Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satis...Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.展开更多
This paper investigates the networked evolutionary model based on snow-drift game with the strategy of rewards and penalty. Firstly, by using the semi-tensor product of matrices approach, the mathematical model of the...This paper investigates the networked evolutionary model based on snow-drift game with the strategy of rewards and penalty. Firstly, by using the semi-tensor product of matrices approach, the mathematical model of the networked evolutionary game is built. Secondly, combined with the matrix expression of logic, the mathematical model is expressed as a dynamic logical system and next converted into its evolutionary dynamic algebraic form. Thirdly, the dynamic evolution process is analyzed and the final level of cooperation is discussed. Finally, the effects of the changes in the rewarding and penalty factors on the level of cooperation in the model are studied separately, and the conclusions are verified by examples.展开更多
Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste,it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of...Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste,it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate.In this study,government is included as a player,alongside waste collectors and recyclers,in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling.The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling.Three conclusions are drawn from this research.First,an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process.Second,policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do.Finally,recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671035)。
文摘Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.
文摘This paper investigates the networked evolutionary model based on snow-drift game with the strategy of rewards and penalty. Firstly, by using the semi-tensor product of matrices approach, the mathematical model of the networked evolutionary game is built. Secondly, combined with the matrix expression of logic, the mathematical model is expressed as a dynamic logical system and next converted into its evolutionary dynamic algebraic form. Thirdly, the dynamic evolution process is analyzed and the final level of cooperation is discussed. Finally, the effects of the changes in the rewarding and penalty factors on the level of cooperation in the model are studied separately, and the conclusions are verified by examples.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No:71532015).
文摘Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste,it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate.In this study,government is included as a player,alongside waste collectors and recyclers,in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling.The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling.Three conclusions are drawn from this research.First,an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process.Second,policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do.Finally,recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.
