The exact evolutionary history of any set of biological taxa is unknown, and all phylogenetic reconstructions are approximations. The problem becomes harder when one must consider a mix of vertical and lateral phyloge...The exact evolutionary history of any set of biological taxa is unknown, and all phylogenetic reconstructions are approximations. The problem becomes harder when one must consider a mix of vertical and lateral phylogenetic signals. In this paper we propose a game theoretic approach to constructing biological networks. The key hypothesis is that evolution is driven by distinct mechanisms that seek to maximize two competing objectives, taxonomic conservation and diversity. One branch of the mathematical theory of games is brought to bear. It translates this evolutionary game hypothesis into a mathematical model in two-player zero-sum games, with the zero-sum assumption conforming to one of the fundamental constraints in nature in mass and energy conservation. We demonstrate why and how a mechanistic and localized adaptation to seek out greater information for conservation and diversity may always lead to a global Nash equilibrium in phylogenetic affinity. Our game theoretic method, referred to as bioinformatic game theory, is used to construct network clusters. As an example, we applied this method to clustering of a multidomain protein family. The protein clusters identified were consistent with known protein subfamilies, indicating that this game-theoretic approach provides a new framework in biological sequence analysis, especially in studying gene-genome and domain-protein relationships.展开更多
This paper analyzes a problem processing mechanism in a new collaboration system between the main manufacturer and the supplier in the"main manufacturer-supplier"mode,which has been widely applied in the col...This paper analyzes a problem processing mechanism in a new collaboration system between the main manufacturer and the supplier in the"main manufacturer-supplier"mode,which has been widely applied in the collaborative development management of the complex product.This paper adopts the collaboration theory,the evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation to analyze the decision-making mechanism where one upstream supplier and one downstream manufacturer must process an unpredicted problem without any advance contract in common.Results show that both players'decision-makings are in some correlation with the initial state,income impact coefficients,and dealing cost.It is worth noting that only the initial state influences the final decision,while income impact coefficients and dealing cost just influence the decision process.This paper shows reasonable and practical suggestions for the manufacturer and supplier in a new collaboration system for the first time and is dedicated to the managerial implications on reducing risks of processing problems.展开更多
With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why ...With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods.However,the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific,universal,and long-term.In this study,we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory(EGT),which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction.Besides,the study also included the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model.At the same time,numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn.Firstly,the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization,and its results and speed show consistent interdependence.Secondly,the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost,and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders,which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other.This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages,which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.展开更多
The improvement of rural human settlement environment is a significant direction of the rural revitalization strategy.Based on the finite rational evolutionary game theory,a cooperative behavior evolutionary game mode...The improvement of rural human settlement environment is a significant direction of the rural revitalization strategy.Based on the finite rational evolutionary game theory,a cooperative behavior evolutionary game model of rural human settlement environment improvement PPP model with local government,social capital and rural residents as the main game players with the reward mechanism of Government Payment and one with the reward mechanism of Viability Gap Funding are constructed.Comparing the total project revenue of two reward mechanisms,the thesis will obtain the effects of choosing the reward mechanism of rural human settlement improvement PPP.Finally,available suggestions are made to the decision of the reward mechanism of PPP project about rural human settlement environment,thus promoting the application and development of PPP in rural environmental management and to promote sustainable improvement of rural habitat improvement.展开更多
文摘The exact evolutionary history of any set of biological taxa is unknown, and all phylogenetic reconstructions are approximations. The problem becomes harder when one must consider a mix of vertical and lateral phylogenetic signals. In this paper we propose a game theoretic approach to constructing biological networks. The key hypothesis is that evolution is driven by distinct mechanisms that seek to maximize two competing objectives, taxonomic conservation and diversity. One branch of the mathematical theory of games is brought to bear. It translates this evolutionary game hypothesis into a mathematical model in two-player zero-sum games, with the zero-sum assumption conforming to one of the fundamental constraints in nature in mass and energy conservation. We demonstrate why and how a mechanistic and localized adaptation to seek out greater information for conservation and diversity may always lead to a global Nash equilibrium in phylogenetic affinity. Our game theoretic method, referred to as bioinformatic game theory, is used to construct network clusters. As an example, we applied this method to clustering of a multidomain protein family. The protein clusters identified were consistent with known protein subfamilies, indicating that this game-theoretic approach provides a new framework in biological sequence analysis, especially in studying gene-genome and domain-protein relationships.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(7117111271502073)。
文摘This paper analyzes a problem processing mechanism in a new collaboration system between the main manufacturer and the supplier in the"main manufacturer-supplier"mode,which has been widely applied in the collaborative development management of the complex product.This paper adopts the collaboration theory,the evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation to analyze the decision-making mechanism where one upstream supplier and one downstream manufacturer must process an unpredicted problem without any advance contract in common.Results show that both players'decision-makings are in some correlation with the initial state,income impact coefficients,and dealing cost.It is worth noting that only the initial state influences the final decision,while income impact coefficients and dealing cost just influence the decision process.This paper shows reasonable and practical suggestions for the manufacturer and supplier in a new collaboration system for the first time and is dedicated to the managerial implications on reducing risks of processing problems.
基金funded by the Southwest Minzu University 2021 Graduate Innovative Research Master Key Project(320-022142043).
文摘With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries,which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods.However,the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific,universal,and long-term.In this study,we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory(EGT),which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction.Besides,the study also included the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model.At the same time,numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn.Firstly,the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization,and its results and speed show consistent interdependence.Secondly,the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost,and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders,which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other.This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages,which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.
文摘The improvement of rural human settlement environment is a significant direction of the rural revitalization strategy.Based on the finite rational evolutionary game theory,a cooperative behavior evolutionary game model of rural human settlement environment improvement PPP model with local government,social capital and rural residents as the main game players with the reward mechanism of Government Payment and one with the reward mechanism of Viability Gap Funding are constructed.Comparing the total project revenue of two reward mechanisms,the thesis will obtain the effects of choosing the reward mechanism of rural human settlement improvement PPP.Finally,available suggestions are made to the decision of the reward mechanism of PPP project about rural human settlement environment,thus promoting the application and development of PPP in rural environmental management and to promote sustainable improvement of rural habitat improvement.
