Belief-eliminativism is a theory of belief in the philosophy of science whose basic position is that there is no belief,and that belief,as an immature concept,should be eliminated along with the progress of human unde...Belief-eliminativism is a theory of belief in the philosophy of science whose basic position is that there is no belief,and that belief,as an immature concept,should be eliminated along with the progress of human understanding.The two different soils,philosophy of mind and epistemology,have nourished two kinds of belief-eliminativisms with different emphases:Belief-eliminativism based on neurobiology by cognitive scientists is an extreme view of naturalism;belief-eliminativism based on Bayesianism by epistemologists is a model used to describe the belief status of ideal subjects.However,these two types of belief-eliminationism have never been able to withstand the interrogation from psychology and common sense theory,and anti-realism is not a proper choice for human subjects after all.展开更多
What is the mental realization of our knowledge of the meaning of words？ Does the lexical side of our semantic competence depend on the fact that we have dedicated representations of the semantic properties of lexeme...What is the mental realization of our knowledge of the meaning of words？ Does the lexical side of our semantic competence depend on the fact that we have dedicated representations of the semantic properties of lexemes or does it arise from world knowledge, encyclopedic information, and non-linguistic categorization？ According to meaning eliminativism, lexical concepts have no robust psychological reality and our ability to use the words of a language should not be explained in terms of knowledge of their conventional semantic value, conceived as their array of possible senses. To start, I will briefly explain what meaning eliminativism is and illustrate the key arguments that have been offered in its defense. Then, I will argue that such arguments are not as persuasive as they wish, and I will show that there are convincing theoretical and empirical reasons to maintain that meaning eliminativism is not a plausible claim about the nature of our lexical skills.展开更多
文摘Belief-eliminativism is a theory of belief in the philosophy of science whose basic position is that there is no belief,and that belief,as an immature concept,should be eliminated along with the progress of human understanding.The two different soils,philosophy of mind and epistemology,have nourished two kinds of belief-eliminativisms with different emphases:Belief-eliminativism based on neurobiology by cognitive scientists is an extreme view of naturalism;belief-eliminativism based on Bayesianism by epistemologists is a model used to describe the belief status of ideal subjects.However,these two types of belief-eliminationism have never been able to withstand the interrogation from psychology and common sense theory,and anti-realism is not a proper choice for human subjects after all.
文摘What is the mental realization of our knowledge of the meaning of words？ Does the lexical side of our semantic competence depend on the fact that we have dedicated representations of the semantic properties of lexemes or does it arise from world knowledge, encyclopedic information, and non-linguistic categorization？ According to meaning eliminativism, lexical concepts have no robust psychological reality and our ability to use the words of a language should not be explained in terms of knowledge of their conventional semantic value, conceived as their array of possible senses. To start, I will briefly explain what meaning eliminativism is and illustrate the key arguments that have been offered in its defense. Then, I will argue that such arguments are not as persuasive as they wish, and I will show that there are convincing theoretical and empirical reasons to maintain that meaning eliminativism is not a plausible claim about the nature of our lexical skills.
