Monetary Stability and Crisis Predictions Fallacies

In present days,our instable financial markets,characterized by heavier growing monetary responsibilities,are delivering and enlarging ever growing central banks’functions.The financial stability applied standards have been creating contradictory results in the recent Great Recessions since the year 1987 up to the central banks model,after the 2008 last financial crisis,with major central banks as the FED and the CEB(Diamond,2007,pp.189-200)conflicting main operative areas,monetary and financial goals with unexpected results.We have been living a very difficult and dramatic period,which suggests a lot of reconsiderations about what the monetary policy means and may pursue and in which area,with respect to the financial system restrictions,in particular,during the post-second World War,based initially on the pseudo gold dollar parity,things were relatively stable and major financial crises were happening in emerging peripheral markets only.Financial stability was ever relevant,but it was not something to which governments devoted institutional attention.Based on what happened during the recent crisis,it is now of capital responsibility connecting monetary and economic financial stability jointly.Central banks,on the contrary,seem not able to pursue both functions relying on classical market tools.Up to now,the only obligation,imposed to a central bank as a private agent,has been taking care of monetary stability,to contain inflation rates over upper limits,assumed in entering definitely in the legal tender monetary,regime almost everywhere over the planet.Originally,for specific monetary policy purposes alone,between central banks and possible financial entities,there were no guidelines or structural determined controls,only institutional and statutory single bank’s operational clauses.There were no legal constraints such as formal loan to-value,or loan to cash-flows,or formal capital level limits,based on actual constraints.Free repurchase agreements and sales or purchases of securities(the most relevant tools of monetary policy guidelines),generally based on private financial covenants,were the sole most recurrent tactical interferences in adjusting the economic free activity.The assuming statutory thresholds were casual in the incorporating state,central banks used to monitor the activities of agents through economic incentives,rather than mandating and monitoring specific legal prescriptions.The evolving inconsistency of both activities has become even more manifest;two conditions should be fulfilled simultaneously:To avoid dilemmas in which a central bank might be called to make the autonomous independent management choice between monetary price stability,pursuing at same time,generally incompatible,financial stability,two different policies should be rarely jointly assigned to same bodies,especially central banks.As regards the first issue,the IMF nevertheless,with Brunnermeier and Sannikov(Brunnermeier&Sannikov,2012),has argued that price stability and financial stability are interlinked Short-term debt financing played an important role in the run-up to the financial crisis,as increases in leverage helped boost growth but also made the economy more susceptible to a downturn.Since the recession,private agents have reduced their debt level while many governments have increased borrowing.This deleveraging process appears to be holding back the recovery,and the Japanese experience suggests that such deleveraging can continue over an extended period”,unless in the long run we are all broken at state level,as history seems now to prove.It is true indeed,as reminded by Lamfalussy(Lamfalussy et al.,2010,pp.7-9),and now widely proved by facts,that prices and the growth-employment objectives,run into each other because it is seldom the case that the pursuit of one is consistent with the pursuit of the second in global economies.

What Happened to Jacques Rueff and Robert Triffin?

A present monetary theory of the Great Depression has been explained as stemming from Milton Friedman,ignoring the previous Davanzati,a Florentine finding,in the 16th Century,an explanation solution to the increase of prices due to the arrival of Spanish silver from the New World.Designed to counter the Keynesian notion that the Depression resulted from instability theories,characterizing most modern capitalistic economies,Friedmans explanation identified lately the monetary trend as a disordered monetary policy,carried out by erroneous Federal Reserve Board interventions,possible after the Aldrich-Vreeland innovations,introducing Treasury money in the year 1908.More recent works about the Great Depression reconsider the attempts to restore the international gold standard,suppressed on the brink of World War I.We learnt that current views of the Depression,as analyzed in the 1920s by Ralph Hawtrey and Gustav Cassel,while recommending a gold standard reset,reflect that such standard risk deflations,unless the resulting increase in the international monetary demand linked to physical gold,could be satisfied.Although their early warnings of potential disaster became actual and their policy advice was consistently correct,their contributions were ignored and forgotten.The vanishing of their comments was firstly outlined not a long time ago,by Batchelder and Glasner What Ever Happened to Hawtrey and Cassel? (2013)This paper explores the possible reasons for the remarkable historical disregard of the Hawtrey-Cassel monetary explanation of the Great Depression,even by Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell in his 2000 historical Nobel reconsideration of the monetary 20th century(Mundell,2000).The paper stresses the identical historical conditions surfacing after the Bretton Woods agreements.Robert Triffin and Jacques Rueff comment likely warnings as in the first Great Depression,under the monetary policy illusion and the Central Banks excessive disregard of the basics of the quantitative theory on the long run,mostly ignored.Robert Triffin started to address the problem in March and June of 1959,Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.The first of these articles(Part One:Diagnosis)explains in the simplest possible terms,the extraordinary success of the nineteenth century system of international gold based convertibility,and the calamitous collapse of the late 1920s attempts to bring it back to life.It may hold for us today an indication of the main efforts facing the similar attempt at reconstructing the past expressed some 64 years later,after the first of August 1914,by Triffin during the 1978 Christmas weekend.To deal with them in simple,commonsense terms would inevitably classify the author as an unrealistic whose views deserve no more than a raising of eyebrows.Jacques Rueff,with his The Monetary Sin of the West,a logical consequence of the Triffin previous notes of the 1960s,went straight to the consequences of the Camp David resolutions of President Nixon who just temporarily asked his Treasury Secretary,John Conally to suspend the gold convertibility.There were two changes in United States(U.S.)government policy toward the monetary role of gold in the last 100 years.The first was in 1933-1934;all holdings of gold were confiscated in March 1933.Then,the U.S.Treasury adopted a parity for the U.S.dollar of$35.00 an ounce at the end of January 1934.Gold production surged,the private demand for gold fell,and the U.S.experienced large increases in foreign demand for U.S.dollar securities.In those years there was a massive flow of gold to the U.S.The second historical change in U.S.gold policy followed the meeting at Camp David on August the 15th 1971,when the U.S.Treasury closed its gold window fearing a run on its gold holdings,declining towards$10 billion.Some U.S.officials sought to diminish the monetary role of gold.The anticipation of some U.S.officials attending Camp David was that the persistent U.S.payments problem would disappear,once foreign currencies had no parities in terms of the U.S.dollar.The prices of these foreign currencies would increase and the U.S.trade surplus would become larger.Instead,many foreign Central Banks became larger buyers of dollarssecurities,which led to a higher price of the U.S.dollar and a U.S.trade structural deficit.The U.S.international investment position morphed from the worlds largest creditor country,to the worlds present day largest debtor.

Financialisation in emerging economies:a systematic overview and comparison with Anglo-Saxon economies

Financialisation research has originally focussed on the US experience,but the concept is now increasingly applied to emerging economies(EMEs).There is a rich literature stressing peculiarities of individual country experiences,but little systematic comparison across EMEs.This paper fills this gap,providing an overview of the debate and identifying six financialisation interpretations for EMEs.These different interpretations stress(1)financial deregulation,(2)foreign financial inflows,(3)asset price volatility,(4)the shift from bank-based to market-based finance,(5)business debt,and(6)household indebtedness.We construct and compare measures of the six financialisation interpretations across a sample of 17 EMEs from Latin America,emerging Europe,Africa and Asia,contrasting them with the US and UK,two financialised economies.We find considerable variation in financialisation experiences of EMEs.Asset price volatility is found across the continents.Asia has been more exposed to capital inflows,stock markets have gained importance and private sector debt has risen.In emerging Europe financial deregulation has been more pronounced with lower levels but strong increases in household debt.The picture is similar in South Africa,the African EME in the sample,where household debt is comparatively high.Financialisation in Latin America is weaker according to our measures.