This paper considers a dynamical system defined by a set of ordinary autonomous differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side. Such systems typically appear in economic modelling where there are two or mor...This paper considers a dynamical system defined by a set of ordinary autonomous differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side. Such systems typically appear in economic modelling where there are two or more regimes with a switching between them. Switching between regimes may be a consequence of market forces or deliberately forced in form of policy implementation. Stiefenhofer and Giesl [1] introduce such a model. The purpose of this paper is to show that a metric function defined between two adjacent trajectories contracts in forward time leading to exponentially asymptotically stability of (non)smooth periodic orbits. Hence, we define a local contraction function and distribute it over the smooth and nonsmooth parts of the periodic orbits. The paper shows exponentially asymptotical stability of a periodic orbit using a contraction property of the distance function between two adjacent nonsmooth trajectories over the entire periodic orbit. Moreover it is shown that the ω-limit set of the (non)smooth periodic orbit for two adjacent initial conditions is the same.展开更多
Incomplete contract theory （GHM-model）, namely, GHM model, Grossman-Hart-Moore model, GHM model or called ownership - control model by Grossman and Hart （Grossman ＆ Hart, 1986）, it is established by Hart and Moo...Incomplete contract theory （GHM-model）, namely, GHM model, Grossman-Hart-Moore model, GHM model or called ownership - control model by Grossman and Hart （Grossman ＆ Hart, 1986）, it is established by Hart and Moore （Hart ＆ Moore, 1990） and other cofounder, so this theory is also known as GHM theory or GHM model. Domestic scholars generally call their theory incomplete contract theory or incomplete contract theory, because the theory is ba^ed on the following analytical framework： They use the incompleteness of contracts for research as starting point to property or （ residual ） optimal control with Ge for research purposes. It is the most important analytical tool for analyze business theory and corporate governance structures with Ge control incentives to obtain the information. GHM model directly inherit the transaction cost theory by Coase, and Williamson, and it is a critical development. Among them, the 1986 model is mainly to solve the integration problem of assets, in 1990, the model evolved into a general model of asset ownership.展开更多
Labor Contract Law receives mixed evaluations since its implementation.The call for the amendment is hot and even some scholars regard it as the"tiger in the road"which hinders the economic development. The ...Labor Contract Law receives mixed evaluations since its implementation.The call for the amendment is hot and even some scholars regard it as the"tiger in the road"which hinders the economic development. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pays high attention to the construction of harmonious labor relation and the amendment has been a top priority. Labor Contract Law leads to two"deadlocks"of which the entrepreneurs are afraid. The first one is that the non-fixed term labor contract cannot be cancelled and the second one is that they must pay the economic compensation at the expiration of contract. These two rules hinder the employment enthusiasm of entrepreneurs. The current laws have excessive expectation for the non-fixed term labor contract and too strict regulations; as for the economic compensation at the expiration of contract, it increases the enterprise cost. The amendment of these two articles will benefit the recovery of Chinese economy and make the labor relation more harmonious.展开更多
Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from...Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.展开更多
The paper argues that labor contracts between employees and organization includes two facets, i.e. economic contracts and psychological contracts, and along with enterprise competition becoming fierce increasingly and...The paper argues that labor contracts between employees and organization includes two facets, i.e. economic contracts and psychological contracts, and along with enterprise competition becoming fierce increasingly and labor force becoming diversified all the more, the psychological contracts have crucial effects on employees＇ attitudes, behaviors and performances. We also argue that, under the challenging organization context, if managers want to make strategic partnership with employees, they must link employees with hearts, pay attention to the management of psychological contracts before, during and after signing labor contracts, and keep dynamic equilibrium of psychological contracts.展开更多
文摘This paper considers a dynamical system defined by a set of ordinary autonomous differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side. Such systems typically appear in economic modelling where there are two or more regimes with a switching between them. Switching between regimes may be a consequence of market forces or deliberately forced in form of policy implementation. Stiefenhofer and Giesl [1] introduce such a model. The purpose of this paper is to show that a metric function defined between two adjacent trajectories contracts in forward time leading to exponentially asymptotically stability of (non)smooth periodic orbits. Hence, we define a local contraction function and distribute it over the smooth and nonsmooth parts of the periodic orbits. The paper shows exponentially asymptotical stability of a periodic orbit using a contraction property of the distance function between two adjacent nonsmooth trajectories over the entire periodic orbit. Moreover it is shown that the ω-limit set of the (non)smooth periodic orbit for two adjacent initial conditions is the same.
文摘Incomplete contract theory （GHM-model）, namely, GHM model, Grossman-Hart-Moore model, GHM model or called ownership - control model by Grossman and Hart （Grossman ＆ Hart, 1986）, it is established by Hart and Moore （Hart ＆ Moore, 1990） and other cofounder, so this theory is also known as GHM theory or GHM model. Domestic scholars generally call their theory incomplete contract theory or incomplete contract theory, because the theory is ba^ed on the following analytical framework： They use the incompleteness of contracts for research as starting point to property or （ residual ） optimal control with Ge for research purposes. It is the most important analytical tool for analyze business theory and corporate governance structures with Ge control incentives to obtain the information. GHM model directly inherit the transaction cost theory by Coase, and Williamson, and it is a critical development. Among them, the 1986 model is mainly to solve the integration problem of assets, in 1990, the model evolved into a general model of asset ownership.
基金Projects of the National Social Science Foundation of China“research on the response of the labor standard under new normal for the group hostility between capital and labor”(15BGL184)
文摘Labor Contract Law receives mixed evaluations since its implementation.The call for the amendment is hot and even some scholars regard it as the"tiger in the road"which hinders the economic development. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pays high attention to the construction of harmonious labor relation and the amendment has been a top priority. Labor Contract Law leads to two"deadlocks"of which the entrepreneurs are afraid. The first one is that the non-fixed term labor contract cannot be cancelled and the second one is that they must pay the economic compensation at the expiration of contract. These two rules hinder the employment enthusiasm of entrepreneurs. The current laws have excessive expectation for the non-fixed term labor contract and too strict regulations; as for the economic compensation at the expiration of contract, it increases the enterprise cost. The amendment of these two articles will benefit the recovery of Chinese economy and make the labor relation more harmonious.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72003082 and 71573130)the Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province of China(2020SJA1015)+1 种基金the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions,China(PAPD)the China Center for Food Security Studies,Nanjing Agricultural University,China。
文摘Farmers’contract breach behavior is cited as one of the major stumbling blocks in the sustainable expansion of contract farming in many developing countries.This paper examines farmers’contract breach decisions from the perspective of time preferences.The empirical analysis is based on a household survey and economic field experiments of poultry households participating in contract farming conducted in Jiangsu Province,China.A discounted utility model and a maximum likelihood technique are applied to estimate farmers’time preferences and the effect of time preferences on contract breach in the production and sales phases are explored with a bivariate probit model.The results show that,on average,the poultry farmers in the sample are generally present biased and impatient regarding future utility.The regression results show that farmers with a higher preference for the present and a higher discount rate are more likely to breach contracts,and time preferences play a greater role in the production phase than in the sales phase.When considering heterogeneity,specific investments and transaction costs promote contract stability only for farmers with a low degree of impatience.Moreover,compared with large-scale farmers,small-scale farmers’contract breach decisions are more significantly affected by their time preferences.These results have implications for contract stability policies and other issues that are impacted by the linking of behavioral preferences to agricultural decisions.
文摘The paper argues that labor contracts between employees and organization includes two facets, i.e. economic contracts and psychological contracts, and along with enterprise competition becoming fierce increasingly and labor force becoming diversified all the more, the psychological contracts have crucial effects on employees＇ attitudes, behaviors and performances. We also argue that, under the challenging organization context, if managers want to make strategic partnership with employees, they must link employees with hearts, pay attention to the management of psychological contracts before, during and after signing labor contracts, and keep dynamic equilibrium of psychological contracts.
