Based on the background of China's emerging and transitional market,government subsidies to enterprises are regarded as a " helping hand" of promoting economic structural adjustment. In this paper,using ...Based on the background of China's emerging and transitional market,government subsidies to enterprises are regarded as a " helping hand" of promoting economic structural adjustment. In this paper,using China's A-share agricultural listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as research samples,we discuss the influence of government subsidies on research and development( hereinafter referred to as R & D) investment,and the difference in the relationships between the two from the perspective of different nature of property rights. The results show that,on the whole,the increase in government subsidies does not promote the intensity of R & D investment of agricultural listed companies. And after distinguishing the nature of property rights,the results show that state-owned enterprises can get more government subsidies than private enterprises,and the increase in government subsidies boosts the increase in R & D investment in private enterprises,but there is a negative correlation between government subsidies and R & D investment of state-owned enterprises. This conclusion can broaden the research perspective of the influence factors of corporate R & D investment,and it is of practical significance to further clarify the role of government subsidies in R & D investment decisions of enterprises with different nature of property rights.展开更多
Traditionally governance structures are classified into ＂hierarchy or market＂ or ＂equity or non-equity.＂ However,such classifications may not be effective in characterizing all governance structures of research an...Traditionally governance structures are classified into ＂hierarchy or market＂ or ＂equity or non-equity.＂ However,such classifications may not be effective in characterizing all governance structures of research and development（R D） alliances.Therefore,the first objective of this study is to investigate why there exist different organizational governance structures in managing R D alliances;the second objective of this study is to give strategic advice in choosing appropriate forms with respect to various characteristics of R D alliances.Through the theoretical lens that integrate both transaction cost economics（TCE） and the resource-based view（RBV）,a model that focuses on six major factors is developed for determining governance structure choices,namely,technological uncertainty,cultural difference,asset specificity,technology complementarity,appropriability of the individual firm＇s know-how,and trust.An R D alliance with higher technological uncertainty,larger cultural differences,and greater concerns for protecting an individual＇s know-how is more likely to adopt non-integrated alliances as the governing structure.An R D alliance with a higher degree of asset-specificity,greater technology complementarity and greater trust among partnering organizations is more likely to adopt integrated alliances as the governing structure;an R D alliance in the face of lower technological uncertainty will tend to adopt integrated alliances.The more aligned the choice of the governance structure with its determinants,the better the R D alliance will perform,and vice versa.展开更多
Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for dom...Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.展开更多
文摘Based on the background of China's emerging and transitional market,government subsidies to enterprises are regarded as a " helping hand" of promoting economic structural adjustment. In this paper,using China's A-share agricultural listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as research samples,we discuss the influence of government subsidies on research and development( hereinafter referred to as R & D) investment,and the difference in the relationships between the two from the perspective of different nature of property rights. The results show that,on the whole,the increase in government subsidies does not promote the intensity of R & D investment of agricultural listed companies. And after distinguishing the nature of property rights,the results show that state-owned enterprises can get more government subsidies than private enterprises,and the increase in government subsidies boosts the increase in R & D investment in private enterprises,but there is a negative correlation between government subsidies and R & D investment of state-owned enterprises. This conclusion can broaden the research perspective of the influence factors of corporate R & D investment,and it is of practical significance to further clarify the role of government subsidies in R & D investment decisions of enterprises with different nature of property rights.
基金The Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions
文摘Traditionally governance structures are classified into ＂hierarchy or market＂ or ＂equity or non-equity.＂ However,such classifications may not be effective in characterizing all governance structures of research and development（R D） alliances.Therefore,the first objective of this study is to investigate why there exist different organizational governance structures in managing R D alliances;the second objective of this study is to give strategic advice in choosing appropriate forms with respect to various characteristics of R D alliances.Through the theoretical lens that integrate both transaction cost economics（TCE） and the resource-based view（RBV）,a model that focuses on six major factors is developed for determining governance structure choices,namely,technological uncertainty,cultural difference,asset specificity,technology complementarity,appropriability of the individual firm＇s know-how,and trust.An R D alliance with higher technological uncertainty,larger cultural differences,and greater concerns for protecting an individual＇s know-how is more likely to adopt non-integrated alliances as the governing structure.An R D alliance with a higher degree of asset-specificity,greater technology complementarity and greater trust among partnering organizations is more likely to adopt integrated alliances as the governing structure;an R D alliance in the face of lower technological uncertainty will tend to adopt integrated alliances.The more aligned the choice of the governance structure with its determinants,the better the R D alliance will perform,and vice versa.
基金The Special Project of Innovative Methods and Work Funded by Ministry of National Science and Technology of China(No.2013IM030600)
文摘Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development（RD）investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the RD subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed.The equilibrium output, RD investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, RD investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the RD investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal RD investment under the RD investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the RD product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm RD investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage RD innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the RD investment subsidy policy.
