Evolutionary game analysis between the government and the waste producer in the venous industry

The relationship between the government and the waste producer is always a representative and realistic issue,especially concerning the venous industry.This article is based on the true relationship between the government and the waste producer,uses the methods from the evolutionary game theory,and analyzes the relationship between the government and the waste producer in detail.

Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality

Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.

Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation study on enterprise green technology innovation

By constructing the evolutionary game model among the government,enterprises and consumers,the paper analyzes the condition that the profit and loss relationship of the game subjects and their behavior strategies reach the stable state in the green technology innovation system,and uses MATLAB to conduct data simulation analysis.The results show that the government,enterprises and consumers have path-dependent behavior choices.The larger the government incentive coefficient and subsidy coefficient is not the better,but the larger the subsidy and subsidy coefficient will hinder the green technology innovation.Government punitive measures will promote green technology innovation,but high innovation subsidies will restrain the government’s environmental regulation.Therefore,the government should further improve environmental regulation policies,increase enterprises’enthusiasm for green technology innovation and consumers’acceptance of green products,and promote the development of green technology innovation.

Research on the Strategy of Information Resource Sharing between Governments in the Perspective of Game Theory

In order to improve the operational efficiency, the government can realize the streamlining policy through the mode of government information resource sharing. By building government information resources sharing, the government breaks the inter-departmental data island. The government realizes the development direction and trend of “Internet government”. This paper also takes the information resource sharing as the game process between the government management department and the information resource sharing body, and analyzes the policy and suggestion of the information resource sharing in the perspective of game theory by constructing the sharing model of the government information resource in the perspective of game theory.

Exploring the dynamic evolutionary mechanism of game model on the protection of traditional villages

With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods.However,the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific,universal,and long-term.In this study,we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory(EGT),which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction.Besides,the study also included the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model.At the same time,numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn.Firstly,the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization,and its results and speed show consistent interdependence.Secondly,the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost,and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders,which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other.This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages,which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.

A Two-Stage Evolutionary Game Model for Collaborative Emergency Management Between Local Governments and Enterprises

Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management,but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government.This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management:non-participation,short-term participation,and long-term participation.We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises,and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises.The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0,an enterprise will participate in emergency management.The evolutionary game then enters the second stage,during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost,reputation benefit,and government subsidies,and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit,government subsidies,and emergency training cost.This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management,and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.

智慧医疗情境下四方主体隐私行为的交互机理及演化趋势研究

[目的/意义]本文针对智慧医疗情境下隐私行为研究在博弈主体、模型参数等方面的不足,探寻患者、医疗机构、智慧医疗平台和政府四方主体之间的隐私行为交互机理与演化趋势。[方法/过程]基于演化博弈理论,构建患者、医疗机构、智慧医疗平台和政府四方博弈模型。根据不同参数调节下各方行为策略的收益、成本、损失等计算收益矩阵,求解主体的演化稳定策略,并考虑不同因素对主体行为策略及系统稳定状态的影响。[结果/结论]患者的隐私披露行为与披露隐私后获得的服务收益密切相关,医疗机构的隐私保护投入成本和隐私泄露概率对其隐私保护行为有显著影响,智慧医疗平台的政府奖惩、罚款收益和投入成本是影响其严格管理行为的关键因素,政府的监管行为与奖惩机制等因素密切相关。通过应用本文模型和方法,可以动态调整隐私保护机制,明确各方职责,推动智慧医疗可持续健康发展。

Evolutionary game analysis of shared parking market diffusion under government management

The imbalance between supply and demand in urban settings poses a significant barrier to the sustainable advancement of urban transportation.Shared parking serves as a viable solution to mitigate these challenges.Nevertheless,for its sustained growth,a regulatory mechanism enforced by the government is imperative.To promote shared parking market diffusion,we construct an evolutionary game model that incorporates the government,enterprises and parking demanders.It explores stabilization strategies for these stakeholders and identifies multiple equilibrium states under different parameter conditions.The results show that the rate and stability of these evolutionary strategies are constrained by the mutual benefits derived by the three parties.Furthermore,such stakeholders are reciprocally influenced by their willingness to engage in shared parking to varying degrees.Government subsidies serve as a determining factor for the strategic choices made by both enterprises and demanders,albeit at different evolutionary rates.Demanders who have a higher value of time tend to park on-street,thereby influencing enterprise strategies.To foster the long-term growth of the shared parking market,the government must enact appropriate subsidy policies,maintain consistent regulations and advocate for increased subsidies for parking demanders to reduce the effect of temporal heterogeneity on parking behavioural choices.

The impact of government incentives and penalties on willingness to recycle plastic waste: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste,it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate.In this study,government is included as a player,alongside waste collectors and recyclers,in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling.The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling.Three conclusions are drawn from this research.First,an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process.Second,policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do.Finally,recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.

基于政府创新补贴的政府-企业Stackelberg-Bertrand博弈

政府政策对企业决策有重要影响,而创新型企业的生产经营活动与政府的创新补贴政策有密切联系。通过建立政府-企业的Stackelberg-Bertrand博弈模型,以社会福利和企业利润最大化为目标,运用逆向归纳法得到系统均衡解,通过定性分析、数值模拟讨论了政府的创新补贴率、产品定价、企业创新投入、企业利润以及社会福利等之间的关系。研究结论对国家创新驱动政策及创新性企业发展战略提出了建议。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Production Decisions of Automakers in the Chinese Automobile Industry:A Tripartite Model of Government,Automakers,and Consumers

Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)Government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.

政府补贴下平台赋能中小企业数字化转型的演化策略研究

已有研究关注到政府补贴、平台赋能可以弥补中小企业数字化转型在资源和能力上的不足,但三者间的互动关系及其相应的行为策略调整还有待深入研究。理顺三者间的协同演化关系,对于推动中小企业数字化转型、促进平台持续健康发展及提升政府补贴有效性具有重要意义。基于此,本文构建中小企业、平台和政府的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab2016对不同因素影响下的三方协同策略进行仿真分析。结果表明,政府加大对中小企业、平台的补贴力度能够提升中小企业选择加入平台、平台选择优化服务的概率,但为了发挥市场主体作用及减轻财政负担等,随着补贴力度的增加,政府选择补贴的速率会降低;平台或中小企业的吸收能力小于临界值、平台赋能资源量大于临界值均不利于三方良性互动;平台承载中小企业的数量存在最低规模边界,低于边界值平台倾向选择一般服务;政府加大对平台的惩罚力度能够提升平台选择优化服务的概率。该研究结论有助于明晰政府补贴、平台赋能和中小企业数字化转型的内在逻辑关系,为中小企业、平台和政府的行为决策提供理论借鉴,以期促进平台赋能中小企业数字化转型。

电厂和政府行为策略演化博弈与仿真研究——基于农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展视角

“双碳”背景下,农林生物质与煤耦合发电成为煤电转型的新路径。政府如何制定有效的补贴和监管政策,以及电厂如何进行正确的策略选择是促进农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展的关键。通过构建政府和电厂的混合策略博弈模型,分析双方的博弈关系和行为策略动态演变过程,并运用系统动力学进行建模仿真,进一步探析关键因素对政府和电厂行为策略的影响路径。结果表明:政府和电厂的行为策略在较长时期里无法趋于稳定,而是在相互影响中波动变化。政府制定补贴和监管策略、提高耦合发电收益、降低耦合发电成本,都将促进更多电厂选择农林生物质与煤耦合发电,从而进一步促进产业发展。

考虑政府参与的区域能源互联网协同演化研究

区域能源互联网将为“双碳”目标的实现提供安全经济的保障,聚焦其市场建设中存在的市场体系不完善、运行机制不健全等问题,构建了能源产品交易者、第三方服务商和能源互联网平台的三方市场主体演化博弈模型,分情景分析了能源互联网市场建设不同阶段的主体均衡策略,初期存在市场失灵需要引入政府监管,待市场机制完善后,政府仅充当“守夜人”即可实现市场的稳定均衡。研究发现:第一,在REI市场建设初期,交易者和服务商容易存在损人利己的机会主义行为,需要政府通过REI平台发挥监管职能;进入成熟期后,主体间的良性合作无需政府监管便可实现系统稳定均衡,并产生社会正外部效应。第二,主体的初始意愿较低时往往需要平台起到示范作用刺激均衡实现;平台通过政府激励和处罚发挥监管职能,适当的政府激励和较强的处罚力度能够刺激均衡实现。第三,平台可以通过控制搭便车收益来抑制市场中的机会主义行为,促进博弈系统实现理想均衡。

基于供应链视角的企业协同生态创新演化博弈

基于演化博弈理论建立政府规制下的供应链核心企业和非核心企业协同生态创新的演化博弈模型,并对策略选择进行稳定性分析,结合数值仿真模拟不同参数变化对系统演化的影响。结果表明:生态创新的收益越高成本越低越有助于企业协同生态创新;搭便车收益会对企业协同生态创新产生负向影响;存在一个最佳的协同收益分配系数使得双方选择协同生态创新的概率最大;政府补贴和惩罚机制对企业协同生态创新有显著推动作用。

生成式人工智能虚假信息协同共治研究

[研究目的]生成式人工智能虚假信息泛滥严重阻碍了互联网行业健康发展,协同共治有助于抑制生成式人工智能虚假信息。[研究方法]本研究从信息生成视角入手,构建“政府—生成式AI服务提供者—生成式AI服务使用者”三方协同共治演化博弈模型,进行仿真分析。[研究结论]研究结果表明,博弈主体协同共治策略受所有主体初始意愿影响;在成本支出方面,合理区间内降低技术治理成本和积极监管成本可促进生成式AI服务提供者和政府参与协同共治;在奖惩机制方面,政府奖励和惩罚措施可相互调节,且政府惩罚重心偏向生成式AI服务使用者时治理效果较好。同时,与政府惩罚相比,生成式AI服务使用者对提供者惩罚更加敏感,在合理区间内生成式AI服务提供者对政府奖励更为敏感;在社会形象方面,与公信力损失相比,政府对公信力提升更敏感。与声誉损失相比,生成式AI服务提供者对声誉提升更敏感。

应急供应链企业数字化转型的动态博弈研究

通过构建政府补贴背景下应急供应链企业数字化转型的演化博弈模型,研究应急供应链企业的行为互动机制。研究结果表明:政府补贴存在一个最优区间,并非所有的政府补贴一定会促进应急供应链企业进行数字化转型,过高或过低的政府补贴并不能明显提升供应链企业数字化转型意愿。政府应在合理区间内加强对应急供应链企业数字化转型的专项补助,提高补贴的有效性和精准度,从而促进行业的良性、有序发展,进而促进应急救援效率的提升。

中小企业间竞争情报共享策略演化博弈与仿真研究

随着中小企业间的关系由竞争转向竞合,竞争情报在中小企业之间共享成为可能。本文旨在探讨中小企业间竞争情报共享策略的演化博弈过程与影响因素,有望为中小企业的共享策略选择提供依据,并为后续理论研究与实践探索提供新的思路和参考借鉴。基于演化博弈理论,推演双方中小企业的竞争情报共享演化博弈过程,分析利益得失、博弈系统的演化稳定策略和不同参数的影响程度,并通过数值仿真对结果进行验证。研究结果显示,协同收益和惩罚成本对中小企业间竞争情报共享策略具有正向显著影响,而泄露风险和共享成本对其具有负向显著影响;当其余所有参数均确定时,可共享竞争情报的质量和竞争情报的吸收能力在某个区间内具有负向显著影响,并且两者在中小企业之间的差距越小,越有可能最终稳定于共享策略。最后,提出促进中小企业间竞争情报共享的针对性建议。

流域水污染协同治理的机制设计及演化路径分析——以新安江流域为例

为探寻流域水污染协同治理的生成逻辑和演化路径,采用协同学和演化博弈理论,建立两方联合和三方演化博弈模型,并通过稳定性分析明确系统均衡状态;仿真分析新安江流域横向生态补偿及该流域杭州-黄山市水污染治理案例,廓清协同治理作用路径和实现策略。研究发现:流域水污染协同治理蕴含属地治理和府际治理的统一,横纵向多主体协同治理的核心外部因素是引入中央政府积极督察;中央政府督察需结合不同博弈主体收益成本变动和不同博弈阶段,适时调整投入规模和督察力度,两方属地治理督察力度不宜过低,三方府际治理督察力度应适时下降;排污权交易和双向生态补偿-奖惩机制一定程度上可提升博弈主体治污动力,推动水污染积极治理行为实现,但案例中二者涉及子要素投入比例仍需优化。

工业互联网背景下高技术船舶企业融通创新演化研究——基于政府干预视角

构建工业互联网背景下地方政府、高技术船舶龙头企业及中小企业三方融通创新演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析三方稳定策略的博弈过程,探究政府干预和主体意愿对理想条件下系统演化的影响。结果表明:地方政府利用意义沟通、创新补贴、税收等干预手段能够明显加快高技术船舶龙头企业与中小企业参与融通创新的步伐,但过高的创新支持成本会加重政府负担,导致政府选择懒政;高技术船舶龙头企业与中小企业初始参与意愿较低时能够促使地方政府实施干预,但伴随两者意愿升高,地方政府是否干预受自身收益影响程度更大;高技术船舶龙头企业和中小企业参与融通创新演化速率均与其余主体初始意愿正相关。