Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party quantum private comparison scheme using Greenberger-- Horne-Zeitinger （GHZ） states and error-correcting code （ECC） lint. J. Theor. Phys. 52, 2818 （2013）], claiming it is...Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party quantum private comparison scheme using Greenberger-- Horne-Zeitinger （GHZ） states and error-correcting code （ECC） lint. J. Theor. Phys. 52, 2818 （2013）], claiming it is fault-tolerant and could be performed in a non-ideal scenario. However, there ex- ists a fatal loophole in their private comparison scheme under a special attack, namely the twice- Hadamard-CNOT attack. Specifically, a malicious party may intercept the other party＇s particles and execute Hadamard operations on the intercepted particles as well as on his or her own particles. Then, the malicious party could sequentially perform a controlled-NOT （CNOT） operation between intercepted particles and the auxiliary particles, as well as between his or her own particles and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. By measuring the auxiliary particles, the secret input will be revealed to the malicious party without being detected. For resisting this special attack, a feasible improved scheme is proposed by introducing a permutation operator before the third party （TP） sends the particle sequences to each participant.展开更多
基金Acknowledgements This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant Nos. 61103235, 61373131, and 61373016）, the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions （PAPD）, the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province under Grant No. BK20140651, and the Scientific Research Innovation Project for College Graduates of Jiangsu Province （Grant No. KYLX_0855）.
文摘Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party quantum private comparison scheme using Greenberger-- Horne-Zeitinger （GHZ） states and error-correcting code （ECC） lint. J. Theor. Phys. 52, 2818 （2013）], claiming it is fault-tolerant and could be performed in a non-ideal scenario. However, there ex- ists a fatal loophole in their private comparison scheme under a special attack, namely the twice- Hadamard-CNOT attack. Specifically, a malicious party may intercept the other party＇s particles and execute Hadamard operations on the intercepted particles as well as on his or her own particles. Then, the malicious party could sequentially perform a controlled-NOT （CNOT） operation between intercepted particles and the auxiliary particles, as well as between his or her own particles and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. By measuring the auxiliary particles, the secret input will be revealed to the malicious party without being detected. For resisting this special attack, a feasible improved scheme is proposed by introducing a permutation operator before the third party （TP） sends the particle sequences to each participant.
