At its 19th National Congress,the Communist Party of China vowed to“strengthen the financial sector’s ability to serve the real economy.”However,many studies provide evidence of the opposite trend,a problematic“tr...At its 19th National Congress,the Communist Party of China vowed to“strengthen the financial sector’s ability to serve the real economy.”However,many studies provide evidence of the opposite trend,a problematic“transition from the real to the virtual,”among Chinese enterprises.Meanwhile,the investment efficiency of China’s Social Security Fund(SSF),a public fund,attracts much attention.In this context,we use A-share listed companies in China from2009 to 2018 to study the relationship between holding by the SSF and enterprise financialization.We find that SSF holding significantly inhibits financialization and that this effect is non-linear.Mechanism analysis indicates that SSF holding suppresses enterprises’financialization mainly by improving their governance.Moreover,SSF holding more strongly inhibits small-scale(vs.large-scale),state-owned(vs.non-state-owned),and non-eastern(vs.eastern)enterprises in China.Furthermore,SSF holding can alleviate corporate value impairment caused by financialization.The conclusions enrich theoretical research and provide empirical evidence that may help regulatory authorities to guide investment by enterprises and prevent financial risks.展开更多
基金financial support from the Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project(No.15YJC790095)the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71602022,71872040)the National Social Science Foundation of China(No.18BG1062,19ZDA097)
文摘At its 19th National Congress,the Communist Party of China vowed to“strengthen the financial sector’s ability to serve the real economy.”However,many studies provide evidence of the opposite trend,a problematic“transition from the real to the virtual,”among Chinese enterprises.Meanwhile,the investment efficiency of China’s Social Security Fund(SSF),a public fund,attracts much attention.In this context,we use A-share listed companies in China from2009 to 2018 to study the relationship between holding by the SSF and enterprise financialization.We find that SSF holding significantly inhibits financialization and that this effect is non-linear.Mechanism analysis indicates that SSF holding suppresses enterprises’financialization mainly by improving their governance.Moreover,SSF holding more strongly inhibits small-scale(vs.large-scale),state-owned(vs.non-state-owned),and non-eastern(vs.eastern)enterprises in China.Furthermore,SSF holding can alleviate corporate value impairment caused by financialization.The conclusions enrich theoretical research and provide empirical evidence that may help regulatory authorities to guide investment by enterprises and prevent financial risks.
