The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and...The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.展开更多
Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with ...Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with fuzzy payoffs by using fuzzy sets theory. Fuzzy Shapley function is defined based on these extended axioms. From the viewpoint the allocation for each partner should be a crisp value rather a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation, a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values is proposed.展开更多
Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable t...Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.展开更多
In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp ca...In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp case.Furthermore,we study the symmetric Banzhaf values for two special kinds of fuzzy games,which are called fuzzy games with multilinear extension form and a coalition structure,and fuzzy games with Choquet integral form and a coalition structure,respectively.展开更多
基金Sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of "985 Project" of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student’s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471063 , 70171036)the Second Phase of "985"Project of China(107008200400024) the Main/Subject Project of Beijing of China(XK100070534)
文摘Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with fuzzy payoffs by using fuzzy sets theory. Fuzzy Shapley function is defined based on these extended axioms. From the viewpoint the allocation for each partner should be a crisp value rather a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation, a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values is proposed.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of"985 Project"of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.
基金supported by Natural Science Foundation Youth Project of China (No. 71201089)National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71071018 and 71271217)Natural Science Foundation Youth Project of Shandong Province,China(No. ZR2012GQ005)
文摘In this paper,a generalized form of the symmetric Banzhaf value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed.Three axiomatic systems of the symmetric Banzhaf value are given by extending crisp case.Furthermore,we study the symmetric Banzhaf values for two special kinds of fuzzy games,which are called fuzzy games with multilinear extension form and a coalition structure,and fuzzy games with Choquet integral form and a coalition structure,respectively.
