The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and...The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.展开更多
Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable t...Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.展开更多
This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors a...This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into different strategic spaces which belong to each player, then it constructs a payoff function based on the coalition mechanism. Each game player takes its own revenue function as a target and obtains the best strategy versus other players. The best strategies of all players consist of the strategy permutation of a round game and it obtains the final game solutions through multi-round games according to the convergence criterion. A multi-objective optimization example of the luff mechanism of compensative sheave block shows the effectiveness of the coalition cooperative game method.展开更多
Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with ...Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with fuzzy payoffs by using fuzzy sets theory. Fuzzy Shapley function is defined based on these extended axioms. From the viewpoint the allocation for each partner should be a crisp value rather a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation, a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values is proposed.展开更多
基金Sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of "985 Project" of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student’s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of"985 Project"of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.
文摘This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into different strategic spaces which belong to each player, then it constructs a payoff function based on the coalition mechanism. Each game player takes its own revenue function as a target and obtains the best strategy versus other players. The best strategies of all players consist of the strategy permutation of a round game and it obtains the final game solutions through multi-round games according to the convergence criterion. A multi-objective optimization example of the luff mechanism of compensative sheave block shows the effectiveness of the coalition cooperative game method.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471063 , 70171036)the Second Phase of "985"Project of China(107008200400024) the Main/Subject Project of Beijing of China(XK100070534)
文摘Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises （VE）. Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with fuzzy payoffs by using fuzzy sets theory. Fuzzy Shapley function is defined based on these extended axioms. From the viewpoint the allocation for each partner should be a crisp value rather a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation, a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values is proposed.
