Optimal social welfare:A many-to-many data transaction mechanism based on double auctions

With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.

A New Protocol for Multi-Item Electronic Auctions

The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.

Multi-Dimensional Customer Data Analysis in Online Auctions

In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.

Electronic Auction Scheme Based on Smart Contract and IPFS

Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.

Evolutionary Techniques for Reverse Auctions

Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.

A Few Notes on Auctions:The Boom in the Asymmetric Art Auction Market

The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.

Cooperative management of an emission trading system:a private governance and learned auction for a blockchain approach

Although blockchain technology has received a significant amount of cutting-edge research on constructing a novel carbon trade market in theory,there is little research on using blockchain in carbon emission trading schemes(ETS).This study intends to address existing gaps in the literature by creating and simulating an ETS system based on blockchain technology.Using the ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption algorithm and the Fabric network to build a platform may optimize the amount of data available while maintaining privacy security.Considering the augmentation of information interaction during the auction process brought about by blockchain,the learning behavior of bidding firms is introduced to investigate the impact of blockchain on ETS auction.In particular,implementing smart contracts can provide a swift and automatic settlement.The simulation results of the proposed system demonstrate the following:(1)fine-grained access is possible with a second delay;(2)the average annual compliance levels increase by 2%when bidders’learning behavior is considered;and(3)the blockchain network can process more than 350 reading operations or 7 writing operations in a second.Novel cooperative management of an ETS platform based on blockchain is proposed.The data access control policy based on CP-ABE is used to solve the contradiction between data privacy on the firm chain and government supervision.A learned auction strategy is proposed to suit the enhancement of information interaction caused by blockchain technology.This study provides a new method for climate change policymakers to consider the blockchain application of the carbon market.

Auction-based profit maximization offloading in mobile edge computing

Offloading Mobile Devices(MDs)computation tasks to Edge Nodes(ENs)is a promising solution to overcome computation and energy resources limitations of MDs.However,there exists an unreasonable profit allocation problem between MDs and ENs caused by the excessive concern on MD profit.In this paper,we propose an auction-based computation offloading algorithm,inspiring ENs to provide high-quality service by maximizing the profit of ENs.Firstly,a novel cooperation auction framework is designed to avoid overall profit damage of ENs,which is derived from the high computation delay at the overloaded ENs.Thereafter,the bidding willingness of each MD in every round of auction is determined to ensure MD rationality.Furthermore,we put forward a payment rule for the pre-selected winner to effectively guarantee auction truthfulness.Finally,the auction-based profit maximization offloading algorithm is proposed,and the MD is allowed to occupy the computation and spectrum resources of the EN for offloading if it wins the auction.Numerical results verify the performance of the proposed algorithm.Compared with the VA algorithm,the ENs profit is increased by 23.8%,and the task discard ratio is decreased by 7.5%.

Cotton Reserves Auctions Touch 57% of Release Plan but Prices Rally

With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.

智能电网中基于二分图匹配的网络切片资源分配算法

为了解决智能电网中多类业务的服务质量需求难以同时得到满足的问题并兼顾电力终端和网络侧经济效用,提出了一种基于二分图匹配的网络切片资源分配算法。针对智能电网场景中的控制类和采集类业务,为电力终端分别制定相应的投标信息,并据此计算支付价格和效用矩阵;将网络切片与电力终端之间的资源分配建模为二分图匹配问题,根据不同业务的时延、传输速率或能耗需求,向终端分配不同的切片资源以最大化系统效用。仿真结果表明,相较于已有的双向拍卖算法和贪心算法,所提算法能够提高10%~20%的系统效用。

预算约束下多任务联邦学习激励机制

联邦学习是一种实现数据隐私保护的分布式机器学习范式,性能取决于数据源的质量和数据规模。客户端是理性个体,参与联邦学习将耗费计算、通信和隐私等成本,需要通过激励提高客户端的参与意愿。因此联邦学习能成功应用的关键之一是尽可能多地激励高质量数据客户端参与训练。多任务联邦学习环境下客户端拥有面向不同任务且质量不同的数据,并具有执行能力的约束。为提高多个学习任务的整体性能,在预算受限的条件下设计一种面向任务的客户选择和报酬机制。通过分析影响模型精度的重要因素,提出一种基于客户端数据样本分布特征的质量评估标准,并结合客户端成本信息,设计一种逆向拍卖的激励机制(EMD-MQMFL),实现客户端的任务指派和支付策略。从理论上分析和证明了该机制具有诚实性、个人理性以及预算可行性,并通过大量实验验证了该方法在联邦学习性能上的有效性。在MNIST、Fashion-MNIST、Cifar-10数据集上的实验结果表明,EMD-MQMFL在数据不平衡的情况下,平均模型精度比已有的机制至少提高5.6个百分点。

基于改进互补品序贯拍卖模型的建设用地指标定价机制

在引入用地指标与土地间相互依存特征前提下,本文改进了传统的互补品序贯拍卖模型,以期提出具有针对性的用地指标定价方法。研究表明,建设用地指标的成交价格受竞标人数和土地闲置费用的影响。竞标人指标报价随竞标人数递增而降低,但随土地闲置费递增而递增。进一步分析表明,适当提高土地闲置费用及资质审核要求可最大程度显化指标核心价值,激发农民退出闲置宅基地的积极性,提高农村用地的使用效率。研究为盘活农村闲置土地资产,实现可持续化发展给予了一定的理论参考。

基于非齐次泊松过程的网上持久型一口价拍卖研究

为了刻画网上拍卖中的投标者到达过程中存在的末尾抢标机制,本文引入时间变量,建立了基于投标者到达的非齐次泊松过程的持久型一口价拍卖模型。通过令投标人与拍卖商的收益最大化,本文分析了投标人的均衡策略,拍卖商的最优一口价以及拍卖平台的最优佣金率,得到拍卖平台为了获取更多的佣金,一口价拍卖中佣金率的设定应小于普通拍卖中的佣金率。通过数值分析得到,投标人应在持续时间较短的一口价拍卖中积极选择一口价,在持续时间较长的一口价拍卖中更倾向于选择进行竞价,而拍卖商应尽可能地设置更长的拍卖持续时间以此获得更大的期望收益。

考虑绿色氢能证书和水电制氢的综合能源系统优化运行

利用清洁能源发电富余电力电解水制氢,绿色氢能实现了生产源头的二氧化碳零排放,在全球能源转型中扮演着重要角色。针对绿色氢能证书市场机制不健全等问题,该文提出一种考虑绿色氢能证书组合双向拍卖和水电制氢的综合能源系统优化运行方法。首先,为解决园区内绿色氢能证书价格和数量匹配不均衡的问题,提出绿色氢能证书组合双向拍卖(combinatorial double auction,CDA)交易机制竞价模型;其次,建立含水电制氢的综合能源系统优化模型,并将绿色氢能证书组合双向拍卖机制引入其中;最后,以某省含水电制氢的综合能源系统为例进行仿真分析,结果表明所提模型不仅能有效提高综合能源系统(integrated energy system,IES)的运行经济性,也能提升可再生能源的消纳量。

基于改进拍卖算法灾后救援多无人机任务分配

为提高灾后无人机(UAV)救援的效率,本文研究多无人机灾后侦察任务分配问题。考虑无人机续航时间、灾区地形以及是否遇到飞行障碍等因素,以无人机执行任务总时间最小为优化目标建立多无人机侦察任务分配模型,设计了混合动态规划的改进拍卖算法(hybrid dynamic programming auction, HDPA)求解模型。首先将无人机执行任务所需时间价值化,以单无人机执行任务所获收益最大为优化目标,设计动态规划算法获得单无人机执行任务最优序列作为初始投标方案,以防止拍卖算法陷入局部最优、提高算法的收敛速度;其次设计价格更新机制,解决投标任务之间的冲突,最终获得多无人机侦察任务分配最佳方案。实验结果表明,各无人机执行任务较为均衡,完成任务的总时间与传统的拍卖算法、遗传算法、海洋捕食者算法(marine predators algorithm, MPA)相比平均缩短了3.5%、5.6%、4.75%。

连续竞价拍卖中羊群行为的驱动机理与逆向选择——基于阿里司法拍卖样本的实证研究

本文聚焦于在线拍卖的竞价行为,通过引入关联价值定义,深入研究了在线拍卖市场中理性与非理性羊群行为的微观发生机制,并运用变量加总的循环推导分析方法,构造出拍品在网络拍卖中的市场需求曲线,分解出羊群行为在资源配置中的规模效应与结构效应。研究发现,羊群行为不仅会提高拍品成交价格,更会对高质量买家产生一定的挤出效应。依据理论分析结果,以阿里司法拍卖实际竞价数据为样本的实证研究表明,连续竞价拍卖中的羊群行为具有一定的内生性,难以完全规避,而且羊群行为会导致在线拍卖市场出现一定的逆向选择问题。因此,要想做大做强中国在线拍卖市场,必须加大对羊群行为的监测、评估和治理,相关部门积极引导网拍平台发挥大数据优势,通过完善信用机制提高在线拍卖市场的有效竞争水平。

论房屋强制执行中案外居住权人的保护

《民法典》新增的居住权制度旨在保障弱势群体的居住权利,但对于强制执行中居住权的处置缺少规定。判断案外人是否享有居住权,不仅应从形式标准判断其居住权是否设立,还应从房屋的使用状况、居住权的设立时间以及是否支付对价等方面对其真实性予以实质审查。根据物权的优先效力与顺位规则,案外人的居住权优先于执行申请人的债权与后设立的抵押权。居住权根据功能不同可分为人役性居住权和非人役性居住权。其中,人役性居住权以保障特定主体的基本生存居住为目的,其实现需要房屋所有人的配合,若案外人能够证明强制执行将妨害其人役性居住权实现,则可排除强制执行。在居住权不能排除强制执行时,设有居住权的房屋以“带居拍卖”为原则,仅在居住权影响在先抵押权实现时可“除居拍卖”。在“除居拍卖”时,居住权人有权要求相应补偿,或者可以向债权人代为履行并取得对房屋所有人的债权。无论采用何种拍卖方式,居住权人均应享有优先购买权。

最优物流运输服务采购拍卖机制

在物流运输服务交易市场,二级市场不断增长,导致供应商面临关联价值的信息结构。关联价值模型允许竞拍者根据其他竞拍者的信息估价,挑战传统私人价值信息结构下的交易机制。文中设计了关联价值情境下的最优运输服务组合拍卖机制,以促使真实信息提交。该机制满足激励相容性与个体理性,允许投标人充分表达其偏好,降低托运人采购成本。理论分析表明该机制有效,实验证实能降低采购成本。

通信约束下UAV集群协同拦截任务分配算法

针对多无人机协同拦截多机动目标的任务分配问题,同时考虑到真实战场环境中存在的通信约束以及探测范围约束条件,本文提出了分步一致性拍卖算法(SCBAA)。首先,对真实战场环境中存在的通信约束以及探测范围约束等问题进行了描述分析,构建了多无人机协同拦截任务分配模型,设计了综合效能函数以及相应约束条件。其次,为解决多无人机协同打击单一目标的不平衡任务分配以及冲突消解问题,将原任务分配过程分为主要任务分配以及次要任务分配两部分,通过多次拍卖以及冲突消解实现多无人机对单一目标的任务分配。仿真结果表明,该算法可有效解决通信约束条件下的分布式多无人机协同拦截问题,并适应动态环境中任务分配对实时性的要求。