Initial allocation of carbon emission permits in power systems

Initial allocation modes and schemes are studied in this paper to provide guidelines for allocation of carbon emission permits in power system. We first introduce different allocation modes and the need to apply free allocation to assignability of emission permits. Then, we compare two different allocation schemes, which are based on historical emissions and generation performance standard. Further, a new allocation scheme based on Boltzmann distribution is proposed. Finally, a case study on Shanghai power grid in China is conducted to compare the allocation effects of these schemes respectively. The analytical results show that Boltzmann distribution based scheme has the best performance and should be adopted when developing initial allocation of carbon emission permits in Chinese power systems.

Estimate of Peaks of Carbon Emissions and Pricing of Carbon Emission Permit in China

With the aid of Matlab software, the peaks of China＇s carbon emissions and their appearing time in three situations were simulated, and the shallow price of carbon emission permit and its effects on China＇s economic growth were analyzed. The results show that it is most effective and feasible to reduce energy consumption per GDP by 25%, and the peak of China＇s carbon emissions will appear in 2017. As a result, energy conser- vation and emission reduction is realized, and China＇s international talk power about carbon emission will improved. However, the shallow price and permit rate of carbon emission permit calculated in the situation are the lowest, and the adverse impact of the initial price of carbon emissions on China＇s economic growth is the largest. Therefore, consideration should be given to both the promotion of pricing and trading of carbon emission permit to reduction of carbon emissions and their adverse effects on GDP in China.

Incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control under emission permit trading

In this paper,we investigate the incentive equilibrium strategies of two neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.Our paper can be viewed as an extension of the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160]in the context of the transboundary industrial pollution.Compared with the work of Yeung[2007.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution.Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,134,143-160],our research significant features(i)introduce the emission permits trading into the transboundary industrial pollution control;(ii)take into account the pollution abatement investment;(iii)examine the incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control;and(iv)design an allocation mechanism for regions’cooperative profits.Furthermore,we illustrate the results of the paper with a numerical example.The utility of this paper is how to make incentive equilibrium strategies in a situation where the neighboring regions facing transboundary industrial pollution under abatement investment and emission permits trading in a differential game setting.

Study on Cleaner Production Subsidies, Income Distribution Imbalance and Carbon Emissions Permit Reallocation Mechanism

The allocation mechanism for carbon emissions permit(CEP)is an institutional guarantee for advancing the development of China’s unified carbon trading market.The initial allocation of carbon quotas fails to solve new inequalities stemming from subsidizing cleaner production.This paper constructs a theoretical framework that describes China’s progressive decline in carbon intensity,calculates the equilibrium solution on the neoclassical saddle point path using the shooting method,and studies the income distribution imbalance caused by cleaner production subsidies and the reallocation mechanism of carbon emissions permit The main conclusion is that the incremental cleaner production subsidy policy meets the goal of maximizing welfare on the saddle point path,but it may lead to over-investment in the clean sector,thus causing the income distribution imbalance among entities.Further research suggests that the amount of carbon emissions permit acquired by the clean sector should be higher than the actual emissions in the trading market and that,as the cleaner support increases,the share of carbon emissions permit acquired by the sector should be constantly increased through reallocation mechanism.This helps achieve the Pareto improvement in all parties’economic benefi ts.