In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we pro...In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we propose the conditions under which the matching mechanism is able to guarantee full participation and Pareto efficient provision, respectively, in the cases with certain and uncertain preference information. These conditions cannot only be adopted in international negotiation and cooperation, but also refines the theory of matching game. In comparative static analyses, we discover that: First, changes of initial stock of climate goods produce a wealth effect and the crowd-out effect is less than 1. Second, climate tax policies affect the supply and welfare of each country only when they produce wealth effects, and if tax revenue is transferred into climate goods with more advanced technology, they will produce positive wealth effects. Third, modifying matching plans dynamically and appropriately can urge countries to improve technology, and especially given a Pareto optimal mechanism, adjusting the matching plan to keep marginal rates of transformation unchanged as technology changes is still able to ensure full participation and efficient supply of climate goods.展开更多
Since the 1990 s, GPGs have become one of the questions arousing general concern in the international political and economic relations. It has its unique characteristics different from the public goods domestically su...Since the 1990 s, GPGs have become one of the questions arousing general concern in the international political and economic relations. It has its unique characteristics different from the public goods domestically supplied in any country in terms of organizational form,incentive mechanisms, implementation means and other aspects. The theory and policy proposal on GPGs mostly reflect the requirements of developing countries to seek an external environment favorable to their stable development, thus it is absolutely necessary to establish an efficient mechanism to supply GPGs for the countries of the world, especially for the developing ones to realize the national benefit and mutual development. The most efficient approach to resolve the problem of supplying GPGs is international cooperation, which raises critical requests on the design of an efficient and reasonable cooperative system. Following the principals of international cooperation system, China must choose an optimal route for supply of GPGs, which conforms to its own interests, by starting from the supply of the regional public goods and in accordance with its own economic development and financial capacity.展开更多
Public-private partnerships(PPPs) have reshaped the institutional structure of global governance.They have advanced collaboration on core issues such as health, clean energy, the rights of women and children, and acce...Public-private partnerships(PPPs) have reshaped the institutional structure of global governance.They have advanced collaboration on core issues such as health, clean energy, the rights of women and children, and access to infrastructure, among others. But which actors create and finance public-private partnerships in global governance to advance such objectives? What are the implications of the agency behind such collaboration for influencing the global agenda on sustainable development? While some scholars and advocacy groups see the growing role of private actors as a powershift away from public institutions, others argue that such arrangements tend to be complementary to public mandates and indeed may provide a new means for international institutions to pursue such mandates. The article probes this debate by analyzing the type of actors that finance global health partnerships, an area in which the influence of hybrid initiatives is particularly prominent. It reveals that public financing remains a core and necessary condition for the emergence and functioning of PPPs. The growing share of private financing,nonetheless, has important implications for shaping partnerships agendas and steering global health and sustainability governance. Rather than a powershift or abdication of responsibilities by the state, there is rather a tendency of deliberate diffusion of power by donors toward hybrid structures.展开更多
In this paper we propose a mathematical model to evaluate the impact of public health sensitization campaign on the spread of HIV-AIDS in Mali. We analyse rigorously this model to get insight into its dynamical featur...In this paper we propose a mathematical model to evaluate the impact of public health sensitization campaign on the spread of HIV-AIDS in Mali. We analyse rigorously this model to get insight into its dynamical features and to obtain associated epidemiological thresholds. If R0 < 1, we show that the disease-free equilibrium of the model is globally asymptotically stable when the public health sensitization program is 100% effective. The impact of public health sensitization strategies is assessed numerically by simulating the model with a reasonable set of parameter values (mostly chosen from the literature) and initial demographic data from Mali.展开更多
基金supported by National Basic Research Program of China[grant number:2012CB955802],Climate Change and Global Economic Problems in Climate ProtectionNational Natural Science Foundation of China[grant number:71471177],Economic Complexity-Oriented Modeling of Behavior and Computational Experiment with ApplicationsCASS-ESRC Partnership Project of China-UK Governments[grant number:ES/N00762X/1],Behavioural Compatibilitybetween Individual Choice and Collective Action with Applications
文摘In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we propose the conditions under which the matching mechanism is able to guarantee full participation and Pareto efficient provision, respectively, in the cases with certain and uncertain preference information. These conditions cannot only be adopted in international negotiation and cooperation, but also refines the theory of matching game. In comparative static analyses, we discover that: First, changes of initial stock of climate goods produce a wealth effect and the crowd-out effect is less than 1. Second, climate tax policies affect the supply and welfare of each country only when they produce wealth effects, and if tax revenue is transferred into climate goods with more advanced technology, they will produce positive wealth effects. Third, modifying matching plans dynamically and appropriately can urge countries to improve technology, and especially given a Pareto optimal mechanism, adjusting the matching plan to keep marginal rates of transformation unchanged as technology changes is still able to ensure full participation and efficient supply of climate goods.
文摘Since the 1990 s, GPGs have become one of the questions arousing general concern in the international political and economic relations. It has its unique characteristics different from the public goods domestically supplied in any country in terms of organizational form,incentive mechanisms, implementation means and other aspects. The theory and policy proposal on GPGs mostly reflect the requirements of developing countries to seek an external environment favorable to their stable development, thus it is absolutely necessary to establish an efficient mechanism to supply GPGs for the countries of the world, especially for the developing ones to realize the national benefit and mutual development. The most efficient approach to resolve the problem of supplying GPGs is international cooperation, which raises critical requests on the design of an efficient and reasonable cooperative system. Following the principals of international cooperation system, China must choose an optimal route for supply of GPGs, which conforms to its own interests, by starting from the supply of the regional public goods and in accordance with its own economic development and financial capacity.
基金support from the Swiss Network of International Studies(SNIS project 3369)for this interdisciplinary project
文摘Public-private partnerships(PPPs) have reshaped the institutional structure of global governance.They have advanced collaboration on core issues such as health, clean energy, the rights of women and children, and access to infrastructure, among others. But which actors create and finance public-private partnerships in global governance to advance such objectives? What are the implications of the agency behind such collaboration for influencing the global agenda on sustainable development? While some scholars and advocacy groups see the growing role of private actors as a powershift away from public institutions, others argue that such arrangements tend to be complementary to public mandates and indeed may provide a new means for international institutions to pursue such mandates. The article probes this debate by analyzing the type of actors that finance global health partnerships, an area in which the influence of hybrid initiatives is particularly prominent. It reveals that public financing remains a core and necessary condition for the emergence and functioning of PPPs. The growing share of private financing,nonetheless, has important implications for shaping partnerships agendas and steering global health and sustainability governance. Rather than a powershift or abdication of responsibilities by the state, there is rather a tendency of deliberate diffusion of power by donors toward hybrid structures.
文摘In this paper we propose a mathematical model to evaluate the impact of public health sensitization campaign on the spread of HIV-AIDS in Mali. We analyse rigorously this model to get insight into its dynamical features and to obtain associated epidemiological thresholds. If R0 < 1, we show that the disease-free equilibrium of the model is globally asymptotically stable when the public health sensitization program is 100% effective. The impact of public health sensitization strategies is assessed numerically by simulating the model with a reasonable set of parameter values (mostly chosen from the literature) and initial demographic data from Mali.
