Emerging economies provide interesting scenarios for examining how institutional context influences the financing behavior of firms. In this study, we examine the capital structure of Chinese listed firms following th...Emerging economies provide interesting scenarios for examining how institutional context influences the financing behavior of firms. In this study, we examine the capital structure of Chinese listed firms following the SplitShare Structure Reform of 2005. This reform allowed a reduction of government ownership by making government shares tradable. We find that the impact of government ownership on leverage is dependent on whether the government is the largest shareholder in a firm and whether the government ownership is through a parent state-owned enterprise. In addition, we document that the largest non-government shareholder positively influences leverage.Overall, our results reveal that the largest controlling shareholder, either government or non-government, has a significant impact on the capital structure of Chinese firms.展开更多
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeo...Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.展开更多
When human capital becomes the most important strategic capital,an entrepreneurial enterprise has to reform and innovate its corporate governance around human capital and its dynamism so as to acquire the capacity of ...When human capital becomes the most important strategic capital,an entrepreneurial enterprise has to reform and innovate its corporate governance around human capital and its dynamism so as to acquire the capacity of sustainable endogenous growth.This article is intended to discuss the meaning and adaptability of Huawei’s characteristic systems and mechanisms and then proceeds to introduce the general design of entrepreneurial enterprises'dynamic ownership governance platform and the possible effect of corporate governance.Subject to existing Chinese laws and regulations and with full consideration of the dynamics of human capital,this article recommends an entrepreneurial enterprise to set up a dynamic ownership governance platform,innovate and optimize its corporate governance structure and relevant mechanisms and promote the gradual socialization of its founder/founding team’s rights to earnings,control and management;then put in place scientific and proper counterbalance mechanisms in accordance with the principle of separation of powers and incentive compatibility,reform its selection of managing staff and introduce market mechanisms to promote fair competition and dynamic incentive compatibility between its founder/founding team and other key stakeholders.This article is meant to facilitate an entrepreneurial enterprise to turn to socialization corporate governance,and acquire the motivation and gradually form the capacity for endogenous growth.展开更多
文摘Emerging economies provide interesting scenarios for examining how institutional context influences the financing behavior of firms. In this study, we examine the capital structure of Chinese listed firms following the SplitShare Structure Reform of 2005. This reform allowed a reduction of government ownership by making government shares tradable. We find that the impact of government ownership on leverage is dependent on whether the government is the largest shareholder in a firm and whether the government ownership is through a parent state-owned enterprise. In addition, we document that the largest non-government shareholder positively influences leverage.Overall, our results reveal that the largest controlling shareholder, either government or non-government, has a significant impact on the capital structure of Chinese firms.
文摘Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.
基金sponsored by the Shanghai Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science(2020BGL026)the National Social Science Fund of China(14BGL194)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71302166).
文摘When human capital becomes the most important strategic capital,an entrepreneurial enterprise has to reform and innovate its corporate governance around human capital and its dynamism so as to acquire the capacity of sustainable endogenous growth.This article is intended to discuss the meaning and adaptability of Huawei’s characteristic systems and mechanisms and then proceeds to introduce the general design of entrepreneurial enterprises'dynamic ownership governance platform and the possible effect of corporate governance.Subject to existing Chinese laws and regulations and with full consideration of the dynamics of human capital,this article recommends an entrepreneurial enterprise to set up a dynamic ownership governance platform,innovate and optimize its corporate governance structure and relevant mechanisms and promote the gradual socialization of its founder/founding team’s rights to earnings,control and management;then put in place scientific and proper counterbalance mechanisms in accordance with the principle of separation of powers and incentive compatibility,reform its selection of managing staff and introduce market mechanisms to promote fair competition and dynamic incentive compatibility between its founder/founding team and other key stakeholders.This article is meant to facilitate an entrepreneurial enterprise to turn to socialization corporate governance,and acquire the motivation and gradually form the capacity for endogenous growth.
