DYNAMIC PRICING AND COMPENSATION ON HETEROGENEOUS SALES FORCES

In this paper, we analyze the pricing decision and the compensation strategy of a firm that relies on a heterogeneous sales force to sell its product in two periods. The sales agents＇ selling abilities are their private information and will determine the effectiveness of the agents＇ selling efforts. We introduce three compensation contract strategies, i.e. pooling, semi-separating and separating that the firm can adopt in period one and by applying principle-agent theory, derive the optimal compensation contracts and optimal price for the firm in two periods in each strategy. Compai＇ing these three contract strategies, we found that the optimal strategy for the firm depends on the discount factor. We show that the firm will surely offer separating contracts in period one for some small discount factor, and for some large discount factor pooling contract is certain to be provided in period one. However, semi-separating contracts may be considered for some mediate discount factor, and also may not appear for all discount factors in period one. Our analysis also reveals that the optimal price decreases with the discount factor when pooling contract is offered in period one and increases with the discount factor when separating contracts is offered in period one.

Synchronizing~① Your Sales and Production Forces

在工厂和企业中,生产人员专管生产;销售人员负责销售,这是显而易见的事实。但是美国McGladrey ＆ Pullen公司的高级顾问(制造和销售)RonPachura认为,由于生产和销售人员的职能观点不同,他们往往单独地和独立地开展各自的活动,经常引发两者之间的紧张关系和冲突。这会损害工厂的收益,甚至铸成大错。例如:Boeing finally recognized its blunder in 1997 and…reported acharge of $1.6 billion and forecast another $ 1 billion loss for 1998 as a direct resultof its mistakes.触目惊心！ 如何才能防止出现类似的错误?这位顾问认为:首先要密切地监控工厂的关键统计资料;管理部门要对这些资料进行评价和分级,明确最主要的成功因素;还必须在生产和销售之间建立合适的渠道,以协调现有的生产能力与市场需求。这样就能化解两者之间的紧张状态。生产者的主要目的不仅仅是生产,而是获得利润。一旦双方认识到这一事实,工厂的经营和有关人员的经济状况将会好转。