This paper primarily focuses on two problems which aim at improving the results of the recent work of Yi S.S.(Yi S.S., Entry, licensing and research joint ventures, International Journal of Industrial Organization, ...This paper primarily focuses on two problems which aim at improving the results of the recent work of Yi S.S.(Yi S.S., Entry, licensing and research joint ventures, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1999,17:1 24).Firstyly, two improper viewpoints are pointed out and rectified. Under his model, Yi argued that the potential entrants can be better off or worse off under the incumbent firm's strategic use of ex post licensing policy, but it is shown in this paper that the strategic licensing undoubtedly reduces the entrants'expected payoffs. Yi also noted wrongly that industry profit is a convex function of the number of firms in the product market by the Cournot oligopoly with a linear demand and constant marginal costs. However, in this paper it is demonstrated that industry profit in such a market is a concave convex function of the number of firms. Secondly, a thorough study of the optimal licensing policy for the incumbent is made on the basis of the correction of the second error. Necessary and sufficient conditions under which the incumbent will choose ex post licensing, ex ante licensing of one entrant or ex ante licensing of both extrants are given.展开更多
The entrepreneurship has positive and significant connection with economic growth.Competition would be increased by new entrants in the market;then,social welfare would be improved.Thus,positive entrepreneurship polic...The entrepreneurship has positive and significant connection with economic growth.Competition would be increased by new entrants in the market;then,social welfare would be improved.Thus,positive entrepreneurship policies are often linked to increased social welfare by authorities.In this paper,we focus on a certain case where potential entrepreneurs are employees of existing firms to test the above ideas.The purpose of our research is to assess the variation of social welfare in the context of employer-restricted separation.Therefore,the model of Cournot competition where employees constitute the only entry threat was used in this paper.The results demonstrate that social welfare would not always be improved even in a good entrepreneurial context.If the deterring strategy is present,the relationship between positive entrepreneurship policies and increased social welfare might not hold,or would depend on the different strategies adopted by the incumbent.Therefore,the sustainability of a positive entrepreneurship policy would be impaired by incumbent firms.展开更多
文摘This paper primarily focuses on two problems which aim at improving the results of the recent work of Yi S.S.(Yi S.S., Entry, licensing and research joint ventures, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1999,17:1 24).Firstyly, two improper viewpoints are pointed out and rectified. Under his model, Yi argued that the potential entrants can be better off or worse off under the incumbent firm's strategic use of ex post licensing policy, but it is shown in this paper that the strategic licensing undoubtedly reduces the entrants'expected payoffs. Yi also noted wrongly that industry profit is a convex function of the number of firms in the product market by the Cournot oligopoly with a linear demand and constant marginal costs. However, in this paper it is demonstrated that industry profit in such a market is a concave convex function of the number of firms. Secondly, a thorough study of the optimal licensing policy for the incumbent is made on the basis of the correction of the second error. Necessary and sufficient conditions under which the incumbent will choose ex post licensing, ex ante licensing of one entrant or ex ante licensing of both extrants are given.
文摘The entrepreneurship has positive and significant connection with economic growth.Competition would be increased by new entrants in the market;then,social welfare would be improved.Thus,positive entrepreneurship policies are often linked to increased social welfare by authorities.In this paper,we focus on a certain case where potential entrepreneurs are employees of existing firms to test the above ideas.The purpose of our research is to assess the variation of social welfare in the context of employer-restricted separation.Therefore,the model of Cournot competition where employees constitute the only entry threat was used in this paper.The results demonstrate that social welfare would not always be improved even in a good entrepreneurial context.If the deterring strategy is present,the relationship between positive entrepreneurship policies and increased social welfare might not hold,or would depend on the different strategies adopted by the incumbent.Therefore,the sustainability of a positive entrepreneurship policy would be impaired by incumbent firms.
