Developing a course of action(COA) is a key step in military planning. In most extant studies on the COA development,only the unilateral actions of friendly forces are considered. Based on stochastic games, we propose...Developing a course of action(COA) is a key step in military planning. In most extant studies on the COA development,only the unilateral actions of friendly forces are considered. Based on stochastic games, we propose models that could deal with the complexities and uncertainties of wars. By analyzing the equilibrium state of both opponent sides, outcomes preferable to one side could be achieved by adopting the methods obtained from the proposed models. This research could help decision makers take the right COA in a state of uncertainty.展开更多
The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. ...The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.展开更多
基金supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China(71471174)
文摘Developing a course of action(COA) is a key step in military planning. In most extant studies on the COA development,only the unilateral actions of friendly forces are considered. Based on stochastic games, we propose models that could deal with the complexities and uncertainties of wars. By analyzing the equilibrium state of both opponent sides, outcomes preferable to one side could be achieved by adopting the methods obtained from the proposed models. This research could help decision makers take the right COA in a state of uncertainty.
文摘The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.
