Board faultlines and the value of cash holdings:Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016,we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings.The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value.This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)than in non-SOEs.As an important governance mechanism,management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings.Overall,we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value.We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.

When New Partners Crowd Out Incumbent Partners:The Moderating Role of Network Chasm

Both the entry and withdrawal of partners have received considerable attention in the venture capital(VC)literature.However,they have been viewed as more or less isolated dynamic choices.This study filled this research gap by analyzing the relationship between new partner addition and incumbent partner withdrawal in VC syndicates.Although the literature on VC partner selection suggests that adding partners can improve the performance of VC syndicates by emphasizing the expected contribution of VCs,the expected development will not occur or may even be reversed if the VC syndicate also experiences the withdrawal of the incumbent partner.We proposed that the VC withdrawal decision is a risk-benefit trade-off.The syndicate’s portfolio similarity with new partners promotes competition between them.This risk of knowledge leakage through the relationship with the new partner jeopardizes the incumbent partner’s competitive advantage.In the meantime,the syndicate’s portfolio similarity with new partners measures the extent to which the knowledge contributed by the new partner matches the needs of the syndicate and can be absorbed by the syndicate,which will enhance the common benefits.Thus,there is a U-shaped relationship between the syndicate’s portfolio similarity with new partners and its incumbent partners’withdrawal possibility.Furthermore,we considered the negative moderating role of partner network characteristics,namely,the relational and structural chasm.Our research not only suggested the dependence of network dynamics to complete the theory of network evolution but also provided advice on partner selection and syndicate governance.We tested our hypotheses using the dataset of VC investment in the United States between 1985 and 2016,based on Thomson Reuter’s Venture Xpert Database and ORBIS Database.