The Formation Mechanism of Systemic Financial Risk under External Shocks

By incorporating both the fire sales contagion mechanism and the bankruptcy contagion mechanism into a bank network model,this paper examines how risks are generated under dynamic shocks.In particular,this paper constructs systemic risk indicators suitable for analyzing multiple rounds of contagion under different shocks(time dimension)and from institutions and assets(spatial dimension).Indicators that measure the indirect relevance between institutions and between assets are also innovatively built.It is found that due to deleveraging or bankruptcy among a large number of banks,the systemic risk exhibits an upward trend marked by intermittent jumps under varying intensities of shocks.Risks are generated mainly through the fire sales contagion mechanism of deleveraging under small shocks,and through the bankruptcy contagion mechanism under large shocks.In terms of influencing factors,a stronger indirect relevance,a lower leverage skewness and a higher leverage level in the banking system lead to higher risks.In particular,the influence of leverage skewness on systemic risk is stronger than that of leverage level.

Global Systemic Financial Risk Spillovers and Their External Shocks

The shock of the global financial crisis sparked widespread concern across the world about systemic financial risk and led to the reexamination of regulatory mechanisms.The traditional principle of“too big to fail”underwent a transformation into the new idea of“too interconnected to fail.”We used Directed Acyclic Graph(DAG)technology and network topology analysis to examine the dynamic evolution of global systemic financial risk and the risk trends in global financial markets from the perspective of network connectivity.Our findings show that financial markets in the Chinese Mainland are net receivers of risk spillovers and that systemic financial risk has a clear cross-market contagion effect due to a global volatility spillover scale of 64 percent.To maintain the stability and security of China’s financial markets,consideration should be given to the regulatory precept of“too interconnected to fail”in establishing macro-prudential risk prevention mechanisms.