-related decision-making behaviors of the upstream and downstream stakeholders of basin ecological compensation.By using data on the water quality of Xiangjiang River Basin,this paper calculates the rewards and penalties in different intervals by building a parametric regression mathematical model and employing the local linear regression method.Results show that a decline in water quality should be fined RMB 925500 yuan,an improvement in water quality should be awarded RMB 1227800 yuan,and a deteriorating water quality should be severely fined RMB 5087600 yuan.

Responses of grazing households to different levels of payments for ecosystem services

Introduction:Payments for Ecosystem Services(PES)programs have been implemented globally to protect ecosystems while securing the well-being of affected people.Reasonable payment standards are key to successful PES programs.Although some approaches are available for determining payment standards,few studies have applied them for grassland conservation with location indicators and socioeconomic contexts properly considered.Methods:Using China’s first pilot Grassland Ecological Compensation Policy(GECP)as an example,we analyzed the effects of payment levels,other natural and socioeconomic factors on herders’willingness to participate in the GECP in Damao County in Inner Mongolia where grassland degradation is happening at an alarming rate due to overgrazing and cropland expansion.Outcomes:Our results show that households with lower herding income,older age,higher education,larger grassland areas,and worse social relationships are more inclined to participate in the GECP.Conservation payment level,as well as natural and socioeconomic contextual factors,significantly affect the response of herdsmen,and a reasonable grassland payment standard with a 95%policy compliance rate should be 8.8 yuan mu-1.Discussion and Conclusion:Our findings can inform governments to develop effective PES programs to balance the need of human well-being improvement and grassland conservation in China and beyond.