Women on Boards of Directors

This research aims to measure the current gender representation in membership of boards of directors,and to study the factors affecting the presence of women on boards.The results of the study will support the decision makers and policy makers at all levels by providing knowledge that contributes to bridging the current gap in participation of women boards.The methodology used in this research is the descriptive analytical approach,which relies on quantitative methods in the process of collecting and analyzing data.This study represents the boards of directors in the three sectors(public,private,and non-profit)in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,The study sample contained 350 targets,where a random sample of 150 people in the public sector,100 people in the private sector,and 100 people in the non-profit sector were selected.The research result found that the majority of the responses believe that the lack of experience and training,and social factors,are the most impact areas of explaining the reasons for the existence of a gap in women’s membership in boards of directors in the three sectors.And the most important reasons for the existence of a gender gap in board membership are:there is no statutory minimum percentage for women’s representation on boards of directors,and scarcity of female competencies in general,and the lack of women occupying leadership positions.

The Criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors

Non-executive directors are now very well established in Chinese business. The uniform and final criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors is not available. It will be valuable to draw an analogy with the criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors in the UK, where over a dozen different criterions are applied.

The Effect of the Board of Directors and Audit Quality on Disclosure of Internal Control Practices: Evidence from European Companies

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.

The Moderating Role of Ownership Structure on the Relation between Board Independence and Voluntary Financial Disclosure: An Analysis of Italian Listed Company

Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance variables, such as board independence and ownership structure are considered mechanisms useful to reduce information asymmetries between competing parties of the firms. This paper aims at investigating both the relationship between board independence and the quality of voluntary financial disclosure and how previous relationship is moderated by the level of ownership concentration. The analysis has been conducted on a sample of Italian non-financial listed companies. The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship between board independence and the quality of voluntary financial disclosure provided by companies. In addition, the findings reveal that ownership concentration plays a relevant moderating role in previous relationship. The results highlight the necessity to consider the interaction effects of different governance mechanisms, when studying corporate governance effectiveness.

Board of Directors, Independent Directors and Audit Fees： Based on the Empirical Data of the GEM of China

As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is very few. From the perspective of GEM of China, this article observes and studies the impact of corporate governance structure represented by board of directors and independent directors on audit fees. This article selects the data of 348 listed companies in the GEM of China in 2012, proves that there is a positive correlation between the number of meetings, independent directors＇ salaries and audit fees through the use of multiple linear regression model, and accordingly proposed suggestions that improve the corporate governance structure of the GEM of China.

An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Board of Directors Governance and Corporate Performance of Chinese Public Companies

Board of directors is an important component part of corporate governance. As a governance mechanism, we empirically study relationship among the scale of the board of directors, the structure of the board of directors and the duality leadership structure with corporate performance in Chinese public companies. The result shows that the smaller scale of the board of the directors is, the better performance is. With the ownership structure changing better, the structure of the board of directors will change better and promote the performance. The duality leadership structure doesn＇t affect the corporate performance. The fundamental method for the governance effectiveness of the board is to set up the reasonable ownership structure and the marketing mechanism for occurrences in human .

A Study of the Role of the Board of Directors in Corporate Governance Based on UK Listed Companies

Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of directors is the brain of the company,while corporate governance is the blood distributed throughout the company,which not only supplies blood to the whole,but also reflects the situation.Therefore,with regard to the role of the board of directors in corporate governance,this paper objectively analyzes the importance of the board of directors in corporate governance from theory to practice and from the internal composition of the board of directors to the impact of the board’s actions on the enterprise as a whole based on United Kingdom(UK)listed companies.

Effects of Pilot Programs for China's Central SOE Board of Directors

Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.

Impact of Multiple Directorships on Performance for Companies Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange （JSE）

The study investigates the plausible link between multiple directorships and company performance for Johannesburg Stock Exchange （JSE） listed companies in South Africa. This study also interrogates whether companies with busy boards perform better or worse than non over-boarded companies. The incidence of multiple directorship on JSE is low, therefore the hypothesis is rejected at 5%. Over-boarded company directors attend significantly less board meetings. The Pearson correlation between connectedness and log-transformed financial ratios is not significant between all the six financial ratios. The study finds no difference in performance between over-boarded and non over-boarded companies, and no association between multiple directorships and company performance.

Does the system of independent directors help improve the quality of accounting information： From the perspective of earnings conservatism

Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of these independent directors： Percentage within BDs, professional capacities, stimulation and work conditions. From the empirical results, we conclude that the more powerful of the independent directors, the better the accounting conservatism, and that their positive impact increases along with the improvement on corporate governance, meanwhile the work conditions plays the most important role, and then are the percentage within BDs and their professional capacities, the stimulation and personal reputation appear the least importance.

The Empirical Study of Board Structure and Firm Performance-Innovative Small Enterprises in China

This study took small enterprises listed from 2010 to 2015 as the empirical object.The board size,CEO duality,and ratio of independent directors were independent variables.The return on total assets,return on shareholders’equity and earnings per share were taken as the dependent variables,and three hypotheses were tested with SPSS.It is found that the board size was positively correlated with firm performance,but was not significant.There was no significant correlation between the ratio of independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance.This study suggests that optimizing the leadership structure of the board of directors can help improve the firm performance of enterprises.

Board Effectiveness in Pharmaceutical Industry： The Case of TAPIC Pharmaceutical Group

Pharmaceutical industry plays a strategic role in economy of Iran. Corporate governance, in pharmaceutical companies as the very core of an organization, and the driving force of corporate leadership, plays a significant role in business success and overall productivity of the firms. As yet, the characteristics, factors causing success and failure of core governance in Iranian pharmaceutical industry have remained unsearched. Furthermore, the applicability of western theories and models to the traditional societies such as Iran are largely unknown. This study is an attempt to explore the pattern of board effectiveness and firm performance in Iranian pharmaceutical industry and suggesting an alternative good governance model suitable to apply to less developed countries （LDC） pharmaceutical industry, with emphasis on Iranian context. After An intensive literature review the model suggested by Ingley and Van der Walt （2001） was found to be more comprehensive, practical and suitable for this study. However, after empirical evaluation further development to the model to fit the pharmaceutical industry and the context of LDCs, especially Iran, is suggested. Empirically the paper stands upon a rich database consisting of Tamin Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Investment Company （TAPIC） and its 11 subsidiary companies which are treated as 11 mini-cases. Data were collected by document analysis, questionnaire and interviews. Since two of the authors have many years experience as managers in the same industrial group, we got access to rich information that normally are not accessible to researchers in less developed countries. The results suggest some improvements to the earlier models and show that the pattern of board effectiveness in Iranian pharmaceutical industry can be influenced by： （1） Internal factors including： （a） board members, the personality and background, （b） board composition, which is influenced by selection criteria, Tribalism, interpersonal relationship and belonging to the same ideological group, （c） board interactions, and （d） power distribution in the board, which is influenced by parenting power in holding companies. All internal factors are directly or indirectly affected by political issues as well as socio-cultural forces. （2） External factors including： （a） industrial complexity and the nature of industry, （b） industrial ethos, （c） legislation, and political forces, （d） economy, which the last two factors are influenced by international environment as well.

Analysis of Boards of Directors of Listed Companies --Empirical Evidence from China Stock Market

Since stock markets came forth in China only about 15 years ago, there are many different characteristics of Chinese listed companies compared with those of western. According to the regulation on Chinese security markets, an effective internal governance system is composed of systems of general meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and managers. The general meeting of shareholders, as the highest agency of power, makes decisions on important affairs of the company and one of its most important rights is to select qualified members for the board of directors. Board of directors exercises the resolution made by general meeting of shareholders and fulfil the responsibilities authorized by general meeting of shareholder during adjournment. Among the system arrangements above-mentioned, board of directors is the most important. However, the efficiency of internal governing system of the whole company depends on board of directors. Combined with ownership structure analysis, this paper analyses the status quo of boards of directors in China and demonstrates every attribute of Chinese listed companies＇ board of directors.

Influence of Board Mechanisms on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures in Nigeria: A Study of Oil and Gas Sector of the Economy

The study examined the influence of board mechanisms on corporate social responsibility disclosure among oil and gas quoted companies in Nigeria for ten(10)years period(2012-2021).Board mechanisms variables of board independence,board size as well as board gender diversity were analyzed to determine their influence on corporate social responsibility disclosures.Data obtained from the financial statement of various sampled companies were suitably analyzed with the help of descriptive statistics,correlation as well as regression analysis by making use of E-view(9.0)econometric packages.Regression result reveals that board independence has significant and negative influence on corporate social responsibility disclosures while board size and board gender diversity have insignificant and negative influence on corporate social responsibility disclosures of various companies.The study therefore arrived at a conclusion that board independence on the board brings about improvement on corporate social responsibility disclosure among quoted oil and gas companies in Nigeria.

Board Independence and Internal Committees in the BRICs

To be successful in global markets, companies from the emerging countries need the approval of foreign investors and other stakeholders. In this regard, Brazil, Russia, India, and China （BRIC） have progressively strengthened their corporate governance rules to help their companies overcome the competitors from the old industrialized countries. Directors＇ non-executive qualification, independence, and professional expertise represent basic requirements for effective corporate governance, so they should be carefully considered to guarantee a proper board composition and an adequate establishment of internal committees in listed companies. The paper intends to compare the legislative and regulatory frameworks adopted by the four countries; then it aims at answering to the following research questions by means of an empirical investigation： Have BRIC companies appointed non-executive and independent board members？ What do BRIC companies do in order to assure an effective participation of non-executive and independent board members to corporate governance activities？ Have BRIC companies established internal committees？ The research examines the appointment of non-executive directors and independent directors to the boards of 100 BRIC leading firms, as well as their involvement in internal committees focused on matters requiring motivated and impartial opinions. Although the laws and recommendations seem to favor a general convergence of corporate governance principles among the four BRIC and towards the international best practices, some differences and peculiarities emerge from a firm-level perspective. Indeed, the Indian and the Chinese companies analyzed appear more inclined than the Brazilian and the Russian ones to reassure their international stakeholders about board independence and effective committees.

Concerns Affecting Behaviors of Independent Directors

This paper tries to find out whether some individual concerns will affect the behaviors of independent directors, specifically voting against proposals during the board meeting.We analyze career concern,compensation concern,reputation concern and term concern.The results show that individual director with longer career horizon,who is better compensated,with less board seats in other firms,and whose term is earlier than that of the board chairman is more likely to dissent.

Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality： The Experience of Listed Companies in Iran

This study examines the relationship among independent boards of directors, board size, managerial share ownership （MSO）, and earnings quality. The study of these relationships is controlled by firm size based on a sample of 114 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange （TSE） for the period from 2008 to 2010. The results demonstrate that there was an insignificant positive relationship among independent boards of directors, managerial ownership, and earnings quality. Subsequent analysis shows an insignificant negative relationship between board size and earnings quality. It also provides evidence of the negative relationship between firm size as a control variable and earnings quality. This can be attributed to the fact that large firms are claimed to be politically sensitive and thus have the incentive to lessen variances in changes in their reported earnings.

The effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia using a sample of 164 companies listed on the Main Board in Bursa Malaysia from 5 different industries （consumer, trading ＆ services, industrial, constructions and properties） within 2001 to 2005. Throughout, this study will use correlation and regression analysis in the SPSS software to determine the effects of corporate governance practices on Market Valuation. In analyzing firms＇ market valuation, we will use the Tobin＇s Q formula and for the corporate governance compliance, we will look at 4 criteria to compare with market valuation, which are （1） Board of Director＇s composition, （2） Board of Director＇s remuneration （salaries）, （3） Board of Director＇s training and development, （4） Board of Director＇s meeting. In order to determine the effects between the corporate governance compliance and market valuation, we will use regression analysis. Based on the correlation analysis, the first null hypothesis must be rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, in which dependent variable and independent variables are significantly correlated with BOD remuneration and BOD training availability. Overall, there is a significant relationship between Tobin＇s Q and independent variables （BOD remuneration and BOD training）. This study also recommends that for the company who did not comply with the code, they should follow the best practice because it will be a pivotal weapon in facing with the fierce competition in era globalization.