Central government agencies play key roles in making and implementing public policies in China,but the empirical studies on these organisations are disproportionally scarce.Scholars in political science and public adm...Central government agencies play key roles in making and implementing public policies in China,but the empirical studies on these organisations are disproportionally scarce.Scholars in political science and public administration predominantly focus their researches on local governments at various levels,while paying little,if any,attention to the central counterparts.This article discusses the phenomenon of strong local but weak central government research pattern(the so called‘central-local research divide’),and identifies the driving forces behind this research gap.It also introduces the lessons and implications from the US and European research projects for developing,replicating,and extending central agency databases.The research further elaborates the existing variables and data sources on central agencies and develops the China Central Agency Database(CCAD)to advance the quantitative research of central agencies in China.Finally,a conclusion is drawn with a research agenda to encourage researchers to coproduce the CCAD and embrace the study of central agencies.展开更多
This paper uses a sample of Chinese listed companies whose controlling shareholders have changed from government agencies to state-owned enterprises＇ （SOEs）, to examine whether reducing government intervention whil...This paper uses a sample of Chinese listed companies whose controlling shareholders have changed from government agencies to state-owned enterprises＇ （SOEs）, to examine whether reducing government intervention while maintaining government＇s ultimate control could improve firm performance. The results show that the overall performance of these firms improves after the transfer of their controlling shareholders, due to improvements in both operating and non-operating performance. When we separate all samples into solely SOEs and other SOEs based on the controlling shareholder, we find that operating performance improved significantly in the solely SOE group, whereas non-operating performance improved significantly in the SOE group. In addition, we identify sources of performance improvement from two perspectives： corporate governance and related party transactions. The results imply that the Chinese Government should continue to decentralize control and, at the same time, continue to monitor firm operating efficiency.展开更多
基金This work was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and the Research Funds of Renmin University of China[grant number:16XNB005].
文摘Central government agencies play key roles in making and implementing public policies in China,but the empirical studies on these organisations are disproportionally scarce.Scholars in political science and public administration predominantly focus their researches on local governments at various levels,while paying little,if any,attention to the central counterparts.This article discusses the phenomenon of strong local but weak central government research pattern(the so called‘central-local research divide’),and identifies the driving forces behind this research gap.It also introduces the lessons and implications from the US and European research projects for developing,replicating,and extending central agency databases.The research further elaborates the existing variables and data sources on central agencies and develops the China Central Agency Database(CCAD)to advance the quantitative research of central agencies in China.Finally,a conclusion is drawn with a research agenda to encourage researchers to coproduce the CCAD and embrace the study of central agencies.
文摘This paper uses a sample of Chinese listed companies whose controlling shareholders have changed from government agencies to state-owned enterprises＇ （SOEs）, to examine whether reducing government intervention while maintaining government＇s ultimate control could improve firm performance. The results show that the overall performance of these firms improves after the transfer of their controlling shareholders, due to improvements in both operating and non-operating performance. When we separate all samples into solely SOEs and other SOEs based on the controlling shareholder, we find that operating performance improved significantly in the solely SOE group, whereas non-operating performance improved significantly in the SOE group. In addition, we identify sources of performance improvement from two perspectives： corporate governance and related party transactions. The results imply that the Chinese Government should continue to decentralize control and, at the same time, continue to monitor firm operating efficiency.
