Pareto Optimal Solution for Supply Contracts with Multiple Suppliers

This paper analyzes an electronic procurement （e-procurement） process between a manufacturer and N-supplier in the e-market. We proof that using the general contract based on auction theory, i. e. the wholesale price contract, would not achieve the coordination of channel composed of the manufacturer and the winning supplier. The paper designs a contract mechanism, i.e. the side payment price-restricted contract based on auction theory, which not only ensures Pareto optimal solutions for both, but also coordinates the supply chain. A numerical experiment is provided to compare the performance of different auction mechanisms and to reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Revenue Sharing Contract under Demand Disruptions

Contract is a common and effective mechanism for supply chain coordination,which has been studied extensively in recent years.For a supply chain network model,contracts can be used to coordinate it because it is too ideal to obtain the network equilibrium state in practical market competition.In order to achieve equilibrium,we introduce revenue sharing contract into a supply chain network equilibrium model with random demand in this paper.Then,we investigate the influence on this network equilibrium state from demand disruptions caused by unexpected emergencies.When demand disruptions happen,the supply chain network equilibrium state will be broken and change to a new one,so the decision makers need to adjust the contract parameters to achieve the new coordinated state through bargaining.Finally,a numerical example with a sudden demand increase as a result of emergent event is provided for illustrative purposes.

Supply Chain Commitment Contract Model Based on Uncertainty Theory under Uncertain Market Information

Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, we study the coordination and optimization problem of three-stage supply chain in this paper. In half a asymmetric market information, participants are risk neutral;under the situation of the manufacturers and wholesalers having twice pre-season decision-making opportunity, wholesalers can be replenished in the season;manufacturers join the lowest supply contract of commitment: manufacturers for exchanging the information that they cannot get directly from the market will promise wholesalers to have a season lowest supply in pre-season. According to this contract, we establish optimization models of manufacturers and wholesalers respectively, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example and comparing the results with that under random circumstances, the result is reasonable.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under flexible contracts

In supply chain management,an important research direction is to coordinate the supply chain through introducing flexible contracts.A supply chain contract is flexible if it can satisfy two conditions at the same time：the supply chain is coordinated,and the total profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily divided between the supply chain members.This paper puts out two contracts,a flexible return contract and a flexible wholesale price discount contract.In contrast to many of literature,the supply chain contracts with an endogenous wholesale price is specifically considered,and a detailed sensitivity analysis of the contract parameters is given.The paper also discusses the application of the contract in vendor-managed inventory（VMI） mode.The results show that the supply chain＇s performance is improved after introducing above contracts.All the findings are illustrated by numerical examples.

E-Supply Chain Incentive and Coordination Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

This paper took the buyer-biased electronic market as an example, where multiple suppliers selling short-life-cycle products are bidding for an order from a powerful buyer with stochastic customer demand. It used a single period newsvendor model to analyze the decision of supplied and buyers to do or not do business online. The results suggest that lack of Incentive is the key factor of B2B electronic markets failure. At the same time, it designed a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the E-supply chain in order to prevent failure of E-market.

Australia Won First Contract to Supply LPG to China

China National Offshore Oil Corp.(CNOOC)declared on August 8, 2002 that Australia Liquefied Natural Gas Company (ALNG) affiliated to Woodside Petroleum Corporation has been accepted as the supplier of LNG (liquefied natural gas) for its LNG distribution station in Guangdong Province.

Supply contract for Nantong Power Plant Phase II signed

Power generating equipment supply contract for Huaneng Nantong Power Plant Phase Ⅱ project affiliated to Huaneng International Electric Power Stock Company Ltd. was signed at the People’s Great Hall on June 28, 1996, Shi Dazhen, Minister of Electric Power, Ye Qing, Vice-chairman of the State Planning Commission, Zhang Youcai, Vice Minister of Finance and

Linear-contract Mechanisms Based on the Risk Preference of an Agent in a Supply Chain

With respect to different risk preference of an agent in a supply chain, linear-contract models are designed according to the principal-agent theory. The study shows that the risk preference of an agent directly correlates with the incentive compensation coefficient of principal, order quantity of principal and production capability level of the agent. The principal should offer an appropriate incentive contract according to the risk preference of the agent, or choose an agent holding a different risk preference to establish the supply chain.

非理性偏好下动力电池再制造供应链最优决策与协调研究

考虑动力电池剩余容量不确定特征,构建由电池供应商和汽车制造商组成的再制造供应链,分别探讨决策双方完全理性、单向非理性偏好和双向非理性偏好等5种决策情形下的均衡解。研究发现:动力电池再制造容量起始点对回收量具有正向作用。在双向非理性偏好情形下,供应商的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致制造商和系统总利润提高(降低),而自身利润总是降低;制造商的非理性偏好对供应链成员及系统利润的影响与供应商的非理性偏好程度有关。在单向非理性情形下,供应链成员的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致自身利润下降(上升)而对方利润上升(下降)。两部定价契约和收益共享契约能够实现双向非理性偏好情形下再制造供应链的协调。

数字出版供应链下区块链投资与版权保护策略

区块链技术的可追溯性、安全性以及不可篡改性可以解决数字内容产品的盗版问题。以此为背景,构建由出版商、销售平台以及消费者构成的数字出版供应链,探讨在传统版权保护和区块链下的版权保护两种版权保护模式中的出版商最优定价和平台最优版权保护强度的决策问题,并比较了供应链绩效。研究发现,区块链下的版权保护模式中平台实施严格的版权保护强度,进而提高正版产品的吸引力,需求上升弥补了传统版权保护下出版商通过降价提高需求造成的利润损失。但是,平台只有在区块链投资成本较低时才愿意投资区块链,无法实现供应链的收益最大化。针对这一问题,通过设计契约提高了平台投资区块链的动机。最后,研究了平台投资区块链对购买正版产品消费者的消费者剩余以及社会福利,发现投资区块链可以提高社会福利,但在一定程度上会损害正版产品的消费者剩余。

突发疫情下考虑供应中断风险的制造商采购策略研究

突如其来的新冠肺炎疫情给我国人民的生命安全与经济活动带来了巨大的影响,供应链作为经济活动的重要组成部分,不可避免地遭受了冲击,如何应对供应链中断风险是企业面临的重要挑战。论文研究供应链中断风险情况下制造商采购策略,通过引入期权契约,构建不同情形下由低价不可靠的主供应商、高价可靠的后备供应商和风险规避制造商组成的采购模型,并得出以下结论:市场需求和采购价格是影响制造商最优采购量的重要因素,其中当主供应商出现中断时,其可靠性也是影响制造商采购的因素;当市场需求,主供应商的可靠性和成本等影响因素变化时,制造商对主供应商的最优采购决策、对供应链中断应急策略的选择都将发生变化;当且仅当主供应商的供应价格小于制造商向市场销售该产品销售价格和自身制造成本之差时制造商的最优采购量随着期权执行价格增加而增加。

融资道德风险下订单农业供应链成员信任决策研究

基于订单农业供应链中农户转移资金用途的道德风险问题,考虑农户受资金约束和农户互惠动机,构建公司与农户的序贯互惠信任博弈模型,通过农户完全理性、农户具有互惠动机但公司不提供担保融资、农户具有互惠动机且公司提供担保融资3种情形,分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对供应链成员信任的影响及信任决策问题.结果发现:当公司不提供担保融资时,无论农户是否具有互惠动机,双方都不能建立信任互惠关系;当公司提供担保融资且农户具有互惠动机时,则存在3种序贯互惠均衡,在互惠动机满足一定条件时可以实现双方互信;最后,通过算例分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对农户互惠敏感程度和守信用概率的影响,提出增强农户互惠动机,设置合理的利益共享和监督机制及丰富订单农业融资服务等建议.

不同数字技术投资模式决策及其对绿色供应链定价影响

将数字技术投资模式引入绿色供应链定价决策中,分别构建数字技术固定投资模式和边际投资模式情形下的供应链模型,研究不同数字技术投资模式对绿色供应链定价决策影响.研究发现,(1)两种模式下,制造商分别存在一个改善自身利润的数字技术投资成本阈值,存在一个数字技术投资合作区间,提出零售商收益分享+罗宾斯坦恩讨价还价模型达成供应链双赢;(2)数字技术边际投资模式下的批发价(零售价)大于数字技术固定投资模式下的批发价格,但数字技术固定投资模式下的产品绿色度比数字技术边际投资模式下大;(3)两种数字技术投资模式都能带来零售商利润的改善,且零售商利润在数字技术固定投资模式下更大.相同数字技术投资总成本下,数字技术固定投资模式更有利于提高供应链成员企业的利润.

基于区块链技术的生鲜农产品溯源系统设计

当前生鲜农产品供应链体系通常采用中心化管理模式,存在不同用户之间信息不对称、缺乏实时信息共享平台以及产品来源可追溯性差等问题。为了解决这些问题,采用区块链技术作为开发框架,提出一个基于区块链技术的生鲜农产品供应链的信息共享和可追溯模型,该模型系统具有信息共享、调度实时控制、溯源机制完善等特点。通过设计智能合约算法和新型的交易提案方式,实现自动化管理生鲜农产品供应链系统,以更好地可视化展现区块链网络交易流程。使用Caliper工具进行性能测试,实验结果表明,该方案可行性高,多节点环境下系统交易时延低,同时可以保证信息安全,具备完善的交易功能。最后,选取几个现有的农产品溯源应用系统做对比分析,该方案相较于现有的农产品溯源应用系统具有更强的溯源监管能力,更高的交易可靠性,以及更好的供应链各环节节点间的数据交互性等优势。

契约约束和政府激励下生鲜电商供应链绿色投资合作行为演化博弈分析

针对消费者对线上优质绿色生鲜农产品的巨大需求,构建由生鲜电商和冷链物流企业组成的生鲜电商供应链绿色投资合作行为决策演化博弈模型。分别研究在契约约束和政府激励下,考虑不同参数变化对双方行为选择的影响。为验证理论的准确性做了数值仿真。研究结果表明:双方或单方是否会进行绿色投资,与绿色投资收益率息息相关。系统双方的均衡策略,随着绿色投资收益率的变化而变化。同时,搭便车现象的存在,会抑制双方的绿色投资。政府激励能促使双方绿色投资,具体体现为:期初时政府采取绿色投资补贴效果快速显著,政府的绿色投资奖励基金更具可持续性,两种方式协同激励效果最优。研究结果对政府制定激励策略和供应链参与主体绿色投入具有一定启示。

碳税-碳交易下零售商主导型供应链公平关切决策

在碳税-碳交易政策的影响下,以一个主导零售商和从属中小制造商(SMM)组成的低碳供应链为研究对象,通过构建SMM有无公平关切行为的分散决策模型以及集中决策模型,并对各个模型的最优决策进行比较分析,探讨SMM的公平关切决策和供应链的协调问题。文章研究了SMM公平关切下公平关切系数、碳减排率和碳税率对供应链定价和利润的影响,并设计了“Nash谈判-两部定价”契约实现系统协调。研究发现,在碳税-碳交易政策的影响下,供应链成员利润随着碳税率的增加而减少,但是供应链成员利润随着碳减排率变动呈现两种不同方向变化。SMM公平关切行为可以提高批发价格和自身利润,降低零售商利润,但对零售价格和系统利润没有影响,随着SMM公平关切系数的增大,零售商与SMM之间的利润差距缩小。文章设计的“Nash谈判-两部定价”契约可以实现系统协调。