We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can ...We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.展开更多
Based on resource and relational theories, this study examined the relationships among organizational citizenship behavior （OCB）, exchanged resources, and career growth opportunities, along with the moderating effec...Based on resource and relational theories, this study examined the relationships among organizational citizenship behavior （OCB）, exchanged resources, and career growth opportunities, along with the moderating effect of member-member exchange （MMX）. Findings from a field survey of 192 supervisor-subordinate dyads revealed that status resource was positively related to OCB and career growth opportunities. MMX moderated the relationship between OCB and status resource in such a way that the relationship was stronger in the low MMX context than in the high MMX context. The main contribution of this study is an explanation of the effects of OCB on individual careers from a fine-grained perspective based on resource and relational theories.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation (No.70632001)the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (No.07JJD630009,No.08JC630073)
文摘We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.
文摘Based on resource and relational theories, this study examined the relationships among organizational citizenship behavior （OCB）, exchanged resources, and career growth opportunities, along with the moderating effect of member-member exchange （MMX）. Findings from a field survey of 192 supervisor-subordinate dyads revealed that status resource was positively related to OCB and career growth opportunities. MMX moderated the relationship between OCB and status resource in such a way that the relationship was stronger in the low MMX context than in the high MMX context. The main contribution of this study is an explanation of the effects of OCB on individual careers from a fine-grained perspective based on resource and relational theories.
